892
R444
joy

$B 14 734

JOY AND FREUDE

A Comparative Study
of the Linguistic Field of Pleasurable Emotions
in English and German

BY

KARL REUNING

SWARTHMORE COLLEGE

SWARTHMORE, PENNSYLVANIA
1941

DISTRIBUTED BY THE SWARTHMORE COLLEGE BOOKSTORE
SWARTHMORE, PENNSYLVANIA

JOY AND FREUDE

A Comparative Study
of the Linguistic Field of Pleasurable Emotions
in English and German

BY

KARL REUNING
SWARTHMORE COLLEGE

SWARTHMORE, PENNSYLVANIA
1941

DISTRIBUTED BY THE SWARTHMORE COLLEGE BOOKSTORE
SWARTHMORE, PENNSYLVANIA

S.C.
R144
c.2

Copyright, 1941

By Karl Reuning

UNIV. OF
CALIFORNIA

Printed by
Times and News Publishing Co.
Gettysburg, Pa., U. S. A.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

PREFACE vii

ABBREVIATIONS ix

CHAPTER I. THE FIELD THEORY 1

1. Introduction 1

(a) "Field" and "articulation" 1

Scientific term "field." — Linguistic field (Ipsen, Trier). — Humboldt's "Gliederung" and de Saussure's "articulation."

(b) Synchrony and diachrony 2

De Saussure's definition and Trier's criticism (langue, parole, langage). — Synchronic linguistics a separate discipline (Gray, Bloomfield). — Precedence of synchronic (or descriptive) linguistics emphasized by Marty in connection with figurative inner speech-form. — "Sein" and "Werden" (Schuchardt, Trier, de Saussure).

2. Trier's original basic principles 6

"Sinnbezirk" (word-texture). — Trier's original ideas essentially the same as de Saussure's. — Similar opinions expressed by Roethe, Wölfflin, and Havers.

3. Trier's controversies with Weisgerber and von Wartburg 8

Blending of synchrony and diachrony by von Wartburg (psychological), by Trier and Weisgerber (inhaltsgeschichtlich). — Weisgerber's research. — Von Wartburg's research. — Trier's dissatisfaction with von Wartburg.

4. Trier's theory and practice 13

Emphasis on "Geistesgeschichte" (examples). — Impossible "diachronic concept of re-articulation." — Basic soundness of practice in contrast with theory.

5. Other conceptions of the "field" 16

Porzig's elementary meaning-fields. — Ipsen's principle of morphological assimilation. — Sperber's psychological explanation. — Summary.

M1800820

6. Critique of Trier's conception of the word-texture 20
Jolles's objections (field and group; συνώνυμον). — Author's objections to Trier's internal and external boundaries. — Dornseiff's critique. — Gaps in vocabularies. — B. Q. Morgan's contribution.

7. Importance of research on living speech 25
Opinions of Jespersen, Deutschbein, and Dornseiff. — Bechtoldt's and Trier's failures. — Paul's emphasis on living speech. — "Umgangssprache."

8. Comparison of two modern languages 29
Context, word-complex, simple word (Ch. Bally, Marty, and others). — Importance of simples in comparisons (Humboldt, Leibniz).

9. The field of pleasurable emotions 33
The differences between languages in the emotional field. — Pascal's, Scheler's, and Voßler's influences. — Importance for literary research. — Necessary limitation. — Linguistic wealth in the field.

10. Method of approach to the problem 38
Psychological classifications. — Ideological dictionaries. — Basis for word-material and analysis.

CHAPTER II. DEPTH GRADATION 40

1. Introduction 40

(a) Method of analysis 40
Traditional methods. — "Sprachgeist." — Different surveys of the totality of the field. — Degree of accuracy.

(b) Psychological basis 42
Psychological definitions. — Klages on "Lust" and "Unlust." — Deep and shallow emotions. — Wundt's system. — W. Stern on affective depth. — Neglect by psychologists of study of linguistic systems.

(c) Klages' and Scheler's ideas 45
Emphasis on language. — Scheler's depth gradation.

2. Shallow words reaching into other fields (Group I) 47
3. Shallow words of pleasurable emotion (Group II) 49

4. Words covering a wide range of depth gradients (Group III) 52
5. Words expressing deep emotion (Group IV) 59
6. Summary 70

CHAPTER III. INTENSITY 75

1. Introduction 75

Definition of "intensity." — Linguistic means of expressing intensity.

2. Intensity in German 76

Emotional words of great intensity. — Intensification by adjectives and adverbs, compounds, two synonyms, word complexes, exclamatory sentence-pitch.

3. Intensity in English 79

Lack of intensity in general. — *Thrilled* and *hingerissen.* — Intensification by adjectives and adverbs, word complexes, progressive form, periphrastic *to do.*

4. Summary 87

CHAPTER IV. KINETIC AND STATIC REFERENCE 88

1. Introduction 88

The polarity kinetic-static. — Wundt's polarities. — W. Stern's classification. — Klages' classification. — W. Stern's four-field tables.

2. Kinetic words (Group I) 91
3. Strongly kinetic words (Group II) 92
4. Static words (Group III) 93
5. "Trance" words (Group IV) 94
6. Neutral words (Group V) 95
7. Summary 98

CHAPTER V. TEMPORAL REFERENCE 99

1. Introduction 99

Definition of temporal reference. — Anticipatory and retrospective feelings (tension and release). — Patterns of temporal occurrence. — Linguistic means of expressing temporal reference.

2. *Hope, Hoffnung,* and compounds ____ 101
3. Expectation and surprise ____ 101
4. *Vorfreude* and *Nachfreude* ____ 103
5. Pleasurable release of tension ____ 103
6. Forms of temporal occurrence ____ 104
7. Summary ____ 105

CHAPTER VI. DIRECTIONALITY AND NON-DIRECTIONALITY ____ 106

1. Introduction ____ 106
Definition of terms. — Scheler's intentionality.

2. Non-directional uses of
(a) adjectives and past participles ____ 110
(b) substantivized adjectives ____ 114
(c) adverbs and adverbial phrases ____ 114
(d) nouns ____ 114
(e) verbs ____ 117

3. Directional uses:
(a) Feeling of feelings ____ 118
(b) Response reactions ____ 119
(c) Mood-characters of objects ____ 124
(d) Sympathetic feelings ____ 126

4. Summary ____ 126
CHAPTER VII. SUMMARY ____ 128
BIBLIOGRAPHY ____ 134

PREFACE

This study of the field of pleasurable emotions in English and German is intended as a contribution to linguistic science. To a certain extent it had to be based on the works of scholars who have investigated, or at least discussed, linguistic fields. Since it deviates considerably from their approach to the problems involved, it seemed necessary to criticize their points of view. This accounts for the length of Chapter I, which may serve as an introduction to a new branch of semantic research, hitherto not attempted in English.

The linguistic material analyzed in this book has been compiled from two living languages (*Umgangssprachen*). In consideration of the far-reaching differences between the spoken and the written word, quotations from writers, especially from poets, had to be used with discrimination and are, for the most part, limited to special cases.

Critics may challenge some of the specific statements, as for instance the definitions of meanings. Let it be remembered that by their very nature words are *mirages linguistiques,* and that it is always possible to quarrel with a definition by producing examples of usage inconsistent with it. Others may disagree with the general plan of limiting the surveys of the FIELD to five basic dimensions. Theoretically the field may be examined from other aspects. Only those surveys have been made that promised to lay bare some essential differences between the two languages.

No excuses are made for mistakes and omissions. I accept full responsibility for the entire material that I have presented and for my method of analyzing it. One of my most difficult tasks was that of ascertaining what help leading psychologists had to offer in their publications, and I can only hope that no relevant facts have been overlooked.

The results which may have been achieved in this piece of research do not constitute a final solution of the linguistic problems raised by the field theory. From the outset it has been my aim to point out the complicated problems inherent in such a study and to stress their significance for further linguistic, psychological, and literary research.

Linguists and psychologists interested in this type of comparative semasiology will understand why passages from books and articles on

the subject have been quoted in the original languages. Some of the technical terms used by foreign authors, such as Trier's *ergliedern* and *ausgliedern,* are new and untranslatable. (Cf. also Ruckmick's remarks quoted in note 85.) Instead of making a choice between an unsatisfactory literal translation and a free and necessarily inaccurate version, I have presented the exact words of the original, especially when the subject is controversial and the foreign works are not readily available everywhere.

It is a great pleasure for me to acknowledge with gratitude the many helpful suggestions made by two close friends of long standing, Roland G. Kent of the University of Pennsylvania, and Edwin C. Roedder of the College of the City of New York, and by members of the faculty of Swarthmore College, especially Herbert Spiegelberg and the late Karl Duncker. (Cf. "On Pleasure, Emotion and Striving." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,* June, 1941. This article by K. Duncker was edited by Mary Henle and published after the completion of this book.) Moreover, I have greatly profited by extended discussions of both linguistic and psychological problems with Robert B. MacLeod of the Swarthmore Department of Psychology, since we have been teaching two interlocking seminars, his on "The Psychology of Language and Thinking" and mine on "General Linguistics." More than to any other one person I feel indebted to my former colleague and friend B. Q. Morgan of Stanford University, who has read the entire manuscript with close attention and given me the benefit of so many constructive criticisms that he has become much more than a mere critic.

Thanks are also due to my young friend and former student George Salomon for his painstaking reading of proofs.

Swarthmore, Pa. KARL REUNING

ABBREVIATIONS

Behaghel Fsch. *Festschrift für Otto Behaghel.*
Cr Crabb's *English Synonymes.*
DW Grimm, *Deutsches Wörterbuch.*
D. Wsch. Trier, *Der deutsche Wortschatz im Sinnbezirk des Verstandes.*
FW Funk and Wagnalls, *Desk Standard Dictionary.*
Krüger G. Krüger, *Synonymik und Wortgebrauch der englischen Sprache.*
NED Murray's *New English Dictionary (Oxford Dictionary).*
Paul H. Paul, *Deutsches Wörterbuch.*
Reum A. Reum, *A Dictionary of English Style.*
Ruckmick Ruckmick, *The Psychology of Feeling and Emotion.*
SSD C. J. Smith, *Synonyms discriminated.*
Streitberg Fsch. *Festschrift für Wilhelm Streitberg.*
Wb Webster's *New International Dictionary.*
adj. adjective
adv. adverb
n. noun
v. verb

Other abbreviations are easily understood. For the full titles of works mentioned on this page and in the footnotes see the Bibliography.

CHAPTER I

The Field Theory

> Kein Phänomen erklärt sich an und aus sich selbst; nur viele zusammen überschaut, methodisch geordnet, geben zuletzt etwas, was für Theorie gelten könnte.
>
> (Goethe, *Sprüche in Prosa*)

In harmony with modern trends in the sciences, such as configurational psychology for example, new approaches to linguistic problems have been recommended, especially by German and French scholars, during the last two decades. In many publications new methods have been discussed theoretically, but their practical application has not been tried very extensively. One of the most important recent contributions to progress in science in general and to research in semantics in particular is the concept of FIELDS. By way of comparison the use of this concept in a laboratory science, namely biology, may be mentioned. General J. C. Smuts reminds us of the error which we committed in

> narrowing down all concepts into hard, definite contours and wiping out their indefinite surrounding "fields." The concept of "fields" is absolutely necessary in order to get back to the fluid, plastic facts of nature. . . . Concepts were in logic as well as in science narrowed down to their most luminous points and the rest of their contents treated as non-existent. . . . One of the most salutary reforms in thought which could be effected would be for people to accustom themselves to the ideal of fields, and to look upon every concrete thing or person or even abstract idea as merely a center, surrounded by zones or aurae or spheres of the same nature as the center, only more attenuated and shading off into indefiniteness.[1]

The concept "Bedeutungsfeld" (field of meaning) was introduced into linguistic science by Gunther Ipsen in 1924.[2] Jost Trier's book *Der deutsche Wortschatz im Sinnbezirk des Verstandes, die Geschichte eines sprachlichen Feldes, Band I, Von den Anfängen bis zum Beginn*

---

[1] *Holism and Evolution*, pp. 1, 2, 16, 19. See also Ruckmick, *The Psychology of Feeling and Emotion*, p. 80.

[2] *Streitberg Fsch.*, p. 225.

des 13. Jahrhunderts, Heidelberg, 1931, is the first detailed historical study of such a field.[3]

Trier expresses his indebtedness to the Swiss scholar Ferdinand de Saussure and stresses the fact that it was he who first showed the way back to Wilhelm von Humboldt's concept of "Gliederung" (articulation).[4] On the other hand Trier is not satisfied with de Saussure's attempt at a solution of the problems of articulation, and since his criticism involves some basic principles of linguistic science the matter should be re-examined.

De Saussure distinguishes and treats separately two different linguistic sciences, which he calls *linguistique synchronique* and *linguistique diachronique.* His definitions seem quite clear and acceptable:

> La linguistique synchronique s'occupera des rapports logiques et psychologiques reliant des termes coexistants et formant système, tels qu'ils sont aperçus par la même conscience collective. La linguistique diachronique étudiera au contraire les rapports reliant des termes successifs non aperçus par une même conscience collective, et qui se substituent les uns aux autres sans former système entre eux.[5]

Trier questions this strict and clear-cut differentiation between synchronic and diachronic linguistics, or descriptive and historical language study. He interprets de Saussure's statement as follows: "Gliederung und Ganzheit ist Gegenstand nur der linguistique synchronique. Linguistique diachronique verfolgt nur einzelne Linien, deren Berührung mit den Tatsachen der linguistique synchronique rein punkthaft und

---

[3] Trier's work was continued in the following dissertations:
Theophora Schneider, *Der intellektuelle Wortschatz Meister Eckeharts.* Hildegardis Hüsgen, *Das Intellektualfeld in der deutschen Arkadia und in ihrem englischen Vorbild.* Maria Trelle, *Zwei Feldgefüge im Sinnbezirk des Verstandes bei Philipp von Zesen.* Heinrich Bechtoldt, *Der französische Wortschatz im Sinnbezirk des Verstandes.* Paul Wahmann, *Der althochdeutsche Wortschatz im Bereich der Gnade, Gunst und Liebe.* Hermann Fischer, *Der intellektuelle Wortschatz im Deutschen und Französischen untersucht an Gerzans und Zesens "Sofonisbe."*
For further bibliographical references see: Jost Trier, *Behaghel Fsch.* (1934), 173-200. Fritz Stroh, *ibid.,* pp. 229-258. Otto Springer, *Germanic Review,* XIII, 159-174.

[4] *Cours de linguistique générale.—Behaghel Fsch.* (1934), 174 ff. Also Iordan in *Streitberg Fsch.,* pp. 608 ff.
Concerning de Saussure see Ipsen, *Sprachphilosophie der Gegenwart.* Also Ipsen in *Zeitschrift f. Deutschkunde,* XXXXVI, 1-18. W. von Humboldt, VII, 1 ff., 54, 60, 176, 190; IV, 17, 20, 21.

[5] *Op. cit.,* p. 140.

bloß auslösend ist."[6] According to Trier, this conception is stimulating and useful, but at the same time a linguistic monstrosity ("sprachwissenschaftliche Ungeheuerlichkeit"). He thinks that it destroys the unity of our object, language, "die nun einmal doch, ob im Werden oder im Sein ergriffen, die e i n e Sprache ist und bleibt." While *ergriffen* is strictly untranslatable (*seized, grasped, studied, looked upon?*), this can mean only: Language remains the same, whether taken in its change or in its persistence (static condition). This sentence, though confusing in its sweeping generality, may constitute a correct statement, if we replace the term "Sprache" by de Saussure's "langage, un phénomène total." Nothing but hopeless confusion can be gained by elimination of distinctions essential for clearness of thought as well as for methods of research. It is not within the province of the linguist, nor is it humanly possible, to concern oneself with all the facts pertaining to an object such as "language" at one and the same time. One basic and indispensable distinction is that of "parole" and "langue" (*le langage moins la parole*). It is the latter which forms the basis of de Saussure's theoretical as well as practical studies. Merely for the sake of clarity and method he investigates "la langue" from the two different viewpoints of synchrony and diachrony, the fundamental principles of which Trier has either failed to understand or has confused, beclouding the issue in abstruse language.

The need for a separate discipline of synchronic linguistics has never been seriously challenged, though in the past it has often been sorely neglected. Only recently Louis H. Gray[7] wrote quite unmistakably:

> Study of language may be either *synchronic* or *diachronic*. Synchronic grammar deals with a language at a given period in its development; . . . It is not only possible but necessary, wherever data permit, to have a purely presentational grammar of a given language at a given stage. . . . A true diachronic grammar can be constructed only on the foundation of a series of synchronic grammars.

Leonard Bloomfield[8] calls Hermann Paul's neglect of descriptive language study a "fault," reviews and stresses the importance of works of that nature, mentioning incidentally that Franz Nikolaus Finck "analyzed descriptively eight unrelated languages" and "insisted upon

---

[6] *Behaghel Fsch.* (1934), 176.
[7] *Foundations of Language,* pp. 23 f., 15 ff.
[8] *Language,* pp. 16-20.

descriptive study as a basis for both historical research and philosophical generalization," and emphasizes what sounds like a warning to Trier:

> All historical study of language is based upon the comparison of two or more sets of descriptive data. It can be only as accurate and only as complete as these data permit it to be. In order to describe a language one needs no historical knowledge whatever; in fact, the observer who allows such knowledge to affect his description, is bound to distort his data. Our descriptions must be unprejudiced, if they are to give a sound basis for comparative work.

It is unnecessary as well as impossible within the scope of this introduction to quote all the scholars who have discussed the problems of descriptive linguistics.[9] However, mention should be made of Marty's contributions to the discussions of this question. For perfectly good reasons he reminds us of the second of Descartes' four basic rules: "de diviser chacune des difficultés que j'examinerais en autant de parcelles qu'il se pourrait, et qu'il serait requis pour les mieux résoudre."[10] In its application to linguistics in general and to Marty's *Bedeutungslehre* in particular this rule requires us to separate descriptive from genetic questions.[11] Descriptive investigation must precede genetic research, and in special pieces of research the material must be limited accordingly. E.g., in regard to the sphere of *figurative inner speech-form,* there is even in one state of language such an abundance of phenomena that the total problem has to be resolved into parts and simple questions have to be treated before the more complicated ones. Thus

---

[9] E.g. see Jespersen, *Philosophy of Grammar,* pp. 30 f.
Schuchardt-Brevier, pp. 329 ff. (Criticism of de Saussure.)
Deutschlein, *System der neuengl. Syntax,* Vorwort and p. 8 (supporting Husserl's demand for a 'reine and apriorische Grammatik").
Kalepky, *Neuaufbau der Grammatik,* pp. VII ff.: "Das Buch...ist dazu bestimmt, . . . die Grundlegung für eine wissenschaftliche Sprachbeschreibung zu liefern, deren Existenzberechtigung—neben der historischen und psychologisch-genetischen Betrachtung—auf der vielfach verkannten Tatsache beruht, daß jede Sprache in jedem beliebigen Zeitpunkte ihres Bestehens, ganz unabhängig von ihrem Werden und Wandeln, einen in sich fest geschlossenen, in den Wechselbeziehungen seiner Teile zueinander sowie zu einem Ganzen, dem des menschlichen Körpers und Geistes ähnlichen Organismus darstellt."
Ries, *Was ist Syntax?,* p. 175.
Iordan in *Streitberg Fsch.,* p. 610, note.

[10] Descartes, *Discours de la méthode,* p. 39.

[11] Marty, *Über Wert und Methode einer beschreibenden Bedeutungslehre,* p. 28. See also pp. 16-21.
The general confusion of the terms "genetic" and "historical" should be avoided. H. Paul's "historische Untersuchungen" actually include current evolutionary or genetic changes.

we should start by investigating these phenomena in a linguistic state which is subject to our own experience, and which promises results on the basis of homogeneous material; therefore we should choose a horizontal section close to the present time. Above all, in descriptive research, cases must be selected which reveal how *figurative inner speech-forms* actually work, and how they enter into the consciousness of the speaker and the hearer, not merely how they may be understood historically. Synonyms allow us to recognize which *figurative inner speech-forms* are used for one "meaning," and equivocations, how one *figurative inner speech-form* may serve to give rise to different meanings. Furthermore, Marty stresses the importance of dealing separately with different types of speech or of style and with different categories of meanings.[12]

In spite of all that has been said in justification of descriptive research, Trier's and Schuchardt's[13] criticism of de Saussure should not be taken lightly. The latter says "Ruhe und Bewegung . . . bilden wie überhaupt so bei der Sprache keinen Gegensatz; nur die Bewegung ist wirklich, nur die Ruhe ist wahrnehmbar," and the former: ". . . das Werden kann aus der Sprache nicht weggedacht werden; das hieße den Begriff Sprache verfälschen." Schuchardt's criticism may easily be contradicted by other statements of his own.[14] Both he and Trier have overlooked the fact that de Saussure does not deny at all continual change in language:

> Un état absolu se définit par l'absence de changements, et comme malgré tout la langue se transforme, si peu que ce soit, étudier un état de langue revient pratiquement à négliger les changements peu importants, de même que les mathématiciens négligent les quantités infinitésimales dans certaines opérations, telles que le calcul des logarithmes.[15]

---

[12] Funke, *Innere Sprachform,* pp. 106 ff. Funke mentions (p. 20) that Marty has repeatedly emphasized the need for a clear differentiation of descriptive and genetic viewpoints in the field of form as well as in that of meaning, and that he has frequently pointed out errors caused by confusion or neglect of the two viewpoints. Funke then finds the same basic error in W. Horn's *Sprachkörper und Sprachfunktion:* ". . . so scheinen mir W. Horns Ausführungen . . . ebenfalls von vorerwähntem Fehler nicht frei zu sein, indem unter 'Funktion' bald genetische Eigentümlichkeiten, bald deskriptive, und zwar solche der figürlichen inneren Sprachform oder der Bedeutung verstanden werden. . . ."
Concerning the term *Inner Form* see W. Leopold in *Language,* V, 254 ff.

[13] *Brevier,* pp. 329 ff.

[14] *Brevier,* pp. 328, 366, et al.

[15] *Op. cit.,* p. 142.

If then de Saussure defines *un état de langue* (the static condition of language) not as "un point," but "un espace de temps plus ou moins long pendant lequel la somme des modifications survenues est minime," this definition of the basis of his linguistique synchronique should prevent Trier from reproaching de Saussure with a "Gewaltlösung." The clear distinction between static and dynamic conditions, between *Sein* and *Werden,* is theoretically sound in any science, and unavoidable in practice. Trier himself bears witness to this in his own research. Had he, in theory as well as practice, heeded this distinction and Schuchardt's axiom "Nur die Ruhe ist wahrnehmbar," a good deal of verbal obscurity and dispute would have been eliminated.

De Saussure's inherently logical arguments notwithstanding, Trier's point of view calls for further examination in some detail. First of all let us see what Trier means by "linguistic field" (*sprachliches Feld* or *Sinnbezirk*). In the title of his book he uses these two German expressions instead of Ipsen's misnomer "Bedeutungsfeld."[16] De Saussure had defined "articulation" as "la subdivision de la chaîne des significations en unités significatives; c'est dans ce sens qu'on dit en allemand *gegliederte Sprache*."[17] According to Trier, no word which is pronounced is as isolated in the consciousness of speaker and hearer as one might assume by reason of its phonetic isolation (*lautliche Vereinsamung!*). Not only does it evoke the opposite meaning, but beyond this there emerges an abundance of other words that are closer or remoter neighbors of it. They are its conceptual relatives. They form with each other and in conjunction with the word which was uttered an articulated whole, a *texture,*[18] which one may call "*Wortfeld* oder *sprachliches Zeichenfeld.*" This *word-field,* in constituting a field of linguistic signs, is associated with a more or less compact "Begriffskomplex" (*conceptual field*), the inner partitioning of which is represented in the *articulated texture* of the sign-field (*im gegliederten Gefüge des Zeichenfeldes*). In other words, such a field is made up of a conceptually homogeneous section of the vocabulary. The individual words form—*mosaic-like*—the word-field (*das Wortfeld, den Wortmantel, die Wortdecke*), and they set up—by the purport of their

[16] See note 2.

[17] *Op. cit.,* p. 26. Trier's reference (*D.Wsch.,* p. 11 note) to H. F. J. Junker's concept of *Struktur* is unjustified because Junker means something else. In the same note he also refers to C. Bally, whose ideas will be discussed later.

[18] See *D.Wsch.,* p. 1. *Texture* is a translation of *Gefüge.* Later on *Gefüge* will also be translated by *complex* in another meaning. See note 40.

number and stratification—boundary lines within the conceptual totality (*Begriffsblock*).[19]

Trier then likens the single word to a stone in the great mosaic of the word-field. Which part of the conceptual totality it represents as a linguistic sign is determined by its place in the sign-field. The meaning of the word is dependent on the meaning of its conceptual neighbors. He does not overlook the fact that a word pronounced in a sentence obtains its real meaning through the context of the sentence. But this is not all, he claims; there is a second factor which gives life to the "dead" single word: the totality of the conceptual field that is present in the speaker's and the hearer's minds. Beyond the sentence spoken by an individual exists the reality of the linguistic system of signs with its many conceptual fields. Incidentally, this system of signs would correspond to what de Saussure defines as "langue," and consequently language in general would be not only *energeia* (Tätigkeit), but also *ergon* (Werk).

The next natural result of Trier's argumentation is the assertion that the single word can be understood and has meaning only within the totality and because of the presence of the totality of a field. If this is correct the fields must be the basis for practical semantic research.

The fundamental principles governing such research are quite acceptable in their original formulation as presented by Trier in his book.[20] Whether his definition of the field should be modified or not, whether it should be called *field* or something else, these are questions that will be considered later on. Older methods of research in semantics cannot and should not be dispensed with, but the concept of "fields" is here to stay as one axiomatic approach to a solution of highly complicated linguistic problems in general.

Trier's original argumentation is briefly as follows: The articulation or structure of fields is perceptible only in a static condition of

---

[19] Trier borrowed the metaphorical use of *mosaic-like* from G. Ipsen: ". . . die Eigenwörter stehn in einer Sprache nie allein, sondern sind eingeordnet in Bedeutungsgruppen . . . , deren gegenständlicher Sinngehalt mit anderen Sinngehalten verknüpft ist. Diese Verknüpfung aber ist . . . so, daß die ganze Gruppe ein 'Bedeutungsfeld' absteckt, das in sich gegliedert ist; wie in einem Mosaik fügt sich hier Wort an Wort, jedes anders umrissen, doch so, daß die Konturen aneinanderpassen und alle zusammen in einer Sinneinheit höherer Ordnung auf-, nicht in einer faulen Abstraktion untergehen" (*Streitberg Fschr.*, p. 225). This seems to have caused a good deal of misunderstanding about the nature of the field. For further details on Trier's conception of field, see especially *D.Wsch.*, pp. 1-10. I have tried to give a simplified presentation of it.

[20] See *D.Wsch.*, pp. 10 ff.

language (*im reinen Sein eines ruhenden oder als ruhend gedachten Sprachzustandes*). "History" is made possible only as "komparative Statik," i.e. a number of horizontal sections must be made and then compared with each other. In other words, the meanings and the distribution of the words in a field are studied and described as they appear today or A. D. 1200, A. D. 1300, etc., and then these successive static conditions are compared. The greater the density of successive horizontal sections, the higher is the degree of accuracy in comparing, the nearer we get to the reality of change. Obviously there is no essential difference between these ideas and those of de Saussure, apart from the fact that the Swiss scholar has never advocated or made a comparison of two or more successive totalities of a field.

Trier is not the only one who has tried to combine diachronic and synchronic linguistics, though nobody else has ever called the solid foundation, laid by de Saussure and actually accepted by Trier, a "Gewaltlösung" or "Ungeheuerlichkeit." The coordination of the descriptive and genetic methods, as a matter of fact, is nothing new in linguistics in general. E.g., G. Roethe said: "Wir brauchen Beobachtungen, die, sei es auch für ein engstes Thema, weite Räume und Zeiten vergleichend durchmessen." Speaking of the struggle for existence among competitive words, Wölfflin made an assertion which sounds quite modern: "Die Behandlung jedes einzelnen Wortes bleibt Stückwerk, solange nicht die Synonyma, die gleichzeitig nebeneinander leben oder zeitlich nacheinander auftauchen, in die Darstellung hereingezogen werden." And W. Havers assures us that this is equally true in syntax.[21]

Two main schools of thought seem to have emerged in semantics in recent years through the tendency to blend synchrony with diachrony. One of them is represented by W. von Wartburg and is essentially *psychological*. The title of his publication is significant: "*Das Ineinandergreifen von deskriptiver und historischer Sprachwissenschaft.*"[22]

---

[21] Roethe in Grimm, *Deutsche Grammatik*, IV, p. XXX.
Wölfflin in *Archiv f. lat. Lexikographie und Gram.*, II, 1.
Havers, *Handbuch der erklärenden Syntax*, p. 7.

[22] In *Berichte . . . der Sächs. Akad.* (See Bibliography.)
See also Review by Frings in *Zeitschrift f. Deutschkunde*, XLVI, 359-361. Also v. Wartburg in *Literaturblatt*, 1932, 142 ff. (This is a reply [*Entgegnung*] by v. Wartburg to Spitzer's Review of the article "Das Ineinandergreifen . . .")
W. v. Wartburg in *Neue Jahrbücher f. Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung*, VII, 231: "Vor allem müssen wir unseren Blick stets wieder richten auf die Symbiose der Wörter. Die Wörter leben nicht einfach jedes sein Einzeldasein dahin. Die kleinste Veränderung, die geringste Neuerung in der Abschattierung der Bedeutung hat sofort ihre Wirkung auf die daneben lebenden Wörter."

The other is concerned with the history of conceptions (*begriffsgeschichtliche oder inhaltsgeschichtliche Richtung*), and its representatives are Trier himself and Weisgerber. There are hardly any essential differences between these two scholars in their general theories, though Trier originally insisted on calling his research "Bezeichnungsgeschichte." In the light of what he said later his terminological quarrel with Weisgerber seems futile. By using terms such as "Feldgliederung, Feldgliederungswandel, Umgliederung," Trier merely places more emphasis on the articulation of the field, a matter which Weisgerber certainly has not overlooked.[23]

One of the outstanding pieces of research, which might serve as a model for others, is Weisgerber's article on adjectival and verbal comprehension (*Auffassung*) of visual perceptions. His clear understanding of the "field" problem is also revealed in his discussion of designations for kinship (*System unserer Verwandtschaftswörter*).[24]

---

[23] See Trier, *D.Wsch.*, p. 18, note. Also Trier in *Behaghel Fsch.* (1934), 176 ff.

[24] Cf. the following publications by Leo Weisgerber; exact references are given in the Bibliography:

Adjektivische und verbale Auffassung der Gesichtsempfindungen.

Das Problem der inneren Sprachform und seine Bedeutung für die deutsche Sprache.

Die Bedeutungslehre—ein Irrweg der Sprachwissenschaft? (Discussion of "Verwandtschaftswörter" pp. 179 ff.)

Die Stellung der Sprache im Aufbau der Gesamtkultur.

Further references in *Behaghel Fsch.* (1934), 257 f.

See also Weisgerber, *Sprachvergleichung und Psychologie,* p. 201: "Für jedes sprachliche 'Feld' kehrt die Problemstellung wieder: Wie verbinden sich in den Denkmitteln, die eine Sprache zur Bewältigung eines bestimmten Lebensgebietes besitzt, Allgemein-Menschliches, 'Wirklichkeitsgemäßes' und sprachlich Gestaltetes, aus den Gegebenheiten einer bestimmten Menschengruppe, bestimmter historischer Bindungen, in einem bestimmten Sprachbau angelegter Möglichkeiten Erwachsenes. Dies ist ja die Fragestellung, auf die W. von Humboldt die Sprachvergleichung als Wissenschaft gründete in seiner Akademieabhandlung über das vergleichende Sprachstudium, in der es heißt: 'Durch die gegenseitige Abhängigkeit des Gedankens und des Wortes voneinander leuchtet es klar ein, daß die Sprachen nicht eigentlich Mittel sind, die schon erkannte Wahrheit darzustellen, sondern weit mehr, die vorher unerkannte zu entdecken. Ihre Verschiedenheit ist nicht eine von Schällen und Zeichen, sondern eine Verschiedenheit der Weltansichten selbst. Hierin ist der Grund und der letzte Zweck aller Sprachuntersuchung enthalten. Die Summe des Erkennbaren liegt, als das von dem menschlichen Geiste zu bearbeitende Feld, zwischen allen Sprachen und unabhängig von ihnen in der Mitte.'"

In his discussion of designations for kinship Weisgerber also draws our attention to the fact that H. Hirt arranged words in conceptual groups in order to investigate their origin, neglecting, however, the changes in the conceptual structure of language. See *German.-roman. Monatsschrift,* XV, 181, note 1.

The application of Weisgerber's ideas to psychology seems to be of major importance. Psychology must not only consider that the choice of the objects of our thinking is linguistically conditioned, but also reckon with the linguistic

Moreover, it seems quite important to point out that Weisgerber has clearly stated what he means by *sprachwissenschaftliche Begriffslehre:* Its task is to investigate the conceptual stock (*Begriffsschatz*) of individual languages, its peculiarities and its changes in descriptive, comparative, and historical research. After all, language serves the intellectual comprehension of the world (*intellektuelle Weltauffassung*) more than anything else. It is the only means which our intellect has at its command for this purpose.

Furthermore Weisgerber should receive credit for stating clearly a fact which does not seem to be quite clear to Trier: Linguistic conceptions are quite different from those of logic. Not only are they —this he has stressed repeatedly—not universally valid (*nicht allgemeingültig*), but moreover definitely conditioned by subjective factors, also those of an emotional kind. De Saussure too stresses the obvious fact that linguistic conceptions are not at all universally valid. E.g., "Si les mots étaient chargés de représenter des concepts donnés d'avance, ils auraient chacun, d'une langue à l'autre, des correspondants exacts pour le sens; or il n'en est pas ainsi."[25] According to Weisgerber's definition linguistic conceptions are working formulas (*Arbeitsformeln*), into which have been gathered the experiences of thousands of years, in which a speech community has included the differentiations important for it, and by which, of course, non-intellectual forces too are vigorously expressed. However, it should not be forgotten that the conceptions of logic are also linguistically conditioned, just like ordinary conceptions: "Sie sind nur logisch zu fassen gesucht."[26]

influence upon the type of resulting experiences. Cf. Goethe: "Niemand hört als was er weiß, niemand vernimmt, als was er empfinden, imaginieren und denken kann." (Weisgerber, *Stellung der Sprache im Aufbau der Gesamtkultur,* I, 60 ff.)

[25] *Cours de linguistique générale,* p. 161 et al.

[26] *German.-roman. Monatsschrift,* XV, 178.

A more detailed presentation of Weisgerber's ideas on this problem is found in *Stellung der Sprache im Aufbau der Gesamtkultur,* I, 83 ff.

Cf. also Erdmann, *Die Bedeutung des Wortes,* especially pp. 4 ff., 105 ff.

Carnoy, *La science du mot,* p. 43.

Urban, *Language and Reality,* especially pp. 141 ff., 279 ff.

Schmidt-Rohr, *Mutter Sprache,* p. 39. Schmidt-Rohr discusses the *wissenschaftliche Begriff.* This concept is an ideal of the greatest importance. Considering the part which conceptions play in the whole of language, we must realize that it is essential for the progress of creative research that this ideal should never be fully attained. The differentiation of pure conceptions and linguistic conceptions is not based on principle; it is useful, but deceptive. Only lower degrees of arbitrariness, of ambiguity (*Vieldeutigkeit*), are involved in scientific conceptions (*wissenschaftliche Begriffe*). A more or less rigid agreement has been reached concerning the use of such conceptions. An absolute delineation of their range (*Begriffsumfang*) is impossible. Were the ideal reached this would mean the end of research.

Trier succeeds in making clear his own point of view by contrasting it with that of W. von Wartburg, and illustrating it with an example which is worth repeating in a condensed form.[27] Von Wartburg would argue as follows:

The Southern French dialects have inherited *cattus* 'cat' and *gallus* 'rooster.' Let us call this *condition A,* object of synchronic linguistics. When in the Gascon dialect Latin *ll* through regular sound change became *t* (diachronic linguistics), a *condition B* (synchronic linguistics) was threatening, where *gat*<*cattus* and **gat*<*gallus* could no longer be distinguished. Such a *condition B* would be quite inadequate, considering the realities calling for expression. This emergency condition (synchronic linguistics) had to be overcome by changes (diachronic linguistics), and finally a new and sensible order (synchronic linguistics) had to be reached. Now there had been for a long time more or less vulgar or comic satellite words for 'rooster' around the word *gallus,* one of them being *vicarius.* It is the task of synchronic linguistics to establish the existence of such words in *condition B.* To find out how they emerged around *gallus* as playful inventions, fraught with wit and humor, prior to *condition B,* is the task of diachronic linguistics. Their presence in *condition B* removes the state of emergency *B; bigey* (<*vicarius*) replaces **gat* (<*gallus*), which perishes because of its homonymy. "Die Diachronie A - B hat das Mittel bereitgelegt, mit dem die in der Synchronie vorhandene Spannung gelöst werden kann." In other words, a *condition C* has been reached in which the equilibrium is exactly the same as during *condition A,* prior to that fatal sound change of Latin *ll* to Gascon *t.*

Trier then claims that von Wartburg has disproved de Saussure's hypothesis of two separate linguistic sciences. I fail to see the validity of this contention. In the presentation of the *cattus-gallus* example

---

[27] *Behaghel Fsch.* (1934), 177 ff.

In *Language,* pp. 396-8, Bloomfield discusses this classical instance: Gilliéron's explanation of the disappearance of *gallus* in SW. France. Concerning the rôle played by homonymy, see *ibid.,* p. 398 and *Behaghel Fsch.* (1934), 180.

Though Gilliéron's example is apparently convincing, as a matter of principle operation with starred forms like **gat* must be regarded as dangerous. Conjectural hypotheses like that of the semantic change of *vicarious* > *bigey* 'deputy, proxy, vicar' to 'farm-helper' to 'rooster' should be corroborated by the results of the research method first recommended in J. Stöcklein's *Bedeutungswandel der Wörter.* He pointed out that changes of meaning do not occur in the isolated word, but rather in the word as part of the context. This was further emphasized on the basis of carefully collected material and with excellent results by Hans Sperber, *Einführung in die Bedeutungslehre.*

practically every statement is clearly assigned to either *synchronic* or to *diachronic linguistics,* and Trier does not seem to realize that de Saussure uses similar examples and a similar method in order to prove his point of view.[28]

Though he agrees with von Wartburg's methods, Trier is not at all satisfied with the aims of this type of research. His own investigations are directed toward the organization or articulation of the *Sprachinhalt,* the conceptual content of language. Keeping that aim in mind, he would have to look upon such processes as are described in the *gallus* example, as peculiarly unhistorical. "Quite a few things are happening, as it were; at the end, however, nothing has happened." Of course as long as we are merely concerned with the word material, with the words *gallus* and *vicarius,* a change is evident. The animal 'rooster' changes its name, and the word *gallus* perishes. Another word (or sign) now designates something else, has changed its "meaning." The *Sprachinhalt,* however, has not changed at all. Nothing has happened to the articulation of the vocabulary or to the conceptual texture. The small sector of reality, *das Stück Weltbild,* which had been disclosed in the *linguistic condition A* with *cattus* and *gallus* is exactly the same as in *condition C* with *gat* and *bigey.*

Trier can see a real and historically significant event or change only when it affects the conceptual articulation, "wo in der Art der sprachgegebenen Ausgliederung, Darstellung und Aufschließung des Weltinhaltes eine Änderung vor sich geht," in other words, when the speech community in *C* has learned something different from what it knew in *A.* Presumably every linguist and psychologist will agree with Trier in emphasizing such significant events as may happen and actually have happened in the texture of the conceptual totality of word-fields designating kinship or the color scale. With regard to changes in the texture of the vocabulary concerned with man, his spiritual qualities and his mental powers, Trier blames linguistic science for having disregarded this *geistesgeschichtliche* problem and the fact that conceptions in this field are subject to change. His criticism of linguists in this respect is not quite justified, and I consider it unnecessary to illustrate by

---

[28] *Cours de linguistique générale,* pp. 119 ff.: "L'opposition entre les deux points de vue—synchronique et diachronique—est absolue et ne souffre pas de compromis. Quelques faits nous montreront en quoi consiste cette différence et pourquoi elle est irréductible. . . ."

Cf. also Carnoy's distinction in his book *La science du mot* between *sémantique statique* (chapt. 1-11) and *sémantique dynamique* (chapt. 11-23).

quotations the extent to which linguists and philosophers are aware of conceptual changes.[29]

It would not be fair to Trier to interrupt the presentation of his case at this point, and therefore his argumentation must be followed further.[30] When words like *klug* and *gescheit* assert themselves successfully against *weise,* and at the same time claim a part of the sphere of *weise,* and when through their sheer existence they provide the older word *weise* with a color which it did not formerly possess; when *kunst* restricts the range of *list* and thereby puts an end to a condition in which craftiness (*dolositas*) was not linguistically separated from the loftiest spheres of the spirit—all these semantic changes are essentially different from those observed in the *rooster-cat* example. While the latter type of changes, being of a physiological and psychological nature, may occur at any time in any language, the former is closely bound up with spiritual situations and shifts in definite historical periods. These changes in the conceptual texture are most illuminating with regard to the innermost character or the *Wesen* of just those periods. There came a time when *Weisheit* ceased to embrace the *Künste,* and in consequence thereof the word-texture in this field ceased to represent a condition in which all worldly endeavors for knowledge were directed toward a spiritual aim in the beyond. As the words *Wissenschaft, Kunst, Bildung* come to a definite understanding with one another (*sich in einer bestimmten Weise auseinandersetzen*), it is impossible to ascertain at what particular point some impulse started to work; Trier, however, claims that he can tell where the texture as a totality becomes re-articulated (*wo das Gefüge als Ganzheit sich umgliedert*)! The world of conceptual content (*die inhaltliche Welt*) disclosed in the vocabulary of a speech community looks different after such re-articulation. Hardly anybody, I think, would question the last statement, or the following: Man has not always known what *klug* is. It makes a difference whether my praise of man's intellect is based on an acquaint-

[29] Trier is not consistent, for elsewhere, e.g., *Behaghel Fsch.* (1934), 184, he refers to Vilhelm Grundtvig, Porzig, Ipsen, and Weisgerber, who have all discussed the principles of *Sprachinhaltsforschung.* Since von Wartburg's work, while of a different type, has a value of its own, I do not see why Trier should call all methods but his own inadequate. "Die Probleme der Bedeutungslehre sind so mannigfaltig und so verwickelt, daß viele Wege zu ihrer Lösung möglich und nötig sind" (Springer, *Germanic Review,* XIII, 174).

Cf. also Rheinfelder's appreciation of Trier's real contribution to research in *Literaturblatt,* LX, 119.

[30] The following paragraph is based on publications previously quoted and on Jost Trier, *Das sprachliche Feld, eine Auseinandersetzung.*

ance with only such words as are overweighted, because of their position in the field, on the side of understanding knowledge (*wissendes Verstehen*), or on other words which emphasize inborn talent as independent of acquired knowledge.

Trier's basic theories are quite reasonable and acceptable, and it is unfortunate that he goes out of his way to set up distinctions between his views and those of de Saussure, which do not really exist. The following quotations may serve as a clear and precise summary:

Das Wort *ergliedert* sich aus dem Ganzen des gebauten, gegliederten Wortschatzes, und umgekehrt *gliedert* sich der Wortschatz *aus* in die einzelnen Worte.

Ein Wort ergliedert sich aus nächst übergeordnetem kleinerem Teilganzen, dieses wieder aus größerem Teilganzen und dieses aus noch größeren.

Felder sind die zwischen den Einzelworten und dem Wortschatzganzen lebendigen sprachlichen Wirklichkeiten, die als Teilganze mit dem Wort das Merkmal gemeinsam haben, daß sie sich ergliedern, mit dem Wortschatz hingegen, dass sie sich ausgliedern. Die Ordnungshöhe ist dabei gleichgültig.[31]

Moreover, Humboldt's influence is felt in Trier's remarks about the different articulations in different languages. In his own research he is concerned with successive periods of the same language, but two of his students, H. Hüsgen and Hermann Fischer, have investigated the intellectual field in a comparison of different languages.[32]

Since Trier insists on attacking the separation of synchronic from diachronic phenomena, his own solution of this problem must be scrutinized. He reaches a kind of climax in the following statement:

. . . das von der Sprache aufgeschlossene Wirklichkeitsbild macht Veränderungen durch. Es ist in sich einheitlich; Werden und Sein sind in ihrem Wesen gleichgeordnet, von einem sinnfremden Anstoß und seiner Auslösewirkung ist nicht die Rede; die Vorgänge in der diachronischen Senkrechten selbst sind schon geistiger Art und betreffen schon das Ganze des gegliederten Gefüges, nicht bloß auslösend irgendeinen Punkt. Geistiger Art sind diese Vorgänge und deshalb berühren sie den Inhalt, deshalb sind sie geschichtlich, deshalb sind sie in sich einheitlich, deshalb widerstreben sie mechanischen Bildern. Innere Entscheidungen der Sprachgemeinschaft sprechen sich in ihnen aus.[33]

[31] *Neue Jahrbücher f. Wiss. und Jugenbildung,* X, 429 f.

[32] See note 3.
Trier's recent article "Giebel" is a noteworthy study in a field other than intellectual. (See Bibliography.)

[33] *Behaghel Fsch.* (1934), 183.

The application of these ideas to research in the history of the intellectual field has uncomfortable, but—in Trier's opinion—unavoidable consequences. He summarizes them in the diachronic concept of *re-articulation* (*Umgliederung*). Thus the intelligible articulation of a static condition is replaced by the unintelligible re-articulation of change. In the light of what has been stated before concerning the "reality" of change and the "perceptibility" of static conditions, this is not feasible.

How has Trier handled the situation in practice? The answer is simple enough: von Wartburg's "sinnfremder Anstoß" (e.g. the "mechanical" sound change of *ll* to *t*, an undeniable fact) is replaced by spiritual impulses (*geistiger Art sind diese Vorgänge*), which Trier has observed and stated in detail on the basis of a collection of material praiseworthy for its completeness.

Since criticism directed against Trier has been either superficial or vaguely general, his failure to merge synchrony and diachrony into diachronic re-articulation may be illustrated by a few quotations, which have been selected almost at random. After having presented all his material up to and including Notker, he examines it in retrospect on the basis of Notker's usage, i.e., of a synchrony. First he describes Notker's terminology briefly in its totality. Then he mentions among other interesting items the fact that Notker does not use the customary former translation OHG *spâhi(da)* = *sapientia:*

> Das Ausscheiden von *spâhi(da)*, dessen Stellung im Gesamtgefüge bisher von zentraler Wichtigkeit gewesen ist, muß sich in eingreifenden Veränderungen im Wortfelde der Accidentia darstellen. In erster Linie in den Worten, die nunmehr das eng zusammengehörige Paar *sapientia* und *prudentia* verdeutschen. . . .[84]

Thus the "Ausscheiden" is the impulse (diachronic linguistics), the "Stellung im Gesamtgefüge" concerns a former static condition (synchronic linguistics), etc. Obviously Trier clearly separates diachrony from synchrony in this instance.

Here is another example of Trier's actual comparative method:

> Nach diesem Rückblick aufs Ahd. von Notker aus nehmen wir unsern Standpunkt außerhalb des Ahd., im Heliand und der as. Genesis, um von dort aus das Gesamtbild der ahd. Terminologie noch einmal zu überschauen, und vielleicht Besonderheiten des Ahd. vom gemeindeutschen Grunde sich abheben zu sehen.[84]

[84] *D.Wsch.*, pp. 77, 90, 141.

This too is sound practice.

The following quotation reads like an illustration of de Saussure's definition of a static condition of language as *"un espace de temps plus ou moins long. . . .":*

Den Bestand der intellektuellen Terminologie der früh-mhd. geistl. Werke als ein Ganzes zu überblicken, kann trotz der großen zeitlichen und örtlichen Abstände versucht werden. . . .[84]

This procedure also proves another one of de Saussure's very clear statements which so far has not been mentioned:

Le même problème se pose à propos de l'espace. Bref, la notion d'état de langue ne peut être qu'approximative. En linguistique statique, comme dans la plupart des sciences, aucune démonstration n'est possible sans une simplification conventionelle des données.[85]

Naturally a complete discussion of all of the less important problems closely connected with the conception of linguistic fields is not intended in this survey. There are, however, some points of major importance which must be taken up in detail. A good deal of needless scholarly dispute and of mutual misunderstanding has been caused by differences in the interpretation of the term *field.*

Among others Walter Porzig has made valuable contributions to this highly controversial matter. Though his *Bedeutungsfelder* are of a different nature, Trier has tried, at least theoretically, to incorporate some of Porzig's ideas into the frame of his own general conception. His argumentation is quite interesting, but unconvincing in the final analysis, and even Trier himself confesses inability to understand fully some of the implications. There is, however, one item in Trier's criticism worth mentioning, because it has a bearing on my own conception of the field. I do not share Trier's doubts of the "discontinuity of the linguistic world"; I do believe (following Porzig and Ipsen) that the world is not uniformly disclosed throughout its entire range by our vocabulary, or by any individual language.[86]

Porzig finds essential meaning relations (*wesenhafte Bedeutungsbeziehungen*), which might also be called *elementary meaning-fields,*

---

[85] *Cours de linguistique générale,* p. 143.
[86] *Behaghel Fsch.* (1934), 196 ff.

in the relation of an activity to the organ or tool with which it is carried out. His examples are: *man fährt in einem Wagen, geht zu Fuß, reitet auf einem Pferd.* Furthermore, there are verbs which permit only one type of subject, such as: *bark - dog, neigh - horse; blühen - Pflanze, wachsen - Organismus.* Others require a definite type of grammatical object: *fell - tree; vorsetzen - Speise oder Trank* (but not *einen Blumenstrauß*). Adjectives too may have very definite meaning relations, so that the nouns belonging to them are implied in the adjectives. Porzig illustrates this with examples: *blond - menschliches Haar, blind - Sehen, taub - Gehör.*

It is characteristic of these elementary meaning-fields that they have a tendency and an ability to spread. In "man fährt in einem Wagen" *fahren* is used in its real, literal or central meaning (*im eigentlichen Sinne,* Lat. *proprie*), in "man fährt jemandem übers Maul," however, it is used in a transferred meaning (*im übertragenen Sinne, metaphorically,* Lat. *translate*). Or: *a person who does not see is blind;* transferred: *a blind alley,* etc. The importance of the metaphor as a means of increasing the expressive capacities of a language has been so frequently discussed that we may take it for granted here. Porzig defines a metaphor as *the combining of members of two semantic fields into a meaningful utterance* (*die Verbindung von Gliedern zweier Bedeutungsfelder zu einem sinnvollen Ausspruch*).[87]

This leads me to raise the question as to how languages differ in the prominence given to particular conceptual fields as sources for metaphoric expressions, and how one language changes in this regard from age to age. Though neither Trier nor Porzig has fully realized this problem both have opened up wide fields of potential research. For the time being we must be careful to avoid confusion between Porzig's line of thought and that of Trier, with which we are concerned in this study.

---

[87] Cf. Walter Porzig, *Wesenhafte Bedeutungsbeziehungen.*
An excellent discussion of metaphors is found in Erdmann, *op. cit.,* p. 165 ff. He distinguishes *artificial* (*künstliche*), *natural* (*natürliche*), *naturalized* (*eingebürgerte*), *faded* (*verwelkte*) metaphors, and other groups. The simplest classification might be (1) *alive,* i.e., metaphors that are still felt as such; (2) *dead,* i.e., metaphors that are no longer felt as such. That is probably what Porzig has in mind when he says "Sie unterliegen dem Schicksal jeder geistigen Form, im Laufe der Zeit vom Geist verlassen zu werden und zu zerfallen, aber im Augenblick ihres Entstehens geben sie ein getreues Bild von der Gewichtsverteilung im Bedeutungssystem einer Sprache . . ."
Cf. also Porzig, *Aischylos, die attische Tragödie,* and *Sprachform und Bedeutung.*

Whereas Trier's conception of the field is based exclusively on the *Sprachinhalt,* notwithstanding his more or less occasional references to categorial articulation (e.g., adjectives and nouns),[38] Weisgerber, who is likewise concerned primarily with the *Begriffsschatz* of language, has not failed to see the essential significance of grammatical categories, as evidenced by his article on the adjectival and verbal comprehension of visual perceptions.[39] Porzig differs from these two scholars mainly in that his elementary meaning-fields are above all syntactically conditioned, i.e., he starts with an investigation of *word complexes* (Ries's *Wortgefüge*) and not of *word textures* (Trier's *Wortgefüge*).[40] Ipsen, on the other hand, in a later elaboration of his original theory,[41] stresses morphological assimilation as a major factor in constituting a field apart from conceptual proximity of words. This is best illustrated by Ipsen in the IE linguistic field of metals. The names of metals coming from the Orient were first assimilated to IE word-types; all of them assumed the neutral gender; all except *aes,* which is the substantival basic word of the field, became adjectives associated with *aes;* and finally these adjectives were linked together by being treated linguistically as adjectives of colors. As a result of these processes a field has been constituted, according to Ipsen. Of course linguistic science cannot afford to overlook this theory as underlying a method of research. But however legitimate and necessary it may be to do research along the lines laid down by Ipsen, this must not be confused with investigations directed at the conceptual structure of totalities called *fields.* Trier is quite right in pointing out that no other way was open to Ipsen the Indo-Europeanist in constituting his field.[42] Why then does Trier not draw the logical conclusion and start his *Feldforschung* on the basis of present-day German instead of older and partly obscure periods of the language?

In his analysis of other field theories Trier includes an appreciation

---

[38] See *D.Wsch.,* pp. 81, note, 341.

[39] See note 24.

[40] Ries, *Was ist Syntax?,* p. 47: "Definieren wir den Ausdruck 'syntaktische Gebilde' oder kurz 'Wortgefüge' als eine sinnvolle Verbindung von Worten zu einer neuen Einheit, so würde die richtige Reihe lauten: Laut - Wort - Wortgefüge." See also note 18.

An alternative English equivalent for Trier's *Gefüge* might be *structure.* This translation, however, might be misleading because of the various meanings of *structure* in linguistics and elsewhere. Support is lent to *texture* by Humboldt's use of *Gewebe der Begriffe.*

[41] *Zeitschrift f. Deutschkunde,* XXXXVI, 1-18. See also notes 2, 4, and 19.

[42] For details see *Behaghel Fsch.* (1934), 193.

and criticism of Hans Sperber's contributions to semasiology.[43] On the one hand he gives Sperber credit for having pointed out emphatically that conceptually connected groups of words spread over other conceptual spheres (*Seinsbereiche*) through metaphorical expansion; on the other he calls his *psychological* explanation, which is based on the emotional value of the words, insufficient from the *geisteswissenschaftliche* point of view. Undoubtedly modern linguistics must also be *Geisteswissenschaft,* but not of that orthodox kind that excludes every other approach to linguistic problems. Even if Sperber's research had remained in the "cocoon of psychological semasiology" Trier's criticism would be unjustified. There are several points which Trier has failed to notice. In the preface of his *Einführung in die Bedeutungslehre* Sperber proposes that linguistic science make fuller use of psychology in attacking the problems of language. He agrees with those psychologists who believe that even on the highest levels of spiritual development the actions and achievements of man are influenced by emotion as well as by reason. Whereas Paul and Wundt, in their studies, had neglected the emotional value of words, Sperber emphasizes its importance. He adopts Erdmann's differentiation of (1) *the conceptual content,* (2) *the marginal meaning,* and (3) *the emotional value* (*Gefühlswert* or *Stimmungsgehalt*) of the word. Though he stresses the significance of intense emotion or powerful stimuli for semantic changes of words in their context, he never loses sight of cultural, historical and *geisteswissenschaftliche* implications, and this he has shown again in his most recent publications.[44]

To sum up our discussion of the somewhat complicated situation as regards research upon fields, I would say first that the definitions of the objects as well as of the methods of this research differ considerably. Second, there seems to be a confusing divergence of opinion concerning the relative importance and the interdependence of descriptive, genetic, historical, comparative, psychological and *geisteswissenschaftliche* problems as here involved. Third, a certain agreement, if only a negative one, seems to have been reached on the nature of the *field:* it is not an etymological group. This is a point the importance of which should not be underrated, though I feel that in historical and

---

[43] *Behaghel Fsch.* (1934), 194 ff. See also notes 26 (Erdmann), 27, and Bloomfield, *Language,* pp. 439 ff.
N.B. Sperber avoids the term *Feld.*

[44] *Im Spiegel der Sprache.* (See Bibliography.)

genetic studies etymological groups within and between fields ought to receive more careful consideration. In general the modern *Geisteswissenschaftler* must never forget the debt of gratitude which he owes to the undeniable achievements of the founders of linguistic science. In semantics in particular much research on a sound etymological basis is still badly needed.[45]

Whether we call the various types of fields which have been discussed *fields* or *groups* is, at least for the present, not very important. In the interest of clarity the term *field* will be limited hereafter to conceptual groups of words. Trier's conception of the *articulation* or *texture* of such fields, however, calls for further examination. Certain fallacies of Trier's conception are due to Ipsen's influence, which has been pointed out above.[46] It was André Jolles who, in a review of Trier's book and of one of his articles,[47] brought out—effectively, as I believe—certain fallacies of Trier's conception. Jolles quotes from Trier's article:

Wie sieht der Wortschatz aus, den das klassische Mittelhochdeutsch im Bereich individueller Verstandeseigenschaften bereithält, und wie sieht der neuhochdeutsche Wortschatz desselben Bereiches aus? Vergegenwärtigen wir uns beide in ihrer Fügung und Gliederung. *Weise, klug, gescheit, begabt, intelligent, schlau, gerissen,* usw. gegen *wîse, witzig, sinnic, bescheiden, künstic, listic, kündic, karc.* Kein einzelnes unter den nhd. Wörtern ist sinngemäß einfach der Fortsetzer eines einzelnen mhd., sondern nur die nhd. Gruppe als Ganzes setzt—im großen und ganzen—die mhd. Gruppe als Ganzes fort.

Jolles calls the second part of the last sentence a *lapsus*. Apart from this, as Jolles states correctly, these groups do not form a *whole* at all. Trier may or may not have felt that when he added to the NHG group the *usw.*, which Jolles perhaps overemphasizes. Even if the benefit of the doubt is given to Trier, Jolles is right in pointing out that actually new links can be and have been added again and again to this chain or group of words. Therefore this group does not constitute a field with anything like definite boundary lines. This statement by Jolles should have been supported by evidence because it is

---

[45] I am thinking of studies like that of H. Kurath, *The semantic sources of the words for the emotions in Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, and the Germanic languages.*

[46] See note 19.

[47] *Antike Bedeutungsfelder.* (See Bibliography.)
Cf. also Trier, *Sprachliche Felder.*

a serious challenge to Trier's (and also to Ipsen's original) conception of the field. The evidence which Jolles omits is found, e.g., in ideological dictionaries. One glance at cross references in nos. 450 (*Verstand*) and 498 (*Intelligenz*) of Schlessing (or Roget), or in *Hauptabteilung* 12 of Dornseiff[48] will prove conclusively Trier's error in assuming anything like rigid boundary lines of his field. Their non-existence, even in synchrony, need not, however, compel us to discard the conception of fields; it merely implies a necessary modification of this conception, which will be discussed later.

Jolles criticizes also Trier's articulation of the field. According to Trier "passen die Einzelformen nach ihren Bedeutungskonturen streng aneinander und decken sie insgesamt lückenlos die Sphäre" (Ipsen's "Mosaik"!). Jolles retorts: "Im Gegenteil, die Bedeutungskonturen sind hier verwischt, die Glieder gleiten ineinander über, überschneiden sich. Man vergleiche damit ein Bedeutungsfeld wie *Vater-Sohn, links-rechts!*" To avoid confusion, this use of the term *Bedeutungsfeld* must be considered irrelevant to the basic argument; moreover it should be noted that Trier does not call his field *Bedeutungsfeld*. Distinct contours of words and a mosaic-like articulation of a field are impossible.

---

[48] Schlessing, *Deutscher Wortschatz.*
Roget's *Thesaurus of English Words.*
Dornseiff, *Der deutsche Wortschatz nach Sachgruppen.*
"Theorien sind gewöhnlich Übereilungen eines ungeduldigen Verstandes, der die Phänomene gern lossein möchte und an ihre Stelle deswegen Bilder, Begriffe, ja oft nur Worte einschiebt" (Goethe, *Schriften zur Naturwissenschaft,* 1. Teil, Jubiläums-Ausgabe, XXXIX, 64).
I have the impression that Trier in his theories frequently falls a victim to his fondness for exaggerated use of imagery. Thus he sees the field "in dem gliedernden Nebeneinander der zu einem Block gehörenden und einen geschlossenen Zeichenmantel bildenden Worte" (*D.Wsch.,* p. 19). Other definitions of the field are: "diese Abgrenzung und dieser Zusammenschluß zum geschlossenen Zeichenmantel" (*ibid.,* p. 20), "geschlossene sprachlich-begriffliche Felder undinglichen Inhalts" (*ibid.,* p. 22).
Of course Trier could not succeed in marking off his intellectual field with unassailable boundaries. One attempt is made by him in the comparison of his field with what he calls Ehrismann's field "der gesamten psychologischen Terminologie." (Cf. Ehrismann's article on Otfrid's psychological terminology in *Behaghel Fsch.* [1924], 324 ff.) Trier's field is smaller than Ehrismann's, limited to "rationabilitas" (*D.Wsch.,* p. 24).
More serious than this vagueness of definition is the fact that he excludes from his research all verbal expressions belonging to "rationabilitas." Naturally this results in an artificial delineation of his field, erroneous even if it seems to be successful. Only occasionally he tells us something about the relations of his field to its neighbors, e.g., the ethical field, and for practical purposes he feels himself compelled even to disregard the historical changes of the exterior boundaries of the field. "Solche Beschränkung folgt nur aus den Notwendigkeiten praktischer Arbeit, fingiert nur vorläufig geschlossene und stetige Außengrenzen des Feldes" (*D.Wsch.,* p. 25).

The very nature of the *word,* as described, e.g., by Erdmann, excludes such metaphoric characterizations of the field. Trier's other definitions, quoted above,[49] do much more justice to his cause and to Humboldt's ideas on which they are based. In rejecting the mosaic-like articulation Jolles is unquestionably right. On the other hand I do not share his opinion that the term *field* should not be applied to what he calls *Trier's "groups."* The words *field* and *group* are vague, like all signs for ordinary conceptions, but they are subject to definition and interpretation whenever they are needed for scientific purposes, and therefore I see no reason for giving up the term *field* in favor of *group,* which has an even wider conventional meaning in linguistic science than *field.* Differences of opinion on the nature of the *field* have not precluded the use of the term by linguists. Jolles is satisfied with Trier's *Sinnbezirk* though he does not accept the definite boundaries implied in the etymology as well as the present day use of this word. Neither German *Feld* nor English *field* has that connotation. Thus one is faced with a paradoxical terminology: What Trier has in mind is a *Bezirk* which he also calls *field;* what Jolles has in mind really is a *field,* but he prefers to adopt Trier's term *Sinnbezirk* for it, and this means a lapsus on the part of Jolles, who in the same article insists on *"strenge Terminologie."*

Jolles offers constructive criticism by referring to an ancient Greek definition of the term *synonymon.* (In modern linguistics the word synonym has become almost taboo.) The author of the *Techne*[50] mentions several "synonyms" for 'sword.' Applying the Greek definition of *synonymon* to these synonyms, one might say in modern terminology: There are things or objects (*Gegenstände, Sachverhalte*) which cannot be apprehended by language in just one word; there is *meaning* (*ein Bedeuten*) that is not inseparably associated with one single and definite phonemic structure (*Lautgebilde*). The *synonymon* is the nucleus of the field, a something that cannot be exactly expressed in one word though we are simply compelled to attempt it, e.g., by the word *Verstand* in the title of Trier's book or as a heading for Schlessing's No. 450, or by the word *Freude* in the field of pleasurable

[49] See note 31.

[50] Τέχνη Διονυσίου Γραμματικοῦ. The synonyms for 'sword' are: ἄορ, ξίφος, μάχαιρα, σπάθη, φάσγανον. Definition of "synonymon": Συνώνυμον δέ ἐστι τὸ ἐν διαφόροις ὀνόμασι τὸ αυτὸ δηλοῦν, or also: ὃ διὰ πλειόνων ἓν ὑποκείμενον σημαίνει.

emotions. In other words (with a modification of metaphors used by Jolles), such nuclear conceptions are besieged by language with words serving as soldiers. These encircling words, each of which in itself and all of which in their totality are trying to conquer the nuclear conception, form one group, which is subject to perpetual change and increase; and the more important the conception happens to be for the community of speakers, the more auxiliary troops are thrown around it. When I call the words soldiers this comparison must be taken *cum grano salis*; the inherent ambiguity or haziness of words must not be forgotten; they have more than just one meaning, and they overlap in manifold ways.

In short, I claim that the internal and external boundary lines have to be eliminated from Trier's conception of the field, just as they have been eliminated in modern dialect geography. Trier's heterogeneous combination of diachrony and synchrony has had no more grave consequences than a somewhat confused presentation of linguistic facts.[51] Likewise his merely theoretical boundary lines do not seriously affect his actual research. They have a tendency to disappear whenever he is confronted with the natural vagueness of words and fields. Statements like "Das sind doch wirkliche Synonymenhäufungen, man darf da keine scharfen Grenzen ziehen," or "*sin* steht mit der überwiegenden Zahl seiner Belege außerhalb des Verstandesfeldes," or the excellent discussion of Parzival's *tumpheit*—these are only three out of many instances in which Trier ignores his own theory of boundaries.[52] Of course there may be boundaries in what the conceptions of language try to disclose; one cannot, however, establish them merely on the basis of words or word-fields, because neither words nor even *Bedeutungskonturen* of words have clearly determinable boundaries. It would seem to be the task of the logician to establish a well-bounded *Verstandesfeld,* and the psychologist will have to decide whether he wants or is able to set the boundary lines for, e.g., the field of pleasurable emotions. Franz Dornseiff, in criticizing Trier's basic error, hits the nail on the head when he says:

. . . Wer bis hierher gefolgt ist, wird mit mir einig sein, daß der einzige nicht irreführende Ausdruck nur lauten kann: Begriffsfelder. Und was sie betrifft, so sollte es wirklich nicht schwer sein, zu der naheliegenden Erkenntnis vorzu-

[51] See note 34.
[52] For details see *D.Wsch.*, pp. 90, 245, 256.

dringen, daß besagte Felder logische Verabsolutierungen von "Sachgruppen" sind. Sachgruppen zu berücksichtigen ist natürlich für jeden Sprachforscher ratsam. . . . Aber gegen Trier hat seinerseits Porzig wieder völlig recht, wenn er ihm sagt, daß seine sprachlichen Felder rein logische, von außen an die Sprache herangetragene Teilungen sind. . . . Daß Trier sich so heftig dagegen sträubt, hat wieder seinen Grund in einer allgemeinen Geistesströmung. Ein Hauptstolz der neuen Sprachwissenschaft ist ihre Gewißheit, daß sie von der Sprachbetrachtung unter Gesichtspunkten der formalen Logik abgekommen ist.[53]

— There is still another fallacy implied in Trier's field theory. Trier does not believe in the "discontinuity of the linguistic world," and he assures us, at least in his theory, that the field is without *gaps, "lückenlos."*[54] Whenever we compare two languages, related or unrelated, we soon become aware of gaps in both of them. Trier himself, comparing older types of German with modern German, finds such gaps. E.g. "der reine Klugheitsbereich hat keine eigenen Worte. Die wachsen ihm mit *klug* und *gescheit* erst im 14. Jahrhundert zu."[55] Schmidt-Rohr, who reveals a deeper insight into the nature of the *Begriff* than most of our contemporaries, stresses the incompleteness of vocabularies of individual languages:

Die Völker besitzen je nur einen Auszug, aber einen verschiedenen, behelfsmäßigen, immer lückenhaften Auszug aus dem als fehlerlos und vollständig gedachten Weltwörterbuch aller benennbaren Dinge.[56]

Schopenhauer mentions, among other things, the lack of an adequate equivalent in any language for the Greek word *sophrosyne* (which since has been compared with MHG *diu mâze*). Moreover he says:

Daher also muß man, bei Erlernung einer fremden Sprache, mehrere ganz neue Sphären von Begriffen in seinem Geiste abstecken: mithin entstehen Begriffssphären, wo noch keine waren. Man erlernt also nicht bloß Worte, sondern erwirbt Begriffe.[57]

The fact that single words of one language may correspond to word complexes of another will be dealt with later on.

---

[53] *Das Problem des Bedeutungswandels,* pp. 126, 130. In some details Dornseiff's criticism is exaggerated.
[54] See notes 36 and 47.
[55] *D.Wsch.,* p. 337, also pp. 303, 307, etc.
[56] *Mutter Sprache,* p. 14. See also pp. 47, 404.
[57] *Sämmtliche Werke,* Reclam, V, 599 f.

Constructive criticism of Trier's field theory is offered by B. Q. Morgan, who writes:

> If Trier actually assumes rigid boundary lines of his field, he is in error, but I think it can be shown that there is a tendency to fill in the gaps which exist in the field and which are bound to make themselves felt as successive writers seek for words to express given ideas.[58]

The introduction of *klug* and *gescheit* into 14th century German may serve as an illustration of that tendency. For a while I hesitated to adopt the term *field* for my own work; the alternative term *group,* suggested to me but not accepted for the reasons already stated, appears to be unsatisfactory to Morgan too. He writes:

> With regard to Trier's *field* and your proposed *group,* I feel a certain fundamental distinction which should carry you a considerable distance back towards Trier's position. The *field,* which seems to me to designate what might be called a spiritual territory with certain fairly definite needs of expression in it, results from more or less universal operations of the human mind and common human relationships. The linguistic material which expresses pleasurable emotions actually occupies such a field. It is no valid objection to say that there are gaps in the linguistic material, nor that the boundaries of the territory cannot be precisely determined. All the latter statement means, is that certain words straddle the boundaries, just as we may find a human settlement cut through the middle by the arbitrary work of surveyors and politicians. In so far as such words express pleasurable emotions, they belong in your field; meanings which fall outside of your territory lie in another country and do not necessarily claim your attention. I do not see any effective substitute for Trier's conception, since it seems to be a fact that it is the expressional needs of the mind which account for the introduction of new words or the extension of old words to cover spaces not filled.[58]

This quotation may serve as a suitable conclusion to a preliminary survey of the field theory, intended as a basis for a comparative study of the linguistic field of pleasurable emotions in English and German. What follows is a special introduction to this study.

In his survey of the general tendencies in modern linguistics Otto Jespersen[59] is glad to report that "now there is a steadily growing interest in living speech as the necessary foundation of all general theorizing." "The science of linguistics had long stood in the sign

---

[58] *Letter* dated Jan. 17, 1940.
[59] *Language, its Nature, Development, and Origin,* p. 97.

of Cancer and had been constantly looking backwards—to its own great loss." Great progress has indeed been made in the study of living speech since the days of such pioneers as Henry Sweet, and this progress has not been limited to phonetics. In the field of semantics we have excellent alphabetical dictionaries, less satisfactory ideological dictionaries, and a great number of books and essays dealing with style in general and "synonyms" in particular, all intended mainly for practical purposes. None of them is concerned with the systematic study of word-fields. The German scholars who have contributed so much to the discussion and investigation of word-fields have overlooked the possibilities afforded by their own speech. So far Trier himself has not carried his own research in the intellectual field beyond the MHG period, and none of his students has investigated present-day German.

Probably Trier's theory of the conceptual field would be different from what it is, and less questionable, if he had based his work on modern German. What can be done by reversing traditional methods has been most conclusively proved by Max Deutschbein, whose system of modern English syntax is founded on modern English, not on OE, ME, or early mod. Eng.[60] The very nature of his OHG sources forced Trier to look upon the words of his field from the point of view of logic and medieval philosophy, and thereby to arrive at what Dornseiff called "logische Verabsolutierungen."[61] If, instead of OHG, the living language had been his starting point, he too might have become aware of the inherent haziness or vagueness of every word, of what Schmidt-Rohr calls "die grundsätzliche Molluskenhaftigkeit des Begriffs."[62]

There are other difficulties, insurmountable for the present at least, inherent in the study of older periods of languages. It was because of such difficulties that Dornseiff, specialist in classical philology though he was, found himself compelled to postpone his plans for an Old Greek Dictionary of Synonyms and instead wrote *Der deutsche Wortschatz nach Sachgruppen.* He had soon found out the necessity of building up his conceptual system first in his mother tongue.[63]

---

[60] See note 9.
[61] See note 53.
[62] *Mutter Sprache,* p. 70.
Cf. also Schnitzler in *Neue Rundschau,* Jan. 1932: "Jedes Wort hat fließende Grenzen; diese Tatsache zu ästhetischer Wirkung auszunützen, ist das Geheimnis des Stils."
[63] *Der deutsche Wortschatz nach Sachgruppen,* p. 7*.

In his critique of Bechtoldt's *Der französische Wortschatz im Sinnbezirk des Verstandes,* Rheinfelder[64] censures Bechtoldt not only for having limited his investigation to nouns and adjectives and to spiritual and didactic OF literature up to the end of the 12th century, but also for not having stated the meanings of his words with either the accuracy or the caution obviously essential for research of that type. On the other hand, he stresses the fact that the author has made every possible effort to arrive at a clear definition of the OF conceptions in the intellectual field. The inference from these somewhat contradictory statements is evident: It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to define the meanings of OF words satisfactorily. Rheinfelder suggests two possible solutions of this knotty problem. One of them is careful preliminary work in old-style semasiological studies: whether or not this is feasible only experience will tell. The other solution is ideal and therefore impossible: instead of translating or paraphrasing words one would have to apply them in some context to a situation, an event, or an experience. E.g., the word "Klugheit" might be explained by presenting a series of situations or telling a number of anecdotes which leave no doubt in the reader's mind as to what sort of human behavior is characterized by the word "Klugheit." If then the same human behavior were described by using English or French instead of German we may find that this behavior would not be characterized by just one English or one French word of similar meaning. While perhaps applicable to modern languages, in spite of its highly complicated nature, this method could not possibly work in historical studies. Rheinfelder himself admits that our search for pertinent stories or anecdotes in literature will be unsuccessful in a majority of cases. Therefore the old method of definitions, paraphrases, and translations cannot be discarded, for all its shortcomings.

What Trier and his school have not fulfilled is the essential demand which must be made in the interest of clarity and accuracy: they should have avoided *logische Verabsolutierungen* in the older vocabularies, and before they ever studied these vocabularies they should have defined as well as possible the modern German words which they use in explaining OHG, MHG, or OF words. As far as I can see, their first task should have been the description of the intellectual field disclosed by conventional modern German. I presume that such a

[64] See notes 3 and 29.

description can be presented in a clearly arranged form, if necessary with the use of graphic charts. Whether this description can be used as a basis for comparisons with older types of language I do not know; it may be necessary first to subject the concepts found in ordinary language to logical, psychological, and phenomenological analysis. Much of Trier's lack of clarity in the arrangement of his valuable material might have been obviated by the application of this method.

None other than H. Paul[65] is quite emphatic concerning the importance of investigations dealing with living speech, as a basis for the study of the history of words. Among the sources of our information there is one which he wants us to consider most carefully: the source that everybody has in his own linguistic feeling, which provides him, very definitely in most cases, with full particulars of usual and occasional meanings of words.

The foregoing detailed discussion, it is hoped, has made it clear that the investigation of conceptual fields other than Trier's *Verstandesfeld* is highly desirable, especially since no such research exists in English. On the other hand, I consider it impossible to follow Trier's method closely in my own work. Historical studies certainly must not be given up, but they have to be postponed until the concept of the linguistic field has been clarified, and this clarification can best be achieved by comparing two living languages in regard to one field. A study of this type may be justified also by the fact that only present-day conditions of language allow us to understand the relationship between "thought" and "speech." Furthermore it is obvious that not the literary language, but rather the *Umgangssprache* must be taken into consideration primarily. The etymological instinct, especially strong in the linguist, must be barred; for, as Charles Bally puts it, "les indices fournis spontanément par l'instinct étymologique sont trompeurs. Les données fournies par l'étymologie proprement dite, qui remonte à l'origine des mots, sont ou inutiles ou dangereuses."[66]

Unfortunately a certain arbitrariness in determining what belongs to the *Umgangssprache* of the average educated person cannot be entirely avoided. Every effort must be made to keep mistakes at a minimum by stating wherever necessary that a word can or cannot be predominantly placed in that particular sphere of language. When a

---

[65] *Über die Aufgabe der wissenschaftlichen Lexikographie* . . . , pp. 53 ff.
[66] *Traité de stylistique française*, I, 142.

conceptual field is examined in order to find essential differences between two standard languages such as modern German and modern English, different strata of language as well as different styles can hardly form a basis for classification. Naturally the necessity of working with a hypothetical standard language in this particular study does not exclude the need for other studies concerned with less generalized types of languages or dialects within English or German.[67]

Two other factors of the foremost importance, sorely neglected by Trier, find expression in the truisms that meanings of words can be stated with an approximation to accuracy only on the basis of their use in a context,[68] and that what is expressed by one word may also be expressed by more than one word, i.e., a complex of words. After having examined single words in many contexts, one is forced, for practical reasons, to define their meanings as best one can. When a translator compares two languages he is very frequently compelled to express the content of a word of one language by a word complex in the other.

The first of the factors just mentioned may be illustrated by a quotation from Charles Bally:

> Le principe fondamental de la connaissance des mots est l'habitude de les voir dans l'atmosphère qui les entoure. . . . Il s'ensuit qu'une série de synonymes ne peut être établie sur des mots isolés, mais que la seule manière logique de les composer est de la greffer, par association d'idées, sur un fait d'expression déterminé par son entourage. Bornons-nous ici à l'observation du contexte et voyons à quelles erreurs on s'expose en le négligeant.
> Soit le verbe *veiller;* isolé de tout contexte, il pourrait suggérer au moins trois séries de synonymes: *veiller, garder, surveiller,* etc.; ou bien *veiller, rester debout, se priver de sommeil,* etc.; ou bien *veiller, prendre soin,* etc. . . . Soit maintenant une phrase comme: Veillez à ce que notre hôte ne manque de rien. Immédiatement

---

[67] Kalicinski criticizes Dornseiff for not having grouped words according to texts, persons, linguistic strata, and styles. Even a superficial perusal of Dornseiff's *Vorrede* reveals how much he is aware of these problems. There is a practical, if not theoretical, limit to the number of subdivisions in any classification, and the number of the problems involved is too great to be classified by Dornseiff. His work is merely intended as an aid to special research in style, special languages, etc. The results of many such pieces of research may then form the basis for an ideal "Wortschatz" on a very much larger scale. Cf. *Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie,* LXII, 166-171.

[68] "Der präzise Sinn eines Wortes wird erst im Augenblick der Verwendung festgelegt, wenn es an eine Stelle im Redezusammenhang gesetzt wird, aus dem heraus es sich selbst erläutert" (Kalicinski in *Zeitschrift f. d. Philologie,* LXII, 170).

tout prend vie et les points de repère abondent; d'abord je constate que si, dans la première série, on peut parler d'un verbe *veiller*, il s'agit ici du verbe *veiller à* ou *à ce que*, distinction très importante. . . .[69]

Concerning synonyms Marty has always stressed the importance of context. When synonymous expressions are used in different connections, a modification of meaning (*Bedeutungsnüancierung*) will result. It may also happen that, while in more careful use scrupulous distinctions are made, when such accuracy is inconvenient or unnecessary the same expressions are sometimes treated as really synonymous. Thus, e.g., *schreiten, gehen, laufen* are sometimes differentiated, but they may be used without any difference, so that temporarily the special conceptions bound up with the first and the last of these three words are merely inner form. Often other expressions are used, not because of the meaning, but simply in order to avoid annoying repetition (e.g. *he said, replied, answered, rejoined, retorted, responded*).[70]

An ideal solution of the problem of stating meanings of single words does not exist. Words are and always will be *mirages linguistiques*, parasites of the connections and situations in which we use them (Sechehaye). A single word torn out of its context, though we may describe it with the utmost care, is *starr und stumm* (Weisweiler). If we attempt to catch a word in a definition, suddenly the inconsistency and capriciousness of linguistic usage become evident. Whoever makes analytical definitions will always correct linguistic

---

[69] *Traité de stylistique française*, I, 148.

It should be noted that Bally also saw quite clearly the dependence of the meanings of words on "termes voisins" or "termes contraires." "Les moyens d'expression sont entre eux dans un état de relativité; ils ne forment pas un *ensemble* par leur nombre, mais un *système* par leur groupement et leur pénétration réciproque; les symboles linguistiques n'ont de *signification* et ne comportent d'*effet* qu'en vertu d'une réaction générale et simultanée des faits de langage, qui se limitent et se définissent les uns par les autres; les mots ne sont *compris* et *sentis* que par une *comparaison*, incessante et inconsciente qui se fait entre eux dans notre cerveau. Pour que cette comparaison se fasse, il importe peu que tel ou tel mot ait eu autrefois un sens ou un autre, un effet semblable ou différent de son effet actuel" (*ibid.*, pp. 21-22).

This is strictly in line with what Trier said at a much later date. Bally sees even more in this respect than Trier: the affective or emotional and the social value of words exists only on the background of "synonyms" of a different value. Cf. "Si une expression nous affecte, c'est que nous la comparons inconsciemment avec une autre qui ne comporte aucun effet ou un effet contraire. De même encore pour les effets de nature sociale: un terme d'argot nous semble-t-il vulgaire et choquant? C'est que ce mot évoque en nous par contraste d'autres mots plus *convenables*, utilisables dans les circonstances de la vie sociale" (*ibid.*, p. 28).

[70] Cf. Funke, *Innere Sprachform*, p. 82.

usage a little; he leaves—strictly speaking—the viewpoint of purely descriptive word analysis, and he replaces it partly at least with prescriptive word-delineation. Therefore all definitions can only be in approximate harmony with linguistic usage, and it will always be possible to challenge them with the aid of examples, where the definition is *evidently* incorrect (Erdmann).[71]

The second factor mentioned above must be considered as vitally important for comparative language studies. Bloomfield expressed it thus:

> One language will use a phrase where another uses a single word and still another a bound form. . . . As to denotation, whatever can be said in one language can doubtless be said in any other: the difference will concern only the structure of the forms, and their connotation. What one language expresses by a single morpheme will in another language require perhaps a long phrase; what one language says in a word may appear in another language as a phrase or as an affix.[72]

It is a well-known fact that in one language the simple names for synonymous simple expressions of another language are often lacking; in order to obtain a strictly synonymous expression, in such cases a paraphrase or a syntactical word complex must be used.

According to Funke[73] two possibilities must be distinguished with regard to this phenomenon: (1) The simple expression of one language may mean a simple concept obtained by abstraction (e.g. many designations of colors). The meaning of the word may be hazy (*verschwommen*), and in different languages this haziness may point in different directions so that there is a real difference of meaning, which may be overcome by the use of word complexes. Examples of the type *hellrosa, dunkelrosa, Erdbeerfarbe,* versus *pink, rose color,* etc., are favorites with linguists and psychologists. (2) The simple expression may designate a conceptual synthesis.

Theoretically the possibility of the formation of conceptual syntheses is unlimited; but actually only a limited number is created. What these are, and of what type they are, depends with different peoples

---

[71] Cf. Sechehaye, *Les mirages linguistiques.*
Schmidt-Rohr, *Mutter Sprache,* p. 52.
Weisweiler, *Streitberg Fsch.,* p. 421.
Erdmann, *Die Bedeutung des Wortes,* pp. 89 f.
[72] *Language,* pp. 277 f.
[73] *Innere Sprachform,* pp. 79 f.

on external and internal circumstances, such as the stage of development of their spiritual life, common experiences, interests, etc. Such conditions are reflected in linguistic designations: Simple means of expression are sought for those complicated concepts that are frequently used in speech, whereas others are communicated by means of combinations of linguistic signs. One language may happen to possess a simple name for such a conceptual synthesis, while another has none at all. On the other hand, there may be in different languages simple expressions for similar conceptual combinations, which cannot be called synonymous because only certain ranges of their meanings cover each other; besides, in the expression of complicated ideas, haziness is rather frequently observed. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that in the case of logical identity two expressions may differ in their affective content so that they are not "synonymous."

Schmidt-Rohr[74] emphasizes the fact that it is not a matter of indifference whether a concept must be paraphrased or can be expressed by one word. "Die ganze lebendige Wirklichkeit des Wortes als Individuum fällt für den Begriff weg, dem es an einem solchen einheitlichen Ausdruck fehlt." This idea, which he quotes from Humboldt,[75] is very important indeed, and Schmidt-Rohr sees in it one of the greatest achievements of Humboldt's genius. The conceptual stock (*Begriffsschatz*) of a language throws light on the spiritual character of the people who speak it, and Schmidt-Rohr is right in raising the question as to what familiarity value (*Geläufigkeitswert*) the different meanings of concepts possess, with how much emphasis they urge themselves upon the speech community.

Humboldt's idea, however, should not be credited entirely to his own genius. Leibniz for example discussed the same problem, revealing a deep insight into its nature.[76]

---

[74] *Mutter Sprache,* p. 83.

[75] See also W. von Humboldt, V, 434 ff. and elsewhere.

[76] "R e i c h t h u m ist das erste und nöthigste bey einer Sprache und bestehet darin, dass kein Mangel, sondern vielmehr ein Uberfluss erscheine an bequemen und nachdrücklichen Worten, so zu allen Vorfälligkeiten dienlich, damit man alles kräfftig und eigentlich vorstellen und gleichsam mit lebenden Farben abmahlen könne. . . . Es kan zwar endlich eine jede Sprache, sie sey so arm als sie wolle, a l l e s geben; ob man schon saget, es wären barbarische Völcker, denen man nicht bedeuten kan, was GOtt sagen wolle. Allein, ob schon alles endlich durch Umschweiffe und Beschreibung bedeutet werden k a n, so verliehret sich doch bey solcher Weitschweifigkeit alle Lust, aller Nachdruck in dem der redet, und in dem der höret; dieweil das Gemüthe zu lange auffgehalten wird und es heraus kommt, als wann man einen, der viel schöne Palläste besehen will, bey

The problem of comparing the means of expression in a conceptual field in two modern languages is tempting, but not without difficulties. The field of emotions has been chosen for this study because it was felt that in the designation of feelings languages differ considerably more than in most other fields. Words like English *enjoyable, cheerful, genial, jolly,* German *gemütlich, innig, herzinnig, Stimmung,* French *frémir, verve,* Latin *gravis* (in *vir gravis*) are only a few of very many emotional words that are "untranslatable." One means of throwing light on meanings is to investigate them within the texture of their field.

The selection of the field of emotions for study also implies something in the nature of a personal reaction to Trier's one-sided emphasis on the intellectual as well as to his application of the methods of formal logic in semasiological research. Incidentally, this reaction was intensified through reading Pascal, Scheler and others.

Le cœur a ses raisons, que la raison ne connaît point.

Nous connaissons la vérité, non seulement par la raison, mais encore par le cœur. . . . c'est sur ces connaissances du cœur et de l'instinct qu'il faut que la raison s'appuie, et qu'elle y fonde tout son discours.

Le cœur a son ordre; l'esprit a le sien, qui est par principe et démonstration, le cœur en a un autre.[77]

---

einem jeden Zimmer lange auffhalten und durch alle Winckel herumschleppen wolte; . . . Nun glaub ich zwar nicht, dass eine Sprache in der Welt sey, die ander Sprachen Worte jedesmahl mit gleichem Nachdruck und auch mit einem Worte geben könne. Cicero hat denen Griechen vorgeworffen, sie hätten kein Wort, das dem Lateinischen ineptus antworte: Er selbst aber bekennet zum öfftern der Lateiner Armuth. Und ich habe den Frantzosen zu Zeiten gezeiget, dass wir auch keinen Mangel an solchen Worten haben, die ohne Umschweiff von ihnen nicht übersezt werden können. Und können sie nicht einmahl heut zu Tag mit einem Worte sagen, was wir *Reiten* oder die Lateiner Equitare nennen. . . . Es sind nemlich viel gute Worte in den Teutschen Schrifften so wohl der Fruchtbringenden als anderer, die mit Nutzen zu gebrauchen, aber darauff man im Noth-Fall sich nicht besinnet. Ich erinnere mich ehmahlen bei einigen gemercket zu haben, dass sie das Frantzösische Tendre, wann es vom Gemüth verstanden wird, durch *innig* oder *hertzinnig* bey gewissen Gelegenheiten nicht übel gegeben. Die alten Teutschen haben Innigkeit vor Andacht gebrauchet. Nun will ich zwar nicht sagen, dass dieses Teutsche Wort bey allen Gelegenheiten für das Frantzösische treten könne; nichts desto minder ist es doch werth, angemerckt zu werden, damit es sich bey guter Gelegenheit angäbe" (Leibniz, *Unvorgreifliche Gedancken,* pp. 343 ff.).

[77] Pascal, *Les Pensées,* Fragments 277, 282, 283.

Cf. also Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik,* p. XI.

Scheler, turning against "the empty and fruitless formalism" of Kant, stresses the revival of Pascal's conception of "ordre du cœur" or "logique du cœur" and its general influence on our generation. The science of language cannot and should not avoid this modern trend. "Wir haben gelernt, das Affektische und das historisch Gewordene zu sehen."[78] We seem to be in the midst of a movement or revolution in linguistics, fathered by men like Voßler; but in spite of occasional radicalism and exaggerations it is essentially a return to the ideas of those who led the revolt against Romance formalism and intellectualism, the German founders of modern linguistic science: Herder, Humboldt, the brothers Schlegel, the brothers Grimm, etc.

Although a linguistic study, especially in the field of the emotions, cannot dispense with aid to be obtained from the science of psychology, its aims must of necessity be confined to the province of the science of language. Whether the results of such a study, i.e. the linguistic findings, will be of any significance for the psychologist, is a question which the latter alone is competent to decide. The reasons for limiting this study to the synchrony of two modern languages have been argued at length. It must, however, be stated emphatically that this does not preclude the necessity of genetic and also historical research, for which the present study is merely a *conditio sine qua non.* Strictly speaking linguistic science can and in many cases must achieve its own ends without "literary" research, though whenever it is concerned with questions of style, with the influence of great men of letters on language, or with *Schriftsprache,* it becomes *Philologie.* On the other hand I fail to see how literary research (*Literaturwissenschaft*) can ever be separated from *Philologie.* More than ever before, Germany's most successful modern *Literaturwissenschaftler,* men like Voßler, Walzel, and Gundolf, have been *Philologen* in theory and in practice.[79]

The field of words primarily expressing emotions is of the greatest significance for the language of poetry. Therefore I feel that by studies of living speech the conditions in this particular field must be

---

[78] Dornseiff, *Das Problem des Bedeutungswandels,* p. 130.

[79] The different uses of the term "philology" in British and American English and the whole question of "Linguistics and Philology" are reviewed by Bolling in *Language,* V, 27 ff., where further references are given.
Cf. the article by Sapir, *ibid.,* pp. 207 ff., and Bloomfield's book *Language,* p. 512.
Voßler, *Logos,* II, 177.
Walzel, *Gehalt und Gestalt im Kunstwerk des Dichters,* pp. 31 ff., 244 ff., et al.
Walzel, *Das Wortkunstwerk,* pp. 104, et al.
Gundolf, *Shakespeare und der deutsche Geist,* pp. 172, et al.

analyzed, and that such studies must form the much needed solid basis for further research of a stylistic or literary nature.[80]

Limitation of this study to the field of pleasurable emotions was caused by the necessity of keeping the linguistic material within reasonable boundaries for the first attempt at an entirely new method, which may have to be modified in further studies of a similar kind. There seems to be no valid reason why unpleasant emotions should not be eliminated from such a study, though reference to that so-called negative field cannot and should not be entirely avoided. The problem of classifying emotions has by no means been solved by modern psychology, though many attempts have been made. In the interest of clarity I have followed the lead of T. Ribot, so that I might not become entangled in recent as well as in older controversies, in which as a non-psychologist I am not competent to take part. To defend my choice of pleasurable emotions, I quote from Ribot:

Cet article a pour but non l'étude du plaisir, mais l'examen d'une seule question qui d'ailleurs me paraît fondamentale. C'est un fait reconnu que la psychologie du plaisir, comparée à celle de la douleur, est extremêment courte et pauvre. Évidemment cette différence a sa cause et, selon moi, elle est dans la nature même du plaisir si on le prend pour ce qu'il est en réalité, c'est-à-dire pour une *forme supérieure de la vie normale*,—une augmentation, un accroissement, un rehaussement de l'état de santé physique et mentale.—Avant d'aborder la question principale, il est nécessaire de nous débarrasser de deux hypothèses qui ont grandement contribué à l'embrouiller: l'une en admettant que le plaisir est le contraire de la douleur; l'autre en l'assimilant à une sensation: 1. Tout d'abord, il convient de remarquer que la notion de *contraire* est vague, beaucoup plus

---

[80] Special studies are planned to answer such questions as what use individual poets or literary movements have made of the linguistic material at their command in ordinary language, and, of course, why they deviate from it. A trial collection of material from Otto Julius Bierbaum in the field of pleasurable emotions, which I have started as an experiment, is beginning to reveal a striking picture on the background of the field of *Umgangssprache*. One attempt, which, though not concerned with a field, might also serve as a model for research, was made in the discussion of the word *heiter* by Ewald Boucke in his *Wort und Bedeutung in Goethes Sprache*.

Theoretically there also arises on the basis of comparative studies the question, how translators from English into German and vice versa seek to overcome the difficulties presented by the basic discrepancies of the two vocabularies. Concerning this question B. Q. Morgan writes me: "I have grave doubts as to the validity of results deriving from the study of translations. Considering that we must deal with the possibilities of (1) misinterpretation of the original, (2) misuse of the translator's language, and (3) distortions of the translation due to the pressure of form (e.g., rhyme, meter, etc.), such results are bound to be open to all kinds of doubt" (*Letter* dated Jan. 17, 1940).

subjective qu'objective. Elle n'atteint la précision scientifique que dans très peu de cas: Par une détermination dans l'espace: Aller d'un endroit à un autre et revenir exactement par la même route. Par une détermination dans le temps: Réciter l'alphabet de A à Z, puis de Z à A. Encore faut-il reconnaitre que ces exemples et leurs analogues sont passibles d'objections. Ajoutons les concepts contraires, au sens des logiciens, qui ne sont guère que des formules abstraites. Dans la realité, la détermination du contraire est toujours approximative, souvent arbitraire, dépendante de l'organisation individuelle. C'est une classification commode pour la pratique, ce qui explique son emploi universel; mais elle n'en demeure pas moins une conception de psychologie populaire, sujette à égarer. Ainsi, sous prétexte que le plaisir est le contraire de la douleur, on a taillé leurs deux psychologies sur le même patron. . . .[81]

The poverty of the psychology of pleasure, which Ribot stresses—the question whether this is still true today may be left open for discussion—would seem to be one more reason to select the field of pleasurable emotions for linguistic research. In general there is a good deal of disagreement on the respective poverty of language and psychology. E.g., compare the two following statements:

A great obstacle to psychological analysis and description is the poverty of language. This condition is magnified in the case of feeling behavior. Whether this language difficulty is the cause of the intolerable affective classifications or whether it is the effect of them, we cannot be sure, but the fact remains that we do not have enough names to describe or to indicate the multiplex and multiform affective responses. In lieu of the impossibility of estimating even the number of distinct feeling reactions we might suggest a few word symbols which represent unmistakable simple affective responses and cannot possibly be classified under the heading of pleasantness or unpleasantness. Such names are elated, ravished, delighted, displeased, pleased, horrified, disgusted, disdainful, satisfied, unsatisfied, dissatisfied, longing, libidinous, apprehensive, uneasy, catatonic, anatonic, manic, mirthful, downcast, disturbed, vexed, flustered, contented, etc.[82]

Man hört oft die Rede von der Armut der Sprache und daß für tiefstes Erfahren uns die Worte fehlten: wahrer möchte es sein, von der Armut des Erlebens zu sprechen, dem in zahllosen Fällen nur der Reichtum der Worte, womit es sich schmückt, einen Anschein von Bedeutung verleiht. Nur weil das Leben, das in der Sprache geronnen ist, so an Glut und Wildheit wie an geistiger Flugkraft die letzten Höhen und letzten Tiefen im Leben des einzelnen—von den dunklen Gefühlen der Jugend abgesehen—hinter sich läßt, so kann es, wenn in Bewegung

[81] *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger*, LXVIII, 180 ff.
[82] Kantor, *Principles of Psychology*, p. 357.

gesetzt, noch heute mit fast dämonischer Zauberkraft die Seelen sich selbst entrücken und in sonst unerreichbare Wirbel eines mehr als menschlichen Geschehens reißen, und durchaus als vom Genius der Sprache begnadet führt uns ein großer Dichter in unbekanntes Wunderland.[83]

Klages also emphasizes the fact that there are at least 4,000 words in the German language designating the simplest and the most complicated conditions, processes, and qualities of the inner life of man, and therefore he calls the attempts of psychologists to invent new word symbols *eine wahre Hybris des Verstandes;* rather should they consider as a basis the study of the word material existing in language.[84]

On the other hand we are again and again faced with complaints of psychologists like the following:

In preparing our definitions we have been struck by the extreme difficulty of finding a good technical meaning for many of the terms in common psychological use. This is particularly true in the field of emotion. There are hosts of these terms in popular use, which presumably have distinguishable shades of meaning—and which would seem to be fair grist for the psychologist's mill. Yet in many cases the attempt to define them in technical language has proved a failure, and they have been discarded as "merely popular" or "self-explanatory." The fault lies not altogether with the Editor and his associates. In many cases it means that psychology has not yet reached a stage sufficiently advanced to give a technical meaning to these terms. We have cited the field of emotion merely as an example.[85]

And yet:

Il n'y a point d'idée à laquelle ne correspond un mot où elle s'incorpore et s'incarne. Les plus légères nuances de la pensée, les plus fugitifs mouvements de la sensibilité peuvent être rendus par le langage: tout ce qui peut être senti, peut être nommé.[86]

---

[83] Klages, *Die Grundlagen der Charakterkunde,* pp. 41 f.
[84] *Die Grundlagen der Charakterkunde,* p. 43.
[85] Warren, *Dictionary of Psychology,* pp. VIII and IX.
Cf. also Ruckmick, p. 111.
When Ruckmick discusses Wundt's so-called tridimensional doctrine and the classification of emotions based on it he stresses the difficulty of translating it into English. "The names of the emotions in the German language are significant themselves as indicative of underlying attitudes and differentiae. In several instances the inherent meaning of the German equivalents is hard even to approximate" (*ibid.,* p. 118).
[86] Lanson, *Canseils sur l'art d'écrire,* p. 169. The quotation is from the beginning of an excellent chapter "Du sens et de la valeur des mots." The next chapters "Association des mots entre eux et des mots avec les idées" and "Des figures: métaphores, métonymies, périphrases" are highly instructive too.

In the 17th century the emotional experiences of man were well described by Descartes in his *Traité des passions de l'âme* (Amsterdam, 1649). "He is generally credited with making the first distinction between sense-feelings, which refer to our own bodies, and emotions, which bear a cognitive reference to objects and situations outside us."[87] The first thoroughgoing classification of emotions was made by Spinoza, and the keenness of his analysis and the basic adequacy of his treatment are still acknowledged by modern psychologists. He considered, however, all emotions as resulting from confused states of mind and he showed "that the mind only suffers in so far as it has confused or inadequate ideas."[88] Since I have not been able to derive much benefit from any of the later classifications of the emotions, I refrain from discussing them in detail. Besides, Ruckmick has already treated this matter better than any other psychologist, and all I could do would be to follow him.[89] For the group of words which designate pleasurable emotions such as *Freude, Heiterkeit, joy, gladness, delight,* etc., no attempt at a classification has ever been made.

The ideological dictionaries which I have already mentioned are limited to an enumeration of words of a similar content. Concerning their value, I agree with Charles Bally, who himself has outlined a skeleton of such a dictionary. They give us a starting point, nothing more, nothing less:

> . . . Enfin le Thesaurus de Roget (et les dictionnaires qui en dérivent, notamment le dictionnaire français de Robertson), rejettent complètement l'ordre alphabétique et font entrer tous les faits d'expression dans un vaste système, arrêté dans les moindres détails, qui a malheureusement l'inconvénient d'être artificiel et compliqué. En somme, tous ces ouvrages présentent des lacunes, des imperfections, des inconséquences, et témoignent d'une méthode qui se cherche encore; mais tels qu'ils sont, ils peuvent rendre des services qu'on néglige trop.[90]

---

[87] Ruckmick, p. 113.
Cf. Irons, *Descartes and Modern Theories of Emotion.*
[88] Willis, *Benedict de Spinoza,* p. 558.
[89] Ruckmick, pp. 110-134.
[90] *Traité de stylistique française,* I, 125.
Words denoting "Sentiments de Plaisir et de Déplaisir" are given in Vol. II, 256 f.
With regard to the classification of the emotions Bally says: ". . . quant aux faits d'expression affective, ils font l'objet de tout ce qui suit et il suffit de noter ici qu'ils ne se prêtent pas aussi facilement à une classification que les faits de langage intellectuels. Le sentiment est synthétique et trouble par nature; rien n'est plus fréquent que la combinaison de plusieurs mouvements émotifs dans un seul fait psychologique, partant, dans un seul fait de langage" (*ibid.,* I, 133).
Humboldt discusses "nach Kategorien geordnete Wörterbücher" (vol. V, 437).

In order to obtain the word-material on which to base my investigation, I had to begin with the lists of words found in Roget, Schlessing, and Dornseiff. Then I made use of a number of dictionaries of synonyms, the names of which will be found in the bibliography and in the notes. The most difficult task during the collection of the material was presented by the necessity of finding the true meanings of words through use in their most common contexts. In most cases the dictionaries are quite unsatisfactory in this respect, since they either omit full quotations in contexts or base their definitions on quotations from literature. For this reason Bartlett and Lipperheide were also of very little value. Thus I had to rely on my German (and English) *Sprachgefühl,* and in many doubtful cases on that of native German and American friends. Fortunately enough, in a college community one has the opportunity of obtaining a fairly good general picture of the *Umgangssprache* of educated Americans and at the same time of noticing interesting sectional differences.

My method of analyzing the word-material in the field of pleasurable emotions was partly found in the material itself, partly influenced by the methods of psychologists such as Ruckmick, Woodworth, and Stern. Even more help, however, was afforded by the works of Scheler, Husserl, Klages, and Geiger.[91]

It is hoped that what Weisgerber demands of such linguistic investigations may also apply to this study: "man kann geradezu sagen, daß sprachwissenschaftliche Untersuchungen über den Aufbau der Sinnenwelt in den einzelnen Sprachen eine notwendige Voraussetzung für die psychologische usw. Beurteilung dieser Dinge sind."[92]

---

[91] Woodworth, *Psychology,* especially pp. 335 ff.
W. Stern, *General Psychology from the Personalistic Standpoint,* pp. 513 ff.
Works of Scheler, Husserl, Klages, and Geiger are quoted in the Bibliography.
[92] *Stellung der Sprache im Aufbau der Gesamtkultur,* I, 61.

CHAPTER II

Depth Gradation

The investigation, the results of which are here presented, has been directed at the linguistic FIELD of pleasurable emotions in two living languages, English and German. The aim of this study and the linguistic material on which it is based are the two main reasons for the application of a new and untried method of analysis. First of all a few negative statements must be made. Since this study concerns itself with living speech in the totality of a field and not with the history of individual words or of a field, the traditional methods of etymological or semasiological research were inapplicable. "Nicht die früheren Phasen einer Sprache erklären die lebendige Rede, sondern die jeweilig im Geiste des Volkes lebende Sprache, mit anderen Worten der Sprachgeist."[93] Trier's research has made it clear that the purely hypothetical external and internal boundary lines of the intellectual field are untenable; in the study of an emotional field no attempt at establishing such lines could possibly be made. The meaning of words belonging in that field is naturally much hazier than that of intellectual words, and moreover a classification of the pleasurable emotions is still a desideratum of psychology. If we keep in mind "daß jede lebende Sprache in jedem Augenblicke etwas Ganzes ist, und daß nur das im Augenblicke Lebende in ihr wirkt,"[94] we must realize that the description of single words as it is found in dictionaries is unsuitable for the purposes of this study.

The logical starting point for all studies of living speech would seem to be the *Sprachgeist,* but in spite of all that has been written about it by philosophically inclined linguists, the spirit of language, usually determined by a *Wesensschau,* has remained something very vague and undefinable. Nearly all attempts to explain linguistic phenomena as expressions of the *Sprachgeist* become loose generalizations not sufficiently substantiated and therefore easily contradicted by induction on the basis of other facts which conflict with those discussed. To apprehend the totality of a living language is an unattainable ideal;

---

[93] G. v. d. Gabelentz, *Die Sprachwissenschaft,* p. 9.
[94] *Ibid.,* p. 8.

consequently, for the present at least, we must fix our attention on partial aggregates such as the linguistic fields. The method of investigating these totalities must be inductive, unless we wish to give up linguistics as a science. The analysis of the field, however, cannot at any time lose sight of the totality of the field.

The original plan to present a detailed discussion of every word in the field of pleasurable emotions had to be discarded; the result would have been a dictionary, and this would not have accomplished the end I had in view. Under the plan now adopted, all this linguistic material has been rearranged so that the whole field is always under consideration. In order to avoid confusion the field had to be surveyed, not from one imaginary point, but from a number of points, and the findings of these different surveys are discussed in successive chapters, each of which represents a different aspect. No claim is made that these are the only possible aspects; partly the linguistic material suggested them, partly the findings of philosophers and psychologists who have dealt with the nature of emotions. This method has the additional advantage of allowing us to compare the linguistic material of English and German throughout our analysis of the field. This is most important because the most effective way to learn something about the *Sprachgeist* is to make a close comparison of two different languages. Since we are least aware of the texture of a field in our mother tongue, comparison with another language would seem to be imperative. The language I know best is German, the language I have studied most is English; my knowledge of other related and unrelated languages may also be an advantage because it has trained me to see differences between languages of which the untrained person might not be aware.

It will not be hard for readers to find flaws in my work, especially in my attempts to find the range of meanings of words denoting pleasurable emotion. It is the nature of most words to be hazy and ambiguous, and the words for the emotions are hazier than any others. Their meanings are narrowed and somewhat clarified by the contexts and situations in which they happen to be used, but the number of these contexts and situations is unlimited, and that is why dictionaries of synonyms, for example, present so many contradictory statements as to the meanings of words. A certain degree of arbitrariness cannot be avoided whenever a *standard* language (i.e., a widely-diffused common-language, not actually codified) is studied, and naturally this de-

gree is higher in semantics than in phonetics or in grammar. Let us remember the words of Aristotle: "It is characteristic of knowledge to expect in every field only that degree of accuracy which the nature of the object permits."

Words like *sensation, emotion, feeling, mood; Empfindung, Affekt, Gefühl, Stimmung* have rather vague meanings, and yet every educated speaker of English and German feels that no two of them have exactly the same meaning. Dictionaries and encyclopaedias are wont to define them at length, but even a casual comparison of these definitions reveals many obscurities and striking contradictions. Such obscurities and contradictions have to be removed, as far as possible, for the purposes of the technical language of psychology. Definite agreement on the meanings of psychological terms has never been reached; it is not even desirable, since that would mean the end of psychological research. Whenever necessary for the purposes of this linguistic study an artificial delineation of such terms will be made by definition. Otherwise they are used in their ordinary (vague) meanings in order to avoid the substitution of psychological language for ordinary language. In the field which has been called the *field of pleasurable emotions* there are, as in other emotional fields, numerous words which refer to both *feelings* and *emotions,* and therefore too much attention to the psychological differentiation between these terms might constitute a petitio principii dangerous for the linguist. Even psychologists very often use these two words quite promiscuously.

The unfortunate consequences of arbitrary psychological language have been pointed out by Klages in his discussion of the words *Lust* and *Unlust:*

Nach der gewöhnlichen Ansicht drücken unwillkürliche Bewegungen schlechtweg Gefühle aus, und beim Worte "Gefühl" pflegen Psychologen mit außerordentlicher Vorliebe an sogenannte "Lust" und "Unlust" zu denken. Es gehörten in der Tat "Psychologen" dazu, um die erstaunlich leblose Lehre auszuhecken, die arme Seele spüre entweder Lust oder sie spüre Unlust oder denn eine Mischung aus Lust und Unlust! Was verschlägt es dem besserunterrichteten Denker, daß jede vollentwickelte Sprache uns hunderte und hunderte von Wörtern bietet, die lauter artverschiedene Gefühle meinen, dahingegen die beiden Wörter, auf die er sich festgelegt hat, ursprünglich erschuf zur Unterscheidung von Willenszuständen! (Vgl.: mit "Lust" an eine Arbeit gehen, zu etwas "Lust" haben, mit "Unlust" bei der Sache sein, es "lüstet" oder "gelüstet" einen nach etwas usw. Paul definiert so kurz als treffend "Lust" als "die Empfindung, die entsteht, wenn etwas verwirklicht wird, was dem Verlangen entspricht." Deutsches Wörterbuch II,

S. 338.) Wir haben hier keine Zeit zu ausholender Genealogie und Widerlegung eines seit Aristoteles in Blüte stehenden Schulirrtums, der wie nichts anderes das klassische Unvermögen bloßer Gelehrsamkeit zur Seelenforschung bekundet, und decken nur den eigentümlichen Widerspruch auf, der darin liegt, daß man bloß zwei Gefühlsarten zugibt und dennoch den Grund der Ausdruckserscheinungen in den Gefühlen ansetzt. Jemand fühlt sich gehoben nach einer glücklich bestandenen Prüfung; er lebt im froher Erwartung eines vergnüglichen Festes; er schwelgt im Rausch erwiderter Liebe; er genießt eine angenehme Geschmacksempfindung; er begeistert sich an heroischer Tat; er frönt der grausamen Wollust der Tierquälerei; er freut sich an der Natur; er wohnt mit Glaubensinbrunst einer kirchlichen Feier bei; er gedenkt mit Stolz seines Wertes: neunmal, wenn wir nicht irren, im Sinne der Schulmeinung "Lust," mithin auch neunmal der Ausdruck der "Lust" und folglich neunmal d e r s e l b e Ausdruck! Die Schadenfreude sähe wie die Begeisterung aus, überschwängliche Seligkeit wie sinnliches Behagen, Hoffnung wie Erfüllung! Allein wir unterscheiden im Leben mit einem einzigen Blick jeden dieser Zustände von sämtlichen übrigen; woraus hervorgeht, daß der irreführende Lustbegriff Gefühle zusammenrührt von erdenklich größter Verschiedenheit der Arten, wofern wenigstens sie den Ausdruck bestimmen sollen.[95]

In fairness to psychology it must be noted that in recent years this one-sided method of classifying emotions has given way to much more elaborate classifications, or to the confession that satisfactory classifications are impossible.

A preliminary survey of the words expressing pleasurable emotions reveals to the mind that allows itself to be influenced by the *magic* of words[96] the presence of words which are symbols of deep emotions and of others which appear to be shallow; there are still many others that seem neither deep nor shallow. This first impression of our field in its totality agrees with what has been said by others, e.g., "Gefühle lassen sich bestimmen nach ihrer Tiefe (Innigkeit) oder Flachheit, was sie von anderen Erlebnissen unterscheidet."[97] Therefore we might start our detailed survey of the field by examining the *depth gradation* of the linguistic material. Since our starting point derives from the author's personal approach and therefore might not carry immediate conviction

---

[95] *Ausdrucksbewegung und Gestaltungskraft,* pp. 22 f.

[96] "Das Gefühlsleben des Menschen steigert sich am Wort in größere Lebendigkeit und Tiefe, und diese Fähigkeit des Wortes, die unsagbaren Empfindungen und Gefühle und Stimmungen während eines Erlebens zu bannen, wird schlechthin besondere Fähigkeit des Klanges" (Schmidt-Rohr, *Mutter Sprache,* p. 109).

Cf. a similar remark in Dornseiff, *Der deutsche Wortschatz nach Sachgruppen,* p. 276.

[97] *Der Neue Brockhaus,* vol. II, 172, article "Gefühl."

to the reader, it seems advisable to try to obtain support for this procedure.

In all psychological discussions of the emotions the conception of *polarity* appears as one of the most essential features. The first step in this direction resulted in the old *pleasantness - unpleasantness* scheme, a unidimensional system of arrangement, which because of its inadequacy was replaced by Wundt's *tridimensional* system of feeling. He added two other pairs of opposites to the original one: *excitement - calm* and *strain - relaxation.* Wundt's system is certainly helpful in describing feelings from different points of view, but most emotional words tell us more about the total qualities of various feelings than Wundt's system does, which allows us merely to determine a complex of degrees on the basis of three types of polarity. Not only must we consider other types of polarity (some of them discovered only recently), we must also survey the field from entirely different viewpoints, which will be discussed later.[98]

One pair of opposites, *depth - surface,* has been especially emphasized in modern works dealing with emotions. According to William Stern,

> *Depth* is not a psychological but a personal dimension . . . depth refers to the strata within the person, located at varying distances from the surface where contact with the world takes place. The "deeper" a content or process lies, the more it represents the person himself. . . . Naturally there are no objective measures for the degree of affective depth. The subjective certainty, on the one hand, of the person feeling, and on the other the emphatic interpretation by the outside observer, must take the place of objective measures. The previously discussed attributes of intensity, breadth, and duration are by no means clear-cut evidence of the depth of feeling. Feelings are called "superficial" when they relate chiefly to the individual's point of contact with the world and vary with every change of environmental stimulation. . . .[99]

We have to accept the verdict of the psychologist that his science does not offer any objective measures for the degree of depth of the emotions which he is trying to study by his own methods. This raises the question whether he has made use of all possible means at his command. It seems to me that he has neglected the sum total of the observations of millions of intelligent human beings whose *Sprachgeist*

---

[98] Stern, *General Psychology from the Personalistic Standpoint,* p. 517.
[99] *General Psychology . . . ,* p. 543.

has created linguistic systems expressing fine distinctions of degrees of emotional depth, intensity, breadth, etc., on the basis of their subjective and empathic experiences. Every one of these systems may be deficient, and it would be expecting too much of them to provide us with definite objective measures alien to the very nature of language; but they might at least help us to gain a deeper insight into the whole problem of emotions, especially if we compare such systems with each other. Stern himself mentions one important case in which psychology has recourse to the Japanese *Sprachgeist.* "T. Chiha introduced the Japanese name '*Muki*-feeling' for an elementary emotional state that is neither pleasantness nor unpleasantness, nor yet indifference."[100]

Great thinkers like Klages and Scheler have pointed the way in the right direction by making frequent use of the linguistic facts. Thus Klages says:

Der Sprachgebrauch folgt dem Sachverhalt mit der uns schon geläufigen Schmiegsamkeit. . . . Auf Grund seines Sprachsinnes weiß es ein jeder, daß Tiefe eines Gefühls etwas gänzlich anderes ist als dessen Heftigkeit oder Stärke. . . . Es kann also heftig bewegt und zugleich flach sein, hinwiederum tief und zugleich "still." Ärger, Vergnügtheit, Eigensinn, Staunen, Furcht z.B. bieten bisweilen bei größter Flachheit einen außerordentlichen Grad von Bewegtheit dar; Liebe, Inbrunst, Seligkeit, Bewunderung, "Versunkenheit" bei außerordentlicher Unbewegtheit die größte Tiefe.[101]

Scheler is more specific concerning degrees of depth than Klages. It is impossible to quote in detail everything he has contributed to our question; besides his manner of following the intuition of the moment and the occasional obscurity of his language have forced me to sift out what seemed to be essential in order to arrive at a simplified method for the purpose of this study.[102] In the first place he emphasizes the *subjectivity* of all feelings, the *generelle Ichbezogenheit der Gefühle.*

Alle Gefühle überhaupt besitzen eine erlebte Bezogenheit auf das Ich (oder die Person), die sie von anderen Inhalten und Funktionen (Empfinden, Vorstellen

---

[100] *Ibid.*, p. 517.

[101] *Ausdrucksbewegung und Gestaltungskraft,* pp. 35 f. In this passage Klages does not distinguish clearly enough between *intensity* and *agitation.*

Cf. also *Meyers Lexikon, s.v.* "Gefühl": "Außerdem besteht der Grundunterschied 'Tiefe' oder 'Innigkeit' und 'Flachheit' der Gefühle. Diese 'Tiefendimension' der Gefühle fällt nicht zusammen mit der Intensität."

[102] *Der Formalismus in der Ethik* . . . , pp. 90, 340-357.

usw.) scheidet, eine Bezogenheit, die prinzipiell verschieden ist von jener, die auch ein Vorstellen, Wollen und Denken begleiten kann.[103]

In the second place, in a manner very much like Stern's, he singles out and investigates depth gradation of feelings (*Tiefenschichtung*), keeping attributes of feelings such as intensity clearly apart from it. In contrast to Stern he makes use of the facts of language and thereby gains better insight—in a sketchy, not a methodical way—into depth gradation or what he calls *Tiefendimensionen.*

Es kann zunächst gar kein Zweifel bestehen, daß die Tatsachen, welche schon eine feiner differenzierende Sprache wie die deutsche mit Seligkeit, Glückseligkeit, Glücklichsein (das Wort "Glück" wird häufig auch objektiv gebraucht, wie in "Glück haben"), Heiterkeit, Fröhlichkeit, Wohlgefühl, sinnliche Lust und Annehmlichkeit bezeichnet, nicht immer dieselben Arten von Gefühlstatsachen sind, die etwa nur an Intensität verschieden seien, oder mit verschiedenen Empfindungen und verschiedenen gegenständlichen Korrelaten verbunden wären. In diesen Worten (wie in ihren Gegenteilen "Verzweiflung," "Elend," "Unglück," "Trauer," "Leid," "unfroh," "unangenehm" usw.) werden vielmehr scharf umrissene V e r s c h i e d e n h e i t e n der betreffenden positiven oder negativen Gefühle selbst bezeichnet.[104]

Scheler finds these words as indicative of various degrees of depth of feelings. Some of our feelings have *zentrale Ichtiefe,* others are located on the surface or periphery of our soul. Feelings have either *Ichnähe* (nearness to the Ego) or *Ichferne* (distance or remoteness from the Ego). E.g., he claims that expressions like "ich fühle mich traurig," "ich fühle Trauer," "ich bin traurig" characterize—in this order—increasing nearness to the Ego. He studies differences in depth by examining the coexistence of positive and negative feelings. E.g., when we suffer a great loss we may remain *heiter* and *ruhig,* while we cannot be *froh* in that situation. In the midst of deep sorrow we may

---

[103] *Ibid.,* p. 344. This should be compared with Stern, *General Psychology . . . ,* p. 526: "The thesis then is: Feelings have a 'subjective' character;—perceptions, ideas, acts of will, an 'objective' character. That it may not be misunderstood, this very important distinction requires more exact definition. If it is regarded purely in terms of the psychology of consciousness, it means that the feelings come into experience as indicators of the states and processes of the self, while perceptions, images, ideas, and volitions do so as indicators of objects outside the subject." The fact that most feelings are combined with a conscious intention to *objectification,* that feelings may have both subjectifying and objectifying trends, does not interest us at this point.

[104] *Der Formalismus in der Ethik . . . ,* p. 342.

show *ein frohes Lächeln.* In this *Frohheit,* according to Scheler, we move as it were out of our central *Ichtiefe* into a surface layer of our soul; whether we stay there for a long or a short time, the deep sorrow remains in that *Ichtiefe.* Thus Luther says after the death of his little daughter: "Ich bin ja fröhlich im Geist, aber nach dem Fleisch bin ich sehr traurig."[105]

It was my first intention to arrange the words for pleasurable emotions under four different headings representing four degrees of depth: 1. Seligkeit; 2. Glücksgefühl; 3. Freuden (plural!); 4. Vergnügen. (The corresponding headings in the negative field might be: 1. Verzweiflung; 2. Gefühl des Elends; 3. Leiden; 4. Unbehagen.) To test this scheme I arranged all German and English words in a chart under these headings, and that helped a great deal to clarify the whole problem, but at the same time it revealed that a dangerous arbitrariness would arise in assigning their proper places to the single words, resulting in an artificial narrowing of their meanings. It need not be repeated that in this chapter we are concerned only with one aspect of our linguistic material: the degree of depth of feeling expressed by words. Examination of the words in many contexts proved conclusively that some of them are capable of expressing any degree of depth from nearness to the person to remoteness from the person, others are definitely deep or definitely shallow, others oscillate, as it were, in various places between these two counterpoles, tending in either one or the other direction or in both directions. All of them, of course, are more or less *hazy.*

I. There is in German as well as in English a large number of words that do not stress depth of feeling. At the same time they are borderline cases, i.e., they straddle the "boundaries" of the field of pleasurable emotions and belong also in other fields; they express also, e.g., conceptions in the spheres of sensation, causation, intellect, volition, sympathetic affections, pleasurable release of fear or other tensions, etc. Here is a list of such words, first German, then English:

angenehm	*befriedigen*	*behaglich*
animieren	*befriedigend*	*Behaglichkeit*
Annehmlichkeit	*befriedigt*	*beleben*
aufgeweckt	*Befriedigung*	*belebend*
aufmuntern	*beglückwünschen*	*beruhigen*
Aufmunterung	*Behagen*	*beruhigend*

[105] Martin Luther, *Tischreden,* "Der Tod," Reclam, Leipzig, 1878, p. 297.

beruhigt
Beruhigung
besänftigen
besänftigend
besänftigt
Besänftigung
beschwichtigen
bunt
erfrischen
erfrischend
erfrischt
Erfrischung
erleichtern
erleichtert
Erleichterung
erlösen
erlöst
Erlösung
erquicken
erquickend
erquicklich
erquickt
Erquickung
Feier
Fest
Festlichkeit
flott
freundlich
frisch
gefallen
Gelächter
gemütlich
gern
Glückwunsch
herrlich
jovial
Jovialität
kurzweilig
laben
Labsal
lächeln
lachen
Laune
Leben
Lebendigkeit
lebenslustig
lebhaft
Lebhaftigkeit
leichtherzig
lieb
lindern
Linderung
Lustbarkeit
mildern
Milderung
Saus und Braus
Scherz
scherzen
scherzhaft
Scherzhaftigkeit
Schmaus (Ohrenschmaus)
schmunzeln
sich sonnen
Spaß
spaßen
spaßhaft
Spaßhaftigkeit
unbesorgt
Unterhaltung
versüßen
Weide (Augenweide)
sich weiden
zufrieden
Zufriedenheit

agreeable
alacrity
alert
alertness
animate
animation
bright(ly)
brighten
brisk
buoyant
comfort
comfortable
comforting
congratulate
congratulation
content
contented
contentment
delicious
deliver
deliverance
disport
divert
diverted
diverting
ease
easement
easy
encourage
encouragement
encouraging
enliven
enlivening
entertain
entertainment
entertaining
exuberance
exuberant
fascinate
fascinated
fascinating
fascination

feast
felicitate
felicitous
fond
frisk
frolic
frolicsome
fruition
funny
genial
geniality
gratification
gratified
gratify
gratifying
invigorate
jest
joke
laugh
laughter
liveliness
lively
lustily
lustiness
lusty
mischief
mischievous
mitigate
pacify
placid
placidity
relief
relieve
satisfaction
satisfied
satisfy
satisfying
serene
serenity
shout
smile
soften
soothe
soothing
spirits
sport
sportive
tranquil
tranquilize
tranquillity
vivify
wanton
winsome
zest
zestful[106]

II. There is furthermore in both languages a comparatively small number of words belonging exclusively or predominantly in the field of pleasurable emotions and expressing shallow feelings. These words are:

amüsant
amüsieren
aufgeräumt
Aufgeräumtheit
belustigen
Belustigung
erfreulich
fidel
Gaudium
lustig
Lustigkeit
munter
Munterkeit
Übermut
übermütig
vergnüglich
Vergnüglichkeit
vergnügt
Vergnügtheit

amuse
amusement
amusing
cheer
cheeriness
cheery
delectable
exhilarate
exhilaration
fun
gaiety
gay
gladly
gusto
hilarious

[106] *comfort, content, ease, feast, jest, joke, laugh, smile* are both nouns and verbs. Whenever necessary *n.* or *v.* is added to such words.

hilarity	*merriment*	*pleased*
jollity	*mirth*	*pleasing*
jolly	*mirthful*	*sprightliness*
jovial	*pleasant*	*sprightly*
joviality	*please*	

The inclusion of some of the words in this group calls for comment. Although none of them expresses depth of pleasurable emotion there are, quite apart from other differences in meaning which are not discussed in this chapter, certain inequalities noticeable in their use in consequence of which they cannot be considered quite uniformly shallow. Of course no definite gradation is possible in this respect. Words like *amüsieren, belustigen, erfreulich, vergnüglich, amuse, delectable, exhilarate, fun, gladly, gusto, hilarious, jolly, jovial, merriment, mirth, please,* all express surface emotions, mostly brought about by external situations.

E.g., "ich hatte ein amüsantes Erlebnis"; "sie hat sich auf dem Ball gut amüsiert" ("had a good time"); "er belustigte seine Zuhörer mit komischen Vorträgen, trug zur Belustigung seiner Zuhörer bei"; "das ist eine vergnügliche Sache"; "eine erfreuliche Nachricht," sometimes slightly ironical; *erfreulicherweise* 'fortunately' reaches into another field ("good luck," "Glück," "chance," "Zufall").

"Whatever *amuses* serves to kill time" *Cr;* "he amuses (or disports) himself" 'er belustigt sich'; "the spirits are *exhilarated* by the convivialities of social life" *Cr;* "it was great fun" 'wir hatten viel Spaß'; *gladly* 'mit Vergnügen, mit Freuden, gern' expresses not only pleasurable emotion, but also willingness or conventional politeness; *mirth, merriment, joviality, jollity, hilarity:* "these terms all express that species of gaiety or joy which belongs to company, or to men in their social intercourse" *Cr;* some of these words and also adjectives like *hilarious, mirthful, jovial, jolly* seem to be slightly less shallow, at least sometimes, than, e.g., *amüsant* or *amusing.*

If we compare *vergnügt* with *vergnüglich, lustig* or *munter* with *amüsant, gaiety* with *merriment* we feel that there is some difference as to the range of depth between them; we might say that words like *vergnügt, lustig, munter, gaiety* express feelings somewhat closer to the person, or at least that they are not always quite as shallow as *vergnüglich* or *amüsant.* "Er war ganz aufgeräumt" hardly differs in meaning from "er war ganz heiter," and *heiter* is a word capable of expressing

great depth of emotion as well as shallowness. The "real" meaning of *aufgeräumt* 'von unnützen, schweren Gedanken befreit' (*Paul*) is known only to the Germanist and should have no bearing on our judging the gradients of depth (or shallowness) of feeling implied in the use of the word. *Lustig* and *Lustigkeit* may be almost synonymous with *aufgeräumt* and *Aufgeräumtheit* in many contexts; in others they may differ. "Er ist immer lustig" is practically identical with "er ist immer aufgeräumt"; the emotions expressed in these sentences are placed in the same strata of the person. In expressions like "lustige Leute," "lustige Geschichten," "lustiger Abend," "da geht's lustig her," one cannot substitute *aufgeräumt* for *lustig,* but this does not mean at all that there is a difference in degree of depth between the two adjectives.

Munter, Munterkeit, vergnügt, Vergnügtheit may be equally shallow in many contexts and situations; "munter und vergnügt" and "vergnügt und munter" are word complexes expressing just one identical type of emotion; then again a person may be "innerlich vergnügt," but not "innerlich munter," and the noun *Vergnügen* may express even deeper emotion than the adjective *vergnügt,* especially when modified by adjectives like *selten* or *himmlisch.* Thus in summing up one might say that *vergnügt* and *Vergnügen,* although on the whole quite shallow, may express also a degree of depth of which *munter* and *Munterkeit* are incapable.

Übermut and *übermütig* are predominantly shallow too; however, sometimes the *Übermut* may be somewhat less remote from the Ego, e.g., "das Mädchen wußte sich vor Übermut nicht zu lassen"; sometimes it may reach into the ethical field, e.g., "Übermut tut selten gut." *Fidel* and *Gaudium* originally belonged to the students' language, and they are somewhat slangy or *burschikos;* in shallowness they equal *lustig, Lustigkeit, Spaß,* just like the South Eastern German word *Gaudi.*

There are also some English words—I think fewer in number—which, though naturally not identical in meaning with any of the German words discussed in the last paragraph, are similarly of a wider range in depth; they too do not express really deep emotions. *Sprightliness* hardly expresses more depth than, e.g., *mirth;* "with *mirth* there is more of tumult and noise; with *sprightliness* there is more buoyancy" *Cr; "mirth* is an occasional elevation of the spirits; *sprightliness* lies in the temperature and flow of the blood" *Cr. Sprightly* comes near meaning 'animated, lively' in "a sprightly dance, air, youth."

To cheer is deeper than *belustigen* and comes close to *aufheitern;* "the conversation of a kind and considerate friend *cheers* the drooping spirits in the moments of trouble" *Cr; "cheering* may be effected either by the direct effort of others or by anything passing outward or inward" *Cr.* The noun *cheer* may mean 'gaiety; mirth; cheerfulness; animation; that which is provided for entertainment, esp. at table . . . ; that which cheers or gladdens . . . ; a shout, hurrah, or acclamation, expressing joy, enthusiasm, applause, favor, etc. . . .' *Wb;* thus on the whole it would express rather shallow feelings. *Cheery* and *cheeriness* cover approximately the same depth gradients as *sprightly, munter, vergnügt.*

Gay and *gaiety* express feelings about as remote from the Ego as *lustig, Lustigkeit,* also *fröhlich, Fröhlichkeit* in their shallower meanings; furthermore they tend to reach beyond our field in the meanings 'liederlich, ausschweifend' ("gay woman, gay life"). *"Gay* objects please or delight the senses . . . *gay* attire, a *gay* scene, *gay* colors, etc." *Cr;* "he waved gaily, he was very happy." *Gaiety* is external in the demeanour, or in objects which tend to excite delight, as bright or festive scenes and exhibitions" *SSD;* in dictionaries we find meanings such as: 'merrymaking, festivity, pleasure-seeking, a festive occasion, a lively entertainment, bright appearance, showiness' (*NED*); 'merriment, fun' (*FW*); synonyms like *liveliness, vicacity, sprightliness, jollity* (*Wb*), all of which testifies to the fact that *gaiety* is one of the most frequently used words in the field.

III. A third group of words has been set up the "boundary lines" of which seem to be even hazier than those of the first two, i.e., one might feel inclined to assign some of the following words to either the second or a fourth group which will be discussed below. This third group contains words which seem to cover a comparatively wide range of depth gradients with a definite tendency to express not only feelings more or less remote from the Ego but also those quite near it. Such words are:

aufheitern	*Erheiterung*	*hoffnungsvoll*
ausgelassen	*sich freuen*	*jauchzen*
Ausgelassenheit	*froh*	*Jubel*
bezaubern	*fröhlich*	*jubeln*
erfreuen	*frohlocken*	*Lebensfreude*
ergötzen	*Frohsinn*	*Lebenslust*
Ergötzen	*gehoben*	*Lebensmut*
erheitern	*Genuß*	*Mitfreude*

schwärmen	*Vergnügen*	*wohlgemut*
Taumel	*Vorfreude*	*Wollust*
Triumph	*wohl*	
triumphieren	*Wohlgefühl*	

anticipate	*delightful*	*gladsome*
anticipation	*enchant*	*glee*
blithe	*enchanted*	*gleeful*
blithely	*enchanting*	*jubilant*
blithesome	*enchantment*	*jubilate*
captivate	*enjoy*	*jubilation*
captivating	*enjoyment*	*merry*
charm	*exult*	*pleasure*
charmed	*exultation*	*pleasurable*
charming	*felicity*	*triumph*
cheerful	*glad*	*triumphal*
cheerfulness	*gladden*	*triumphant*
delighted	*gladness*	

Ausgelassen and *Ausgelassenheit* might be placed in the second group with words like *übermütig* or *aufgeräumt;* unquestionably they are more kinetic than the latter two, a fact which in itself has no bearing on the degree of depth they may express. Yet, when I say, e.g., "er ist ganz *ausgelassen* vor Freude," my *Sprachgefühl* tells me that a deeper emotion is the cause of a person's behavior than when I use *übermütig* instead; "aufgeräumt vor Freude" is hardly idiomatic German, and "er ist aufgeräumt" expresses a shallower feeling. In sentences like "zum Ergötzen (Gaudium, zur Belustigung) der Mitmenschen verlor er seine Perücke" the joy expressed by *Ergötzen* is not deep; but in "er ergötzte sich höchlich (tief innerlich) an meiner Verlegenheit" the word *ergötzen,* in combination with the adverbs, implies profound feeling. On the whole both these words are rarer than they used to be and they no longer express noble feelings. (Goethe, *Die Aufgeregten,* iv,2: "dieser edle Zorn ergötzt mich.")

Aufheitern, erheitern, Erheiterung describe the causing or arousing of emotions mostly deeper than *Gaudium, Lustigkeit,* or *gaiety; belustigen* is shallower than *aufheitern* or *erheitern. Erfreuen* and *sich freuen* cover a wide range of degrees of depth, but they never equal in depth expressions like *selig* or *glückselig sein,* unless they are modi-

fied, e.g., by adverbs like *sich tief innerlich freuen.* Later on we shall see that *Freude* may express nearly every degree of depth; in compounds, however, like *Lebensfreude, Mitfreude, Vorfreude,* its range seems to be narrowed down, though it may be widened again by modifiers like *höchste Lebensfreude, innigste Mitfreude,* etc. The same is true of *Lebenslust. Lebensmut* reaches into the ethical sphere, just like *wohlgemut,* and both these words are never really shallow. *Wohl* has many meanings depending on the context; the word *Wohlgefühl* and a sentence like "ich habe mich nie so wohl gefühlt wie heute" express a definite element of pleasure by which a person can be more or less deeply affected. This might also be said of *hoffnungsvoll* and *gehobene Stimmung.*

Jauchzen, jubeln, Jubel, frohlocken are almost "synonyms" for utterances of emotions which may be deep or shallow. *Taumel* and *schwärmen* have a wide range too, e.g., *Freudentaumel, Taumel des Vergnügens;* "sie *schwärmt* für Jazzmusik"; "er *schwärmt* für die Werke dieses Dichters." Both of these words reach into other fields. I am not prepared to decide whether these words ever express the highest possible degree of depth of feeling or real "nearness to the Ego"; I doubt it very much in the case of *Taumel.* If we examine *schwärmen* with regard to the polarity *genuineness - non-genuineness,* which is related to and hardly distinguishable from *depth - superficiality,* we may tread on somewhat safer ground in asserting that *schwärmen* tends to express *non-genuine* feelings.[107]

Bezaubern does not imply great depth of emotion; it even has a tendency to become more and more conventional; e.g., "sie bezaubert alle durch ihre Liebenswürdigkeit," "eine bezaubernde Erscheinung." *Wollust* expresses an emotion which may be located near the center of the person, but in its present day use the negative moral value of the word seems to outweigh its value in our field so much that it seems almost impossible to determine how shallow or deep it is in as far as it indicates pleasurable emotions. The use of *Genuß* is not limited to our field either, but it is comparatively easy to arrive at the statement that the word expresses more shallow than deep feelings, unless modified by adjectives like *wahr, groß, rein, hoch* (*hoher Genuß, Hochgenuß*). The noun *Vergnügen* may indicate emotions that are

---

[107] Cf. Stern, *General Psychology* . . . , p. 544. "The enthusiasm of an adolescent girl for the high art of a tenor is non-genuine, since not aesthetic but erotic needs provide the basis of the feeling."

very much on the surface; it even means 'entertainment,' and thus it may be shallower than *vergnügt*. On the other hand it may express deeper feelings than the latter. In its use the degree of emotional depth is determined by situation, context, and modifiers; it may be linked with adjectives like *himmlisch, selten, groß, innig, kindlich, kindisch, töricht, zweifelhaft, dumm,* etc. It may be also a mere term of politeness, e.g., "mit (dem größten) Vergnügen; das Vergnügen ist ganz auf meiner Seite; ich erfahre zu meinem Vergnügen, daß. . . ."

The difference between *froh* and *fröhlich* is hardly to be found in different depth ranges. All that might be stated in this respect is a great deal of similarity in usage. Thus in the following word-complexes the substitution of *fröhlich* for *froh* does not noticeably change the depth gradient. "Sie ist immer froh; ein frohes Kind; er ist immer frohen Muts; ein frohes Fest, Gesicht, Herz; eine frohe Gesellschaft." I am doubtful about "innerlich froh" versus "innerlich fröhlich." When I apply the latter to the same profound emotion as the former I may be influenced by the language of literature, of Luther and the Bible. In "O du fröhliche, o du selige gnadenbringende Weihnachtszeit," in Luther's "Ich bin ja fröhlich im Geist," the word gives utterance to the deepest human feelings. A. Götze's *Frühneuhochdeutsches Glossar* quotes only the meanings 'frei heraus, getrost' for the adverb *fröhlich,* which would place it outside our field; *froh* is not mentioned at all; MHG *vrô* does not seem to differ considerably from NHG *froh.*[108] *Froher* or *fröhlicher Sinn* are slightly stronger or more intense than *Frohsinn,* but hardly deeper.

The adjective *blithe* is antiquated and, according to *NED,* rarely used in modern English prose or speech, but still spoken in Scotland. The same is true of *blithely* and *blithesome,* judging from *NED's* quotations, all of which are poetical. It is not uncommon, however, to use conscious archaisms in a humorous fashion. Thus a student

---

[108] "Der *Fröhliche* ist gleichsam halbfroh, beginnt sich zu freuen; *frohe Empfindung, froher Mut* gehen tiefer als eine bloß *fröhliche,* als ein bloß *fröhlicher*" *DW.* The difficulty with *DW* and with *NED* is the lack of emphasis on the modern language, and the fact that entirely too many quotations are definitely poetical.

"Luther setzt in der Bibel *frölich* viel häufiger als *fro,* meistens auch praedicativ" *DW.*

Concerning MHG usage cf.:

Bock, *Wolfram v. Eschenbachs Bilder und Wörter für Freude und Leid.*

Korn, *Studien über "Freude und Trûren" bei mhd. Dichtern.*

The meaning changes of these and similar emotional words call for a good deal of historical "field" research, covering the period from early NHG to the present.

once told me: "We skipped *blithefully* over the philosophy of the Romantic movement, of which I am *blissfully* ignorant." (He may have been conscious of my preoccupation with that type of words.) On the whole, if used at all, these words do not seem to express great depth of emotion.

Of the words *charm, charmed, charming, captivate, captivating, enchant, enchanting, enchanted, enchantment* the last four seem to be more definitely placed in the field of pleasurable emotions and capable of expressing deeper joy than the others (though mainly in poetry). *Charm* (verb and noun), *charming* and *charmed* belong more to the *Umgangssprache* than the others and may therefore tend more to the shallow side. "A charming young lady" may be merely an expression of politeness. *Fascinate* has not been included in this group because, especially in its participial form *fascinating,* it is just a *Modewort* and as such not expressive of either deep or definitely pleasurable emotion, or it may be more intense but not deeper or more pleasurable than the others. "A bad woman may have more power to *fascinate* than a modest woman." *Cr. Cr* claims that *fascinate* and *captivate* are "oftener used in a bad sense than a good one," which I doubt.[109] It is one of those general statements which can be proved or disproved only on the basis of detailed special research. The quotations which I have collected for *captivate* are either of a literary nature or point out not particularly deep pleasures derived from poetical, rhetorical, or flowery language.

Exult, exultation, jubilant, jubilate, jubilation are very similar to *frohlocken, Jubel, jubeln, jauchzen* in their range of depth. The words *triumph, triumphal, triumphant* and the German *Triumph* and *triumphieren,* as far as they belong in our field, are very similar to *exult, exultation, frohlocken,* etc. *Anticipate* and *anticipation* in the meanings 'sich freuen auf . . . ,' 'Vorfreude' (which will be discussed in a later chapter) range in depth with these German expressions, of course, only if the situation or context make it clear that they are to be understood in that sense; otherwise they are neutral as far as pleasurable emotion is concerned.

Enjoy, enjoyment express the same degrees of depth as *sich freuen;* when they refer to some external cause or object of joy as in *to enjoy*

[109] B. Q. Morgan shares my doubt: "In America there is no bad color in either word *per se,* only in a given context or situation. I could easily say that I found a young girl 'fascinating,' or that she had a 'captivating' manner; nothing derogatory to her would be implied" (*Letter* dated Apr. 28, 1940).

something, enjoyment of something, sich freuen an or *über . . . , Freude an* or *über . . . ,* they seem to me, as a rule, to be less expressive of real depth than the words *joy* or *Freude* in some of their absolute uses as expressions of spontaneous emotional acts or states; in the latter sense even *sich freuen* seems capable of expressing greater depth than *enjoy,* e.g., "ich freue mich so sehr, von ganzem Herzen." *To enjoy oneself* is shallower than *to rejoice,* or *sich freuen* in the last mentioned context; *NED*: *"Enjoy refl.* To experience pleasure, be happy; now chiefly, to find pleasure in an occasion of festivitity or social intercourse, in a period of recreation, etc." *Enjoyment,* though in no instance as suggestive of depth as *joy,* is less shallow than *fruition;* e.g., *"enjoyment,* but not *fruition* of music or of study." (Of course in general *fruition* is very much over the border of our field.)

Merry is synonymous with *hilarious, gay, mirthful,* etc., and might therefore have been placed in our second group of words. Yet sometimes it seems to express deeper emotions, much like *fröhlich;* e.g., "Merry England." *Pleasure* presents some difficulties. Through the influence of psychological and philosophical language it has become a generic term, and thus shares the fate of German *Lust,* which, however, seems to me to have a wider depth-dimensional range than *pleasure* in ordinary language. In this connection I might mention also that the adjective *pleasurable* is used in this study as a generic term in preference to the definitely shallow *pleasant,* which psychologists use as an alternative for *pleasurable.* It should be noted also that *pleasing* is often close to *pleasurable.* A typically misleading definition, influenced by an older school of psychology, is this: "Pleasure is a very extensive word, embracing almost every feeling or sensation which is not painful, from its lowest to its highest degree" *SSD.*

Certainly words like *joy* or *delight* often express much greater depth of feeling than *pleasure* ever could. *Krüger* even says: "Pleasure bezeichnet nur einen mäßigen Grad von Befriedigung. Books no longer give me any pleasure. . . . You have spoiled my pleasure utterly. . . . I take no pleasure in dancing." In cases like "Our children give us so much pleasure; a workman must take pleasure in his work" *pleasure* corresponds in meaning to *Freude* and indicates a deeper emotion than *Vergnügen,* with which it is often translated. Often it is a term of politeness as in "It gives me much pleasure to inform you. . . ." *Wb's* definition 2 places it in the field of volition: "What the will dictates or

prefers as gratifying or satisfying; hence, will; choice; wish; purpose."[110] Like *pleasure* and *pleased, delighted* is frequently just a conventional term as in "delighted to meet you." It seems remarkable how shallow *delighted* and *delightful* can be, whereas *delight n.* frequently expresses the deepest emotions. The genesis of this and similar pejorative changes seems worth more detailed research.

Though *glee* and *gleeful* very nearly equal *gaiety, merriment, gay* in depth range, there are also instances that point to greater depth in occasional usage; e.g., "it is natural that rumors of projected drives against Britain's vulnerable sectors should be received with glee in Rome."[111] *Felicity* means a state of supreme happiness, but it loses much of its depth because it is a rather cold and formal word. *Cheerful* and *cheerfulness* extend over a wide range of gradients of depth though they are never as deep as *selig, Seligkeit.* We say "a cheerful person, face, room," and we may render *cheerfulness* with 'Heiterkeit, Fröhlichkeit, Munterkeit, Frohsinn.' On one hand *Cr* defines *cheerfulness* as "an even tenor of the mind, which it may preserve of itself independently of all external circumstances," and he speaks of the zealous Christian who "cheerfully submits to every hardship"; on the other we find in commercial language "we'll cheerfully refund your money," which reveals the same devaluation of much used words that was found in *delighted* and others.

If we compare *gladly* (the meaning of which has been discussed above) with *glad* and *gladness,* it seems that the loss of emotional value is greatest in the adverb, less great in the adjective, and hardly noticeable in the noun. *Krüger* remarks that *gladness* "ist stärker als *glad,*" and in *NED* (Glad 3) we find "In mod. Eng. (at least in prose use) the sense is much weaker than that which the word had in the older language, and which appears in the derivatives *gladly, gladness.* In general 'pleased' would now be an adequate synonym, while 'delighted' and 'rejoiced' suggest a much stronger feeling." The difficulty with these definitions is the use of the vague opposites *strong : weak, stark : schwach*; we never know whether or not they refer only to high and low degrees of intensity. Like the psychologists, linguists and dictionary-makers should distinguish more clearly between different

[110] Morgan thinks "the use of *please* and *pleasure* to denote what is willed derives from court usage." He draws my attention to the phrases "May it please your majesty" and "What is your pleasure" (*ibid.*).

[111] Morgan (*ibid.*): "I think *glee* is definitely deeper in range than *gaiety.* One might say 'deep (profound) glee' but never 'deep gaiety.'"

kinds of polarity. I feel inclined to interpret *NED's* statement like this: *glad* is shallower than *gladness*; it is less intense than *gladly,* if and when the latter emphasizes volition; *glad* 'pleased' is less deep and less intense than *rejoiced* and *delighted,* apart from the conventionally polite use of the latter. Furthermore it seems to me that *glad* still is capable of greater depth than *pleased* because the value of the word as revealed in poetical usage (e.g., *glad tidings*) is not entirely lost in the *Umgangssprache.*[112] An excellent comparison between *joy* and *gladness* is made by *FW: "Joy* is deeper than *gladness* to which it is akin." As to depth range, *gladden* and *gladsome* apparently differ very little from *gladness.*[113]

IV. Our fourth group contains words which predominantly express, or which can express, the deepest of our pleasurable emotions:

begeistern	*Entzücken*	*himmlisch*
begeistert	*Freude*	*hingerissen*
Begeisterung	*freudevoll*	*Lust*
beglückt	*freudig*	*Paradies*
Beglückheit	*Freudigkeit*	*Rausch*
berauschen	*Glück*	*selig*
berücken	*glücklich*	*Seligkeit*
beseelen	*glückselig*	*überglücklich*
beseligen	*Glückseligkeit*	*verzücken*
Beseligung	*heiter*	*Verzückung*
Ekstase	*Heiterkeit*	*Wonne*
entzücken	*Himmel*	
beatific	*ecstasy*	*happiness*
beatitude	*ecstatic*	*heaven*
blessed	*elated*	*heavenly*
blessedness	*elation*	*happy*
bliss	*enrapture*	*intoxicate*
blissful	*enthusiasm*	*intoxicated*
blissfulness	*enthusiastic*	*intoxicating*
delight	*entrance*	*joy*

[112] E.g., "I am very glad that you are going along" (*ibid.*).

[113] "It is difficult to determine the depth of *gladsome,* as it has become a 'precious' word and therefore artificial. I think it has little depth, and less range than *gladness,* which has more than *gladden*" (*ibid.*).

joyful	*rapturous*	*thrill*
joyfulness	*ravish*	*thrilled*
joyous	*ravishing*	*thrilling*
overjoyed	*ravishment*	*transport*
paradise	*rejoice*	
rapture	*rejoicing*	

German *Lust* belongs in the sphere of volitions as well as in that of emotions. The use of the word in psychology has been mentioned above, also the criticism which Klages directs at this use.[114] Even Klages, however, does not seem to realize the almost limitless number of meanings which this word has. M. Geiger, who discusses *Lust* and *Glück* at some length, is justified in using *Lust* in a narrower sense because he bases his discussion on the following definition: "Lust dagegen—wie die Psychologie diesen Ausdruck gewöhnlich gebraucht—als Vergnügen, Freude, Genuß—ist ein einzelnes Geschehnis." Moreover, in a certain sense, he does justice to linguistic facts by saying:

. . . die Freude über einen Erfolg mag den Künstler so überströmen, daß er glückselig in der Welt herumläuft, erstaunt, daß nicht jeder an seinem Glück teilnimmt, aber dann hat sich die Lust gleichsam von ihrer Veranlassung losgelöst und ist selbständig geworden und w i r d zum Glück.[115]

Should the artist in that state of mind express his feelings he might exclaim: "Es ist eine Lust zu leben!" We might say: "Er schwelgt in Lust und Freude; sein Herz ist voller Lust und Wonne." My *Sprachgefühl* tells me that in these three sentences *Lust* is a synonym of *Glück,* and that it expresses the deepest kind of emotion. Therefore one should take the following discussion of *Glück* and *Lust* by Geiger for what it is: a scientific construction:

Glück ist ein personaler Zustand, Lust ist zunächst die Umkleidung eines einzelnen Geschehens. . . . Erst die künstlerische Tiefenwirkung geht auf die Person, auf die Sphäre des tiefsten Ich und erhebt sich damit aus der Schicht der Lust in die Schicht des Glückes. Die Wirkung, die an der Oberfläche bleibt, kann nicht zum Glück führen, denn sie dringt nicht zu der personalen Sphäre vor, in der das Glück seinen Ort hat, sie muß sich mit der bloßen Lust begnügen, die an der Oberfläche spielt.[115]

---

[114] See note 95.
[115] *Zugänge zur Ästhetik,* pp. 52-54.

Overemphasis on the depth-value of *Lust* is not intended, and we must realize that the word is also frequently an expression of emotions of the lowest possible order as in *Mordlust, fleischliche, sündige Lust,* etc.; but it would seem that even in these contexts—though without ethical value—the word expresses deep pleasurable emotion. How synthetic linguistic conceptions (*sprachliche Begriffe*) often are, may be illustrated by the phrase *Lust und Liebe.* Though alliterative phrases of this type are frequently perpetuated merely because they are effective or melodious, *Lust und Liebe* in many contexts contains: pleasurable emotion (cf. MHG *liebe* 'Freude'), urge, desire, will, love for work and success, etc. Most of the authors of dictionaries tend to narrow down the content of the word *Lust* in ordinary present-day language because of the presence in their minds of its original meaning 'heftiges Verlangen.'

Freude and *joy* are among the most important words in our field, so much so that they might be considered as nuclear. In "Zu meiner *Freude* kann ich Ihnen mitteilen" the pleasurable emotion of the writer may be quite shallow or non-existent; on the other hand we speak of "rechte, große, herzliche, wahre, innige, hohe, tiefe, tiefinnerlichste Freude." In the language of religion and poetry there are few words that move the innermost heart more than *Freude.* "Er ist zur ewigen Freude eingegangen; Geh' aus, mein Herz, und suche Freud' . . . ; Freude, schöner Götterfunken, . . ." One of the greatest triumphs of the word in music is the "Lied an die Freude" in Beethoven's Ninth Symphony. When in the last movement the instruments have tried in vain to become articulate, with the onset of the word, order arises in the chaos of the masses of tone, and jubilantly all the instruments join the resonant and stirring ode to JOY. Most of the examples in my filing case show average gradients of depth. In a special class are cases like *Schadenfreude* 'malicious joy,' which after all is a pleasurable emotion. On the other hand, in "schlechte, geringe Freude" and in the ironical use of "eine schöne Freude" the word loses its pleasurableness.

It seems significant too that *Freude* is found in an unusually large number of compounds, many of which express deep emotions: *freudebebend, freudeberauscht, freudeglänzend, freudestrahlend, freudetrunken, freudevoll, freudezitternd, Freudentränen,* etc. Less deep are: *Freudenfest, Freudenfeuer, Freudengesang, Freudenruf,* etc. In compounds like *Freudenmädchen, Freudenhaus* pleasurable emotion is absent

in present-day use.[116] The *adj. freudig* is rarely shallow as sometimes, e.g., in "einem freudigen Ereignis entgegensehen"; most of the time it is above average depth, e.g., "freudig ging er in den Tod." The same is true of *Freudigkeit*. "*Freudig* . . . sagt . . . mehr als *froh*, es wird für die höchsten und erhabensten Gefühle des Menschen gebraucht."[117] An interesting derivative of *Freude* is the word *Freudenschaften*, created by Nietzsche:

> Einst hattest du Leidenschaften und nanntest sie böse. Aber jetzt hast du nur noch deine Tugenden: die wuchsen aus deinen Leidenschaften. Du legtest dein höchstes Ziel diesen Leidenschaften ans Herz: da wurden sie deine Tugenden und Freudenschaften.[118]

In the *Umgangssprache* of the lower strata of society the word *heiter* is mostly quite shallow. It occurs in two basic meanings which cannot always be clearly separated from each other: 1. 'clear, bright,' as in "heiteres Wetter, heiterer Tag, heiterer Himmel." This is close to the original meaning of the word 'glänzend,' then 'frei von Trübendem'; but "heiteres Wetter" contains a pleasurable element which is absent in "klares Wetter." 2. 'cheerful, happy,' as in "heitere Stimmung, Laune, heiteres Gemüt, heitere Gesellschaft"; these expressions imply a shallow or average degree of pleasurableness. When used euphemistically ("die Herren waren schon in sehr heiterer Stimmung, angeheitert") or ironically ("das kann ja heiter werden") the word is no longer inside our field. In a more refined type of *Umgangssprache, heiter* and *Heiterkeit* still have something of their former depth, which we find so frequently in Goethe. "Eine wunderbare Heiterkeit hat meine ganze Seele eingenommen."[119] Goethe's sentence "Erfreuliches begegnete dem fürstlichen Hause, daß dem Herzog Bernhard ein Sohn

---

[116] "In *Freudenmädchen* we have what I call a 'crystallization,' i.e., an original meaning or connotation leads to a certain form of expression which retains a sort of petrified existence apart from the realities of life. Would a young man of today say that he was going to a *Freudenhaus?* I think not. Strictly speaking, then, these words are not a part of the 'living language' of today; they are survivals of a past age. It would be difficult to determine just when a word 'dies' and is buried in print; but it should be possible to determine, by persons now living, what are the words in actual use in our day" (B. Q. Morgan, *Letter* dated Apr. 28, 1940). Words of this type in actual use are either euphemistic or vulgar; they vary a great deal in different localities and are subject to rapid change.
Cf. Schiller, *Tell*, V, 2, 15: "Er fühl's, daß er ins Freudenhaus gekommen."

[117] Wilke, *Deutsche Wortkunde*, pp. 350 f.

[118] *Also sprach Zarathustra*, p. 50.

[119] Goethe, *Werther*, Jubiläums-Ausgabe, XVI, 5.

geboren war, ein Ereignis, das allgemeine Heiterkeit verbreitete" reveals the fact that to him *Heiterkeit* meant 'joy' and did not have the ironical color, which in present-day German makes it much shallower.[120]

While *happiness* is almost entirely within our field, the word *Glück* with which it is often translated is not. We are not concerned here with the meanings '(good) luck, hap, fortune, success, fate,' which place *Glück* beyond the limits of our field. In the meaning 'happiness' it is quite generally of average depth, but modified by adjectives such as *tiefstes, höchstes, inneres Glück* it expresses emotions deeply embedded in the soul. *Glücklich* has about the same range of depth as *Glück,* but in its use the emphasis is more definitely on the pleasurable emotions. E.g., "ein glücklicher Mensch, eine glückliche Natur, glücklich allein ist die Seele, die liebt." Sometimes it reaches beyond our field as in "er hat eine glückliche Hand; nun hat er sich glücklich auch das noch verscherzt!" In most of their uses *beglückt* and *Beglücktheit* express deep emotions though the verb *beglücken* is often used ironically: "Er hat mich wieder mal mit seinem Besuch beglückt."

Great depth of feeling is almost always expressed through the words *selig, Seligkeit, beseligen* ('mit Seligkeit erfüllen'), *Beseligung.* E.g., "selige Wonne; selige Stunden; das Kind war ganz selig unterm Weihnachtsbaum; er ist selig vor Glück (= *überglücklich*)." "Die Tiefe des Gefühls ist Seligkeit" (L. Schefer). Uses of *selig* as in "ihr seliger Vater; der Zollkrieg seligen Angedenkens; selig (betrunken) sein" are outside the field of pleasurable emotions. The deepest possible emotion is expressed by the compounds *glückselig, Glückseligkeit* 'supremely happy, blissful; superlative happiness, blissfulness.'

Wonne means 'deep joy, happiness; bliss, ecstasy,' but as a word of deep emotional content it is mainly found in elevated style. In ordinary speech it is used facetiously and thereby loses its depth. E.g., "Es war mir eine wahre Wonne, ihm mal gründlich die Meinung zu sagen." I have sometimes heard young girls use the *adj. wonnig* in the sense of the American slang word *swell* ("Isn't that swell!").

Verzücken, Verzückung, Ekstase apply to deep emotions though mainly of a morbid or abnormal nature, often not pleasurable; people whose acts or states of mind are thus described appear to be in a trance. Sometimes these words lose their depth when used somewhat ironically. E.g., "Der gerät mal wieder in Ekstase; sie macht ganz verzückte Augen."

[120] Boucke, *Wort und Bedeutung in Goethes Sprache,* p. 50.

Entzücken 'to delight, overjoy,' *Entzücken n.* 'delight, rapture' generally express deep emotions as in "die Landschaft entzückte uns; er war ganz außer sich vor Entzücken." Sometimes in the *Umgangssprache* they lose much of their depth, e.g., when used ironically "das ist ja entzückend, zum Entzücken."

Begeistern, begeistert, Begeisterung belong in the spheres of both volition and emotions, and they usually strongly affect the inner self. E.g., "er begeisterte sich für alles Schöne und Gute; begeisterte Zustimmung; es herrschte große, helle Begeisterung."

If we use *Rausch* in contexts like "Rausch der Seligkeit, des Entzückens," or if we form compounds like *Freudenrausch,* we mean deeper emotions than by using *Taumel* instead of *Rausch. Taumel des Entzückens, der Begeisterung, des Glücks* somehow seem to be more idiomatic than *Taumel der Glückseligkeit. Berauschen* expresses the same depth as *Rausch* in similar contexts. Of course both words have other meanings too, just as does *intoxicate.*

In instances like "berückende Schönheit, berückendes Lächeln, von berückendem Zauber" *berücken* implies less depth of genuine emotion than was found in *entzücken* or *verzücken,* which may be due to the connotation 'to ensnare.' I have heard it used ironically in the same sense as *entzückend:* "Diese seltsame Idee ist ja geradezu berückend."

Hingerissen expresses deep and intense excitation of feeling not necessarily of pleasurable nature; it is very similar to *begeistert;* "die Zuhörer waren von seinen Worten hingerissen (begeistert)."[121] Gustav Bally has made a very interesting analysis of past participles expressing emotional states. He mentions the examples *deprimiert, gebeugt, niedergeschmettert, niedergedrückt, verletzt, verquält, gehoben,* to which may be added *vergnügt, hingerissen, ausgelassen.*[122] "Es ist uns gar nicht möglich, gewisse Gefühlszustände anders als mit dem Particip präteriti auszudrücken, wodurch eben immer eine Passivität des Subjekts zum Ausdruck kommt."[123]

Himmel and *Paradies* often serve to express emotions of considerable depth. "Wie im siebenten Himmel sein; den Himmel offen sehen; seinen Himmel in der Brust tragen (das Glück in sich selber finden); der Himmel hängt ihm voller Geigen (er ist in einem Glücksrausch);

---

[121] B. Q. Morgan points out a difference between the two words: "*Hingerissen* refers to the effect of the speaker's words, *begeistert* includes admiration for the speaker himself" (*Letter* dated Apr. 28, 1940).

[122] The greater number of "negative" words is significant.

[123] G. Bally, *Psychologische Phänomene im Bedeutungswandel,* p. 25.

er fühlt sich wie im Paradies." The adjectives *himmlisch* and *paradiesisch* are used similarly. "Das ist doch himmlisch (entzückend); himmlisches Behagen; eine paradiesische (entzückende) Gegend; himmlische Freude."

Beseelen is an untranslatable word; 'animate, inspire' are customary, but inadequate translations; lately psychologists have used *besoul.* This German verb has a deep emotional value in many contexts and meanings. Only in conjunction with words expressing pleasurable emotions does it belong in the group which is being discussed here. It has been included because it adds depth to such words. E.g., "er ist von Freude beseelt (begeistert); Fröhlichkeit, Frohsinn, Lebenslust, Lebensmut beseelte ihn."

The importance of the word *joy* in the field of pleasurable emotions is attested by its frequency in the language of psychologists, philosophers and poets; the wide range of its meanings and—consequently—its vagueness or haziness is shown by the variety of its definitions. The somewhat vague definitions 1. 2. and 3. of *NED* are very much to the point in that they prove, if anything, a great variety of depth (and also of intensity) of emotion as characteristic of the uses of this noun. According to *Cr joy* and *gladness* "lie more internally" than *mirth; FW's* statement that *joy* is deeper than *gladness* has been mentioned above. These and other definitions of a similar nature seem to indicate the tendency to express considerable depth of feeling by the use of *joy.* It would rarely—unless the situation or context in which it is used reveals by itself the deepest emotion—designate such definite nearness to the person as *Seligkeit* or *Glückseligkeit.*

Significantly *Krüger* translates *joy* 'wirklich grosse Freude,' overlooking, however, the modifying adjective in his example "It gave him great joy to hear of his son's safety." As an equivalent of 'the perfect bliss or beatitude of heaven' *joy* is obsolete or archaic (*NED*). The general vagueness of our word is further emphasized by the urge to combine it with adjectives in order to express a higher degree of depth, e.g., "deep, sincere, heartfelt, profound, pure, serene, perfect, real, genuine joy" (*Reum*). Similar adjectives mentioned above in conjunction with *Freude* prove a belief, first expressed to me by B. Q. Morgan, "that the two languages are closely parallel in this respect."[124]

Various levels of depth down to shallowness are found in the use of *joy,* depending on the context (though it hardly ever seems to reach

[124] *Letter* dated Feb. 22, 1940.

the lowest degree of intensity). E.g., "to be beaming with joy; joy transfigured his countenance; joy gleamed in his eyes, cheered up his face; to have, feel joy; to show, testify one's joy." When joy is noisy, riotous, wild, or uncontrolled it may be quite shallow (though very intense). E.g., note the rather shallow outcry, "O joy!" *Cr's* statement that "*joy* and *delight* can be employed only to express a positively high degree" would seem to be rather superficial and arbitrary. High degrees of depth (also of intensity and saturation) are expressed by phrases like "enraptured with joy; to abandon oneself to joy; he does not know what to do with himself for joy; to tremble, leap, jump, cry, weep, sing, die with or for joy."

With regard to *joyful, joyfully, joyfulness, joyous,* I am inclined to assume that none of them can ever be quite as deep or quite as shallow as *joy.* This belief, naturally more or less personal, is based on many examples and on especially detailed comment on these words by B. Q. Morgan, though he concerns himself less with depth gradation than with other aspects of this study, which will be discussed later. Morgan's comparison of *joyful* and *cheerful* seems to me to indicate (besides other important differences) that *joyful* comes closer to expressing emotions near the Ego than does *cheerful.*

To me *joyful* and *cheerful* are also quite different, the former tending to designate the reality, the latter the appearance. I can say "I am *joyful* (not *cheerful*) that the operation was a success," but I say "Although the operation was not a complete success, I am *cheerful*" (not *joyful*). *Cheerfulness* can be assumed or feigned or actually brought about by an act of will; *joyfulness* is primary and genuine, the result of a given situation. So we can say to a man "Cheer up," but not "Be joyful" (the phrase in the Bible is archaic, a translation, and of special connotation); but we can say "Try to be happy," i.e., put up with something and make the best of it.[134]

Comparing *glad* with *joyful* Morgan stresses the fact that

the word *glad* is more conventional (I shall be glad to come, I am glad that you agree with me, give him the glad hand); *joyful* is reserved for occasions of greater moment: "That is a *joyful* thought" (not a *glad* thought). Also, "She has a *joyful* (or *joyous*) nature," not a *glad* nature.[135]

All this would seem to imply greater depth for *joyful* than for *glad. Krüger* says: "*Joyful* gewählt für *cheerful,* von Personen 'vergnügt'." This, however, like the following statement, is concerned with levels of

style and has hardly any bearing on depth gradation, at least in regard to the *Umgangssprache.* "For my feeling, *joyous* . . . is more restricted in use, being more bookish or poetical; . . . In poetry . . . *joyous* might seem more choice, more distinctly poetic in flavor, without essential distinction in meaning." (This is quoted from Morgan's comparison of *joyous* with *joyful.*[124]) *Overjoyed,* like *überglücklich,* expresses considerable depth of pleasurable emotion.

Rejoice, rejoicing tend to express great depth of feeling, but frequently they are just average, or even somewhat shallow. "The old man rejoiced in his son's happiness; the boy will be greatly rejoiced to see his sister; rejoice in the Lord; rejoicing of my heart." (The last two examples from religious language.) "Mrs. X rejoiced to see her husband back safe; there were all sorts of rejoicings on Christmas Eve; I am rejoiced to say that the lady seems satisfied." On the whole these two words do not seem to be much used in ordinary speech. This is true of a rather large number of words in this group: *beatific, beatitude, blessed, blessedness, bliss, blissful* (the last four at least as expressions of really deep feelings), *elated, elation, enrapture, entrance, rapture, rapturous, ravish, ravishing, ravishment, transport.* In contrast, the German words in this group are all quite common in the *Umgangssprache,* though, as has been pointed out, some of them have less emotional value there than in the written language.

Beatitude, beatific refer to supreme happiness of the person, especially in a religious sense. Likewise *blessed* and *blessedness* relate to heavenly joys. On the other hand they have changed this original meaning considerably so that now in ordinary speech much and sometimes all of their deep emotional value is gone. Thus *blessed* has become synonymous with 'confounded, cursed, worthless,' and we speak somewhat facetiously of *single blessedness. Bliss, blissful* too express heavenly or superlative delight, but phrases like *blissfully ignorant* seem to conform much more to the spirit of common speech.[125]

Elated, elation describe a jubilant and exalted state of mind. "*Elated* commonly suggests a certain excitement or exaltation of spirit, following upon success or good fortune; it frequently connotes undue self-

[125] A few more examples, contributed by B. Q. Morgan, may be added: "Note, *Well, I'll be blest* (also *blowed*), which may be euphemistically and alliteratively connected with *blasted.* Note also, *blessed event* as a shallowing of the word. Note also the colloquial, *Well, that's a blessing,* definitely shallow. I regard the use of *blissful* as either poetic or facetious—a point which must be constantly borne in mind in American speech, where the verbal witticism flourishes as nowhere else" (*Letter* dated Apr. 28, 1940).

satisfaction" *Wb*; this does not imply great depth! ***Enrapture, rapture, rapturous,*** compare in depth value with ***entzücken, Entzücken, entzükkend.*** The ironical use of the last may be paralleled with the "rapturous maidens" of Gilbert and Sullivan fame. ***Ravish, ravishing, ravishment*** are very similar in regard to depth, apart from their other meanings that do not belong in our field.

Entrance and *transport v.* and *n.* apply to conditions of deepest emotion, mostly abnormal and not necessarily pleasurable, like ***verzücken, Verzückung, Ekstase.*** I think that *ecstasy, ecstatic* hardly differ from the last though *Cr* claims that *"esctasy* and *rapture* are always pleasurable, or arise from pleasurable causes." As far as *rapture* is concerned, this is correct; it means 'bliss, ecstatic joy,' often linked with deep thought. Other meanings of *rapture,* such as 'act of seizing and carrying off with force; act of transporting; a hurrying along; a spasm or fit of emotion; a paroxysm' (*Wb*), are either obsolete or rare. *Ecstasy,* on the other hand, is not limited in present-day usage to pleasurable states of mind, especially in the language of medicine.

What has been said of *begeistert* and *Begeisterung* applies also to *enthusiastic* and *enthusiasm;* they usually describe deep (and intense) stirrings of the soul, and it would be a vain endeavor and also contrary to the methods of modern psychology to try artificially to separate the emotional from the volitional content of these words. By frequent use in the spoken language *enthusiastic* has lost much of its inherent force and depth.

Thrill v. and *n., thrilled, thrilling* often express sudden, yet very deep emotions; but they have become so common in ordinary speech that much of their depth is lost in many situations; sometimes they even remind me of light coin of the type ***reizend, fabelhaft,*** etc.

Intoxicate, intoxicated, intoxicating, given the proper context or in combinations with words denoting pleasurable emotions, may express considerable emotional depth though in their application the emphasis is more on the deprivation of one's reasoning faculties. In trying to determine the respective depth values by asking German-speaking Americans to compare these words with *Rausch* and *berauschen* I have failed to get results because of their very contradictory statements. Examination of translations did not help much either, a fact which seems to confirm opinions expressed by B. Q. Morgan.[126]

---

[126] See note 80.

In general, *happy* and *happiness* cover a wide range of gradients of depth, with *happy* tending a little more to the shallower side. E.g., "a happy family, man, day, idea, event, occasion; the happy mean" (*Reum*). The adjective is politely conventional in examples like "I shall be happy to do so; I should be happy if I thought so." Combinations like "happy heart, tears, face, laughter" imply slightly varying degrees of emotional depth. *Happiness* may be modified with adjectives such as "pure, extraordinary, true, real, peaceful, (ever)lasting"; then again we mean a shallower kind of pleasurable emotion when we speak of "incomplete, passing, transitory, short happiness." B. Q. Morgan points out that one can say *"joy, happiness,* but not *enjoyment* (*gladness* ?) made me faint, or kept me awake all night."[124]

These linguistic facts, in my opinion, reveal, besides other differences with which we are not concerned in this chapter, also differences in depth: *joy* and *happiness* in these contexts express greater depth of emotion than *enjoyment* and *gladness.* A very good definition of *happiness* is found in *SSD*: "It is a state of the soul, and is applied to every degree of consciousness of well-being, and is not employed of any state, however keen, of mere animal gratification, irrespectively of the mental state." This seems to be in line with my observation that the noun hardly ever describes feelings of a very shallow nature. Sometimes it straddles the boundaries of our field, as in "greatest happiness of the greatest number," a principle of moral and political action (*NED*). *Happy* meaning also 'dexterously or fortunately effective; opportune; fortunate' (*FW*) reaches beyond the field of pleasurable emotions.[127]

The noun *delight* generally expresses a very high degree of depth of emotion. It means 'höchste Freude, Wonne; rapturous joy' and is commonly linked with adjectives such as "great(est), splendid, unspeakable, rare, highest"; deepest emotion is implied in phrases like "the delights of music, of Paradise," though in cases like "the delights of the country" it may be somewhat shallower. The same is true of sentences of the type "He takes delight in puzzles, in teasing everybody." Thus the statement of *Cr "joy* and *delight* can be employed only to express a positively high degree" would seem to be an erroneous generalization. The verb *delight* 'erfreuen, ergötzen, entzücken' covers

---

[127] A detailed history of the root *hap* 'chance, fortune,' and of the development of the modern meaning of *happy* would be a promising research problem.

an equal range of depth gradients though we have noticed above how very shallow the participle *delighted* can be.

The use of *paradise* and *heaven* as expressions of deep joy is akin to that of *Paradies* and *Himmel* in German. E.g., "to be in the seventh heaven; paradise of delight, etc." The adjective *paradisiac* does not seem to be quite as common as *paradiesisch* ("a paradisiac dream"); but *heavenly* is quite similar to *himmlisch* ("heavenly delight, music"). Other uses of *Himmel* and heaven do not concern us here because they are outside the limits of the field of pleasurable emotions.

An attempt at a comparison of the German and the English vocabularies expressing pleasurable emotions may form the conclusion of this chapter on depth gradation. In determining the meanings of the words with regard to their present-day degrees of depth, the influence of etymological data has been carefully avoided. On the other hand the origin of the words should not be overlooked since it may help us to explain significant differences between German and English.

The German vocabulary is almost entirely Germanic; there are a few exceptions: words like *Ekstase, Paradies, Gaudium, amüsant* are felt as foreign words, while *Laune, Spaß, jubeln* have become fully Germanized. The overwhelming majority of the English words is of Romance origin. (The fact that some of these are ultimately derived from other languages, e.g., *ecstasy, enthusiastic, gay,* has no bearing on our argument.) The following and their derivatives are Germanic:
Group I. *bright, enliven, fond, funny, laugh, lively, lusty, shout, smile, soften, soothe, wanton, winsome;*
Group II. *frolic, fun, gladly, merriment* (Rom. ending!), *mirth;*
Group III. *blithe, glad, glee, merry;*
Group IV. *blessed, bliss, happy, heaven, thrill.*

In the light of what has been said about these words it seems clear that the Germanic element of the vocabulary has contributed very little to the expression of deep emotions in English. Accurate measurements of the respective importance of the Romance and Germanic elements are impossible; even if we counted the words and their frequencies the resulting percentages would be wrong because neither their depth range nor the degree to which they belong in our field can be expressed arithmetically. Only *bliss* is definitely deep, but on the whole its sense has shifted from earthly to heavenly joy by confusion with *bless* (cf. *NED*). Moreover, it is not a frequent word in ordinary speech. Really frequent words in groups II, III, and IV are very few: *happy, thrill, glad, merry, fun,* none of them definitely or even predominantly deep,

with the exception of *thrill* which has possibilities of considerable depth. The number of Germanic words in Group I is also comparatively very small.

British as well as foreign Anglicists have always stressed the unequaled profusion of approximate synonyms due to the etymological diversity of the English vocabulary, and probably there are few languages, perhaps there is none other in the IE family, in which subtle shades of difference in meaning and in tone of feeling can be expressed with the same precision as in English. The generally accepted opinion in regard to the emotional value of Germanic and Romance words has been expressed, e.g., by Henry Bradley:

> It is true, as a general rule, that when there are two words expressing approximately the same notion, one of them being of native and the other of French or Latin etymology, the native word is the one that has the fuller emphasis, and the greater richness of emotional suggestion.[128]

In its generality this statement is not applicable to our field, in which Germanic words in general, and those of them which express depth of emotion in particular, are in an almost hopeless minority. The difference between the Germanic and the Romance elements in this field is not one of depth, richness, or emphasis, but at least partly one of common over against literary language. Moreover the Romance element is by no means uniform in this respect.

Jespersen asserts that many of the French words,

> and one might say, nearly all the words taken over before 1350 and not a few of those of later importation, have become part and parcel of the English language, so that they appear to everybody just as English as the pre-Conquest stock of native words. But a great many others have never become so popular. There are a great many gradations between words of everyday use and such as are not at all understood by the common people, and to the latter class may sometimes belong words which literary people would think familiar to everybody.[129]

He then relates an anecdote of a clergyman who had used the word *felicity* in his sermon; a ploughman whom he asked about the meaning of this word defined it: "Summut in the inside of a pig, but I can't say altogether what." The first quotations of three of the most common

---

[128] *The Making of English*, p. 106.
[129] *Growth and Structure of the English Language*, p. 98.

Romance words in our field, *joy, delight, cheer,* are dated *a*1225 in *NED, gay* appears *a*1310, *pleasure c*1386, while *enthusiastic,* for example, is first found in 1603, and *enrapture* not until 1740. Though all this is historical and not felt by the ordinary speaker of the language, there has remained until the present day a differentiation between synonyms which Aronstein expresses in the following words:

> Es ist vielfach so, daß eine doppelte Garnitur von Bezeichnungen vorhanden ist, eine einfachere und eine vornehmere, sozusagen eine werktägliche und eine für den Sonntag. Das germanische Wort und oft auch das alt-volkstümlich-romanische dient dem ersteren Zweck, das romanische und besonders das gelehrt-literarisch-lateinische dem zweiten.[180]

The most striking difference between English and German is found in Group IV. The German *Umgangssprache* has more words at its command to express great depth of pleasurable emotions, while in English a more or less literary type of words predominates in this group. The literary element of Romance origin is very strong in English, though, on the other hand, e.g., *joy* is popular, whereas the Germanic word *bliss* is not.

In Group III there are no such pronounced differences between the two languages. E.g., *exult : frohlocken, jubilate : jubeln (jauchzen), triumph : Triumph, enjoy : sich freuen, merry : fröhlich, pleasure : Vergnügen, cheerful : fröhlich* present no significant differences between the two languages, as far as range of depth is concerned. The Romance words *captivate* and *enchant,* and the Germanic word *blithe* are mainly poetical, *felicity* is cold and formal, while German words of that type are lacking in this group. The German vocabulary seems to be somewhat richer because of its ability to form compounds which are hard to match in English. E.g., *Vorfreude, Frohsinn, Lebenslust.*

---

[180] *Englische Stilistik,* p. 19.
Aronstein discusses not only this, but also other basic differences between Germanic and Romance words in English; e.g., the Germanic word expresses the "unmittelbare Empfindung," the Romance word the "mittelbare Reflexion darüber"; "jenes gibt, wie Münch sehr gut sagt, mehr die empfundene, dieses die vorgestellte Sache wieder." His instance, the differentiation of *feeling* and *sentiment,* as found in George Meredith's novels, is quite convincing, as far as these two "synonyms" are concerned; yet his procedure is somewhat dangerous; *NED* shows quite clearly that both these words have a much wider range of meanings than those which form the basis of Aronstein's discussion.
Cf. also Deutschbein, *Neuenglische Stilistik,* especially paragraph 34, "Saxon and Romance Words" (with bibliography).

In Group II there are about three times as many English words as German that express definitely shallow feelings, while in German the words with a wider depth range seem to be a little more numerous than in English.

In as far as the words in Group I reach within our field they do not seem to reveal any significant differences between English and German, apart from their etymological origin.

One might feel inclined to draw conclusions as to the character of the English-speaking and the German-speaking peoples. At this point I do not propose to do this for the following reasons: 1. Although definite differences in the depth gradation of the two vocabularies have been stated, the linguistic basis offered in this chapter is too small to permit generalizations of that nature. The depth gradation of other emotional fields would have to be investigated in the two languages before we could prove the theory that such differences throw light on differences of national character. 2. The whole problem is further complicated by the fact that the two languages from which the word material has been taken are standard languages. These languages are spoken by groups of educated people, racially and therefore emotionally far apart from one another, such, as e.g., Rhinelanders, East Prussians, Austrians, English, Scotch, Irish, Americans, etc.[181]

All this, however, does not mean that general statements concerning relations between character and language of a nation should be avoided entirely. In Chapter III I felt justified in making such statements because the striking lack of intensity in the English vocabulary of pleasurable emotions can easily be linked with general observations

---

[181] Use of words for emotions by individuals or small groups, deviations from the standard language by certain authors or poets, present research problems whose solution may reveal the influence of "character" on speech or language to some extent. Generalizations which have often been made on the basis of a number of linguistic phenomena selected more or less at random are wrong and can always be contradicted by other phenomena which have been overlooked. For this reason I refuse to accept, e.g., Jespersen's general statement on English: "The English language is a methodical, energetic, businesslike, and sober language, that does not care much for finery and elegance, but does care for logical consistency . . ." (*Growth and Structure* . . . , p. 17). The weak points of this sweeping statement become at once apparent when we try to apply it, not to the theoretical abstraction "the English language," but to the different levels of *standard* English, which, e.g., Deutschbein calls: 1. alltägliche Sprache, familiäre Umgangssprache; 2. gehobene Verkehrssprache der Gebildeten, auch in schriftlicher Form, z.B. in Briefen; 3. journalistisches Englisch; 4. die Sprache der öffentlichen Rede; 5. die Sprache des Romans (prose fiction), der biographischen und historischen Darstellung; 6. die Wortkunst im eigentlichen Sinne: Poesie und die sog. Kunstprosa (prose poetry) (*Neuenglische Stilistik*, pp. 45 ff.).

made by others. Sectional deviations from the two standard languages, though they may be an important basis for further studies, have not been considered in this connection. Theoretically this may constitute a source of error, but not of a very dangerous character, especially in the case of English. The emotional behavior of the average Englishman is clearly reflected in lack of intensity, in his speech habits in general, and in his emotional vocabulary in particular, and, after all, he has set the standard for the English-speaking peoples.

CHAPTER III

Intensity

Our second survey of the linguistic field of pleasurable emotions is devoted to an examination of the emotional intensity of the words. While gradation according to depth is a *personal* gradation, feeling is viewed *formally* when graduated according to intensity. *NED's* definitions of and synonyms for *intensity* are quite appropriate as descriptions of the use of the word in ordinary language; among them we find "extreme force, strength, depth [sic], brightness; high-strung quality of personal feeling or emotion." For our purposes we have to narrow down the meaning of the word, and the most acceptable definition seems to be one offered by William Stern: "*Intensity is the distance from the feeling threshold,* that is, from the personal state at which feeling is just manifested (or ceases to be manifested) *as* feeling."[132] Stern asserts that exact determinations of affective intensity are impossible, at least as long as one keeps to the "purely psychological domain." Only manifestations of feelings, such as physiological expressive indications, e.g., changes in heartbeat, can be measured "objectively." "Yet in the purely psychological domain *relative comparisons of intensity* are possible; one feeling may be weaker than another, or may become stronger in contrast to its previous intensity."[132]

Of course a psychological study of the intensity of feelings is no task for a linguist. All he can hope to do is to determine how language indicates those varying degrees of intensity of feeling which are tacitly assumed to exist. Thus our special problem in this chapter is to determine as nearly as possible the comparative intensity value of the expressions for pleasurable emotions in English and in German. It goes without saying that this can only be done subjectively and approximately.

In the chapter on depth gradations we found that verbal context and life situation play an important part in determining the depth of words for the pleasurable emotions; at the same time the degree and range of depth of these words themselves was examined in detail and

---

[132] *General Psychology from the Personalistic Standpoint,* pp. 540 ff. Stern (*ibid.*) discusses *formal* and *personal* gradation in detail.

determined, at least approximately, in many cases. In regard to their intensity value the words do not seem to differ from each other sufficiently to allow us to arrange them in groups similar to the ones established in the preceding chapter. In other words, English and German express intensity of pleasurable emotions not so much by using individual words of varying degrees of intrinsic intensity as by other linguistic means such as word complexes, forms of verbal aspects, intonation, etc.

There is, to be sure, a small number of words in both languages which in themselves designate intense emotion. The participles *hingerissen, ausgelassen, begeistert* certainly indicate much more intensity of feeling than, e.g., *aufgeräumt, munter, froh, vergnügt.* It is important to note that words which express great depth of emotion do not necessarily indicate great intensity as well. To prove this point and to show more clearly what is meant by *depth* and *intensity,* respectively, let us use typically *deep* words like *selig, glückselig* in sentences. "Er lebte jahrelang in *seliger* Erwartung eines großen Glücks; er fühlt sich (tief innerlich) *selig* im Glauben an Gott; ein *seliges* Lächeln gibt uns Kunde von seiner Stimmung, Gemütsverfassung; *glückselig* schlief sie ein; sie machte ein *glückseliges* Gesicht, als sie von seiner Rettung hörte; ich hatte den Eindruck, daß sie wirklich *glückselig* aussah." In all of these sentences we may speak of deep feelings, emotions, or moods, but on the other hand the words *selig, glückselig* describe personal states "at which feeling is just manifested." Compare these two words with *hingerissen, ausgelassen, begeistert;* the difference between depth and intensity becomes clear at once.

Ausgelassen is definitely shallower than *selig* or *glückselig; hingerissen* and *begeistert* may be just as or almost as deep as *glückselig* and *selig,* though they describe feelings of a different quality and reach beyond the boundary lines of our field. *Hingerissen, ausgelassen, begeistert,* though they differ from one another in various ways—e.g., *hingerissen* may be partly static, *ausgelassen* is always kinetic—have one characteristic in common: they express strong intensity of emotion, considerable "distance from the feeling threshold," manifested through the actions and behavior of persons. In "ein *seliges* Lächeln" the deep feeling indicated by this expression may just have emerged from the unconscious and therefore be quite weak or of a low degree of intensity; in "*glückselig* schlief sie ein" the very deep feeling meant by *glückselig* is just about to lapse into the unconscious of sleep, and therefore it is evidently

devoid of intensity. "*Begeistert, hingerissen, ausgelassen* schlief sie ein; er lebte jahrelang in *hingerissener, ausgelassener* Erwartung eines Glücks" are linguistic impossibilities which may help to illustrate the difference between depth and intensity.[188]

There may be a difference in degree of intensity between *hingerissen* and *ausgelassen;* the latter seems somewhat weaker, and can therefore be intensified by strong adverbs like *schrecklich, (ganz) furchtbar,* while *hingerissen* is so strong in itself that it can be intensified only to a lesser degree by weaker adverbs like *ganz, richtig, geradezu; furchtbar* or *schrecklich hingerissen* somehow seem most unusual if not impossible word complexes. There are also differences of intensity between *sich begeistern, begeistert, Begeisterung.* "Er begeistert sich für . . ." seems to be less intense than "er ist begeistert für . . . ; die Rede wurde begeistert aufgenommen; begeisterte Zustimmung, Zurufe." The noun *Begeisterung* has less intensity than the adjective or adverb, and therefore it is frequently intensified by modifiers like *groß, hell, jubelnd;* also: "die *Wogen* der Begeisterung gingen *hoch.*"

Jauchzen, Jubel, jubeln belong among the words which clearly denote great intensity of emotions and of their manifestation. They too are further intensified in the context. E.g., "er jauchzte vor Freude; sie jubelten laut; es herrschte heller Jubel." *Frohlocken* is equally intense, and still greater intensity is expressed by combining such words, e.g., *jubeln und jauchzen, jubeln und frohlocken.*

Verzücken, Verzückung mostly seem to have a high intensity value, especially when we are aware in using them of the outward manifestations of the particular emotional state to which these words are applied; in that case they are frequently further intensified by additional words. "Sie benahm sich, als ob sie im Zustande völliger, größter, stärkster Verzückung wäre; der sah ja ganz und gar verzückt aus; er wanderte wie verzückt herum." Of course, like many other emotional words they may be used without depth or intensity, e.g., when we say to someone in a joking way: "Du siehst ja heute ganz verzückt aus."

Ekstase, Taumel, Rausch, berauschen(d) indicate intense emotions though not necessarily of a pleasurable kind only. Complexes like *Rausch des Entzückens, der Begeisterung, der Seligkeit* express a very high degree of intensity of feeling. On the other hand I am not in-

---

[188] In determining the value of *hingerissen, ausgelassen* I have tried to forget the history of these words because the average German is not at all or not as much aware of their original meanings as the Germanist or the foreign speaker of German.

clined to ascribe a very high intensity value to words like *Entzücken,*[134] *Wonne, Wollust* (which is somewhat bookish), unless they receive it by the context in which they occur, as in "er schwimmt wieder einmal ganz und gar in Wonne." *Beglückt, Beglücktheit* lack specific intensity; *überglücklich* is rather intense.

Among the other words in the field of pleasurable emotions there seem to be none which just by themselves would clearly indicate intensity of emotion; in other words, their degree of intensity is quite low, though there are slight differences among them. It is interesting to try to arrange them in groups of medium or weak intensity, but experience proves that no two Germans would agree on the intensity value of these words, and therefore any such classification will lack objective validity. Instead, I turn to other means of expressing intensity of emotion afforded by the German language.

Adjectives and adverbs are very frequently used as intensifiers. Thus we speak of "große, riesige Freude; unbändige Heiterkeit; ausgelassene, überschäumende Lustigkeit; größtes Entzücken, Vergnügen; toller Uebermut." Or we say "Er hat sich mächtig amüsiert, sich riesig, gewaltig gefreut." It is common knowledge that designations for unpleasant emotions are more numerous than those for pleasurable emotions; moreover, they are to a large extent more intense. This may be the explanation for the fact that, whenever we want to express a really strong pleasurable emotion, a word that actually belongs in the so-called negative field is made use of as the linguistic means most adequate to the intensity of the feeling.[135] The "negative" quality of such words is lost in the process. Thus we say: "Ich habe mich schrecklich, furchtbar, schauderhaft, mordsmäßig, höllisch gefreut; wir haben uns fürchterlich amüsiert." As soon as such words become frequent as intensifiers they have a tendency to lose their original force, and in cases like "sich *sehr* or *arg* freuen" only the linguist is conscious of the original meaning and intensity of the adverbs *sehr* and *arg*.

Great intensity of emotion is also expressed by the compounds that are so characteristic of the German language. Thus we find *Hauptvergnügen, -spaß; Riesenfreude, -begeisterung, -spaß; Freudentaumel, -rausch, -jubel; Hochgenuß; hochentzückt; glückstrunken; seelenvergnügt; urgemütlich.* Words of the same type which belong more

---

[134] Cf. "Du siehst heute *entzückend* aus" as a conventional utterance.

[135] For a more detailed discussion of this matter see Wundt, *Völkerpsychologie, Die Sprache,* II, 575 ff.
Gustaf Stern, *Meaning and Change of Meaning,* pp. 324 ff.

or less to popular speech are *ur-, kreuz-, mopsfidel; quietschvergnügt; heidenfroh; Mordsvergnügen, -heiterkeit, -freude, -begeisterung, -spaß, -jubel; sauwohl.*

A third means of intensification is the linking of two synonyms, especially adjectives: *fidel und munter; froh und munter; froh und heiter; lustig und heiter; munter und vergnügt; Lust und Freude. Jubeln und jauchzen, jubeln und frohlocken* have already been mentioned.

Word complexes in which words for pleasurable emotions occur are frequently employed to express a high intensity value. E.g., "die Freude war so groß, daß sie gar kein Ende nehmen wollte; sie zittert, tanzt vor Freude; sie überließen sich der Fröhlichkeit, gaben sich der Freude hin; er schwelgt in Seligkeit; wir ließen der Lustigkeit freien Lauf; sie stürzten sich in den Strudel des Vergnügens; das Mädchen wußte sich vor Übermut nicht zu lassen; wir gerieten außer uns vor Entzücken."[136] Frequently the word complex is in the nature of a comparison: "vergnügt wie ein Seifensieder; er freut sich wie ein Schneekönig; er ist lustig wie die Lerche; immer lustig, immer froh wie der Mops im Paletot."

Exclamatory sentence-pitch is another factor contributing to intensification of expressions of emotion. E.g., "Sind die aber lustig gewesen! War das ein Gaudium! Wohin mit der Freud'? Juchhe, da geht's lustig her!"

Examining the words denoting pleasurable emotions in English and contrasting them with the German word-field as a whole, native speakers of English as well as of German who are familiar with both languages and whose advice has been sought have supported my own impression that in general the English vocabulary in the field is less forceful, less emphatic than the German. With the exception of *thrill,* which quite frequently expresses very intense emotion, there is no Germanic word in the English language equaling, e.g., *hingerissen* or *ausgelassen* as words for pleasurable emotions of great intensity. Even *thrill* often lacks intensity in many contexts and situations in which it would be impossible to use *hingerissen* because of its inherent force. In "I was *thrilled* by the play" *hingerissen* would be an appropriate translation of *thrilled.* On the other hand I have often heard people characterize

[136] Cf. Spanish *trasportarse,* which seems to have the same intensity value as German *vor Entzücken außer sich geraten;* e.g., nos trasportamos á la vista de las montañas cubiertas de nieve."

some ordinary social affair or a speech as *thrilling;* though by accompanying utterances and the play of their features they reveal the fact that their real emotion is only mildly pleasurable and certainly not intense, they say that they are "thrilled (or delighted)" without necessarily being hypocritical about it. In German one cannot use *hingerissen* in the same situation because the word has too much intensity; it might of course be employed ironically and consequently describe an unpleasant feeling of disgust, but then again it would be definitely intense. It goes without saying that the two words *hingerissen* and *thrilled* differ not only in regard to intensity and to depth: *hingerissen* describes an emotion more static than *thrilled* and also of longer duration.

It must be noted that English dictionaries pay little or no attention to the fact that *thrill* may and does express pleasurable emotion without being modified by other "pleasurable" words; emphasis is placed in most of the definitions of *thrill* on the type of emotion which Claparède has isolated as "an *émotion pure,* a kind of state of being 'stirred,' which signifies a brief shocking of the physical and mental situation that is not attended by pleasure or unpleasure."[187] In sentences like "we all felt a thrill of horror at the sight" the word is applied to "negative" emotions of great intensity, while the *thrillers* of Edgar Wallace are intended to arouse a mixture of pleasant and unpleasant feelings. *Hingerissen* does not refer to the emotions of fear, terror, or horror; it denotes either an *émotion pure* or a pleasurable emotion.[188]

Other English words in our field which express intensity of pleasurable emotion are *exult, jubilate, ecstasy, enthusiasm, intoxicate, rapture,* and their derivatives. However, most of these words, more especially *exult, intoxicate, rapture,* are somewhat bookish, and most of the less intense words in the field seem to be weaker in general than comparable German words. This statement is not merely a subjective generality, but is based on numerous experimental comparisons, which the reader can easily duplicate by using similar English and German words in similar contexts and situations. Apart from the fact that words of Romance origin which were borrowed comparatively late in English belong in a higher sphere of style, I do not think that the Romance element is

---

[187] W. Stern, *General Psychology . . .*, p. 517.

[188] Schlessing errs by placing the word only under his heading No. 824 *Erregung des Gefühls.*

necessarily less forceful than the Germanic. The Romance languages, including French, have an abundance of pleasurable words of great intensity.[136]

This lack of intensity observed in our field should be further investigated in other semantic fields in English. For the present we have reasons enough to assume that it is characteristic of English in general. Support for this theory is found in many statements by others. E.g., Deutschbein, who is not inclined to generalize hastily, says:

In der englischen Sprache kommt die Neigung des englischen Volkscharakters zum Ausdruck, Gefühle und Werturteile absichtlich zu unterdrücken, mindestens aber alle emotionalen Äußerungen abzuschwächen, abzutönen und zu mildern. So erklärt Raleigh: "The English temper has an almost morbid dislike of all that is showy or dramatic in expression."[139]

H. W. Fowler speaks of "a stubborn national dislike of putting things too strongly," "the intemperate orgy of moderation," "the use of *understatement* not to deceive, but to enhance the impression on the hearer."[140] According to Deutschbein understatement is the "allgemeine Bezeichnung für die Unterdrückung alles Emotionalen und Gefühlsmäßigen im Englischen."[139]

To people other than Englishmen the British habit of understatement often seems artificial, and the theory is that it is due to Puritan influence. Thus W. Havers says:

Daß gewisse Kulturströmungen dazu führen können, auch den natürlichen und ungezwungenen sprachlichen Ausdruck der eigenen Gefühle einzuschränken, kann die Geschichte des Englischen zeigen. Wohl durch den Einfluß der Puritaner ist hier namentlich in der Oberschicht die warme und gemütvolle Redeweise zurückgedrängt worden durch eine kühle und objektive.[141]

Greenough and Kittredge point out another trend in the use of English words of an emotional character which, though found to a certain extent in all languages, is of special significance in English and is, I believe, due to this so-called Puritanism:

Observe that the degeneration of words is often due to euphemism. The mild or decent word, when applied to the disagreeable or indecent idea, begins to be

---

[139] *Neuenglische Stilistik*, pp. 180 ff.
[140] *A Dictionary of Modern English Usage*, pp. 383, 550, 610.
[141] *Handbuch der erklärenden Syntax*, p. 156.

shunned by speakers on account of its dubious meaning, and soon comes actually to express the meaning which it was intended at first merely to suggest, or even to conceal. Thus, for *dissolute* (itself a euphemism) we have almost every possible word that means "lively" or "sportive," and hence these words acquire a doubtful character. Such is *wanton*, . . . which has come to have a distinctly bad sense, and such are *gay, lively, fast, reckless, a sport.*

Wanton, "sportive" (in an innocent sense), illustrates by its change of meaning

> How mirth can into folly glide,
> And folly into sin.[142]

It is well known that a tendency to avoid the expression of intense feeling goes hand in hand with the absence of emphatic gestures in the behavior of the British and also with less dynamic speech habits than those of the Germans and French for example, with a certain laxity in the movement of the speech organs, and with *level stress* in English intonation.

No matter how correct they may be in general, the statements just made are subject to some modifications on the basis of other observations which, however, do not nullify their basic import. Like any other language English cannot be expected to get along without linguistic devices for expressing intense pleasurable emotions. Most of them are quite similar to the ones used in the German language.

Thus we find adjectives and adverbs as intensifiers. E.g., we speak of "extraordinary happiness; intense, excessive, immoderate, wild, unrestrained, uncontrolled, impetuous, exuberant, tempestuous joy." "We enjoy something thoroughly, enormously; and we are really, greatly, simply, perfectly delighted." As in German, "negative" adverbs are popular in their function of emphasizing strong feelings of a pleasurable nature. E.g., "I am awfully (or, terribly) glad that nothing happened to him." On the basis of the material which I have collected, however, I have reason to believe that the number and frequency of such adverbs is greater in German than in English.

The second type of words of great intensity, compounds like *Riesenfreude, kreuzfidel,* is absent in English, because most English *compounds* are separated in printing, or at most hyphenated, (e.g., *white-hot, lightning speed*), and most of the words in our field do not lend them-

---

[142] *Words and their Ways in English Speech,* pp. 307, 253.

selves to the making of compounds (cf. *captivating charm, joyously happy*).

The third German type, double phrases like *froh und munter,* seems to be contrary to the spirit of present day English, not only in our field but quite generally, if we may believe Greenough and Kittredge:

> The style of the Anglo-Saxon translator of Bede's Ecclesiastical History is marked by a peculiar trick of repetition. Again and again he uses two synonymous nouns or verbs or adjectives, where one would suffice to convey his whole meaning. This may be called, then, an English literary habit of the ninth century . . . the habit survived in English prose until the end of the eighteenth century. And, though out of favor at the moment, it has left a number of idiomatic or colloquial phrases in the language: as, "end and aim," "lord and master," . . . "bright and shining," "honest and true." . . . Such double phrases occur very frequently in the Book of Common Prayer. . . . The older fashion conduces to dignity and copiousness of style, but easily betrays one into tiresome verbiage.[143]

The fourth type, intensification through word complexes, seems to be no less common in English than in German. "A burst of delight; an outburst of mirth; a transport, cries of joy." Such complexes frequently correspond to German compounds like *Freudentaumel, -rufe.* Other complexes are, e.g., "to be beaming with joy; to abandon oneself to joy; to tremble, leap, jump, cry, weep, sing for joy; he does not know what to do with himself for joy; to enjoy thoroughly one's happiness; happiness overwhelms a person; to delight in a great joy." As in German there are also intensifying comparisons in English: "happy as a king; gay, merry as a lark." "Tickled to death" is more or less slangy.[144]

---

[143] *Words and their Ways in English Speech,* pp. 113 ff.

A related type of intensification: repetition of the same word, has been stressed by Deutschbein in his *System der neuenglischen Syntax,* p. 41. "In 1666, there was a great fire in London, it spread and spread and burnt and burnt for three days." I have been unable to find any significant or frequent examples of repetition of pleasurable words in English. Of course we may say: "I am so happy, so happy"; or we may repeat *very,* in "very, very happy." But all this is merely incidental, and not characteristic of the English language in the field of pleasurable emotions.

Deutschbein and others have pointed out the frequency of this type of intensification in Italian. Cf. "I am violently in love with the Italian fashion of repeating an adjective or adverb, and even noun, to give force to expression: there is much more fire in it than in our circumlocutory phrases, our dull 'verys' and 'exceedinglys' and 'extremelys'" (George Eliot's *Life as related in her Letters and Journals,* arranged and edited by her husband, J. W. Cross, Edinburgh, 1884, vol. I, 73).

[144] American English is much richer in such phrases, many of them humorous or facetious.

There is another means of intensification, quite important in English in general, but of no particular significance in our field: intensive verbal aspect, or what Deutschbein calls *Intensive Aktionsart.* It is a well-known fact that English is far superior to all other modern IE languages in the linguistic means which it has developed for expressing fine distinctions of verbal aspect. The most individual among these means is the periphrastic form commonly called the progressive. One of its many functions is in its use as an expression of intensive verbal aspect. Unfortunately this function of the *progressive form* has found only scant attention by grammarians. Notable exceptions are G. O. Curme, Philipp Aronstein, and M. Deutschbein; but in spite of the enlightening remarks in the works of these scholars on the problem of the *Intensivum* the whole question calls for further clarification on the basis of a much greater collection of material than has been offered so far. Curme does not use the term *Intensivum,* but he has in mind what Aronstein and Deutschbein call *Intensivum* when he says:

As the present participle in the progressive form has not only verbal force, but is also a predicate adjective, it frequently, like an adjective, has descriptive force and by reason of its concrete meaning and the emphasis or peculiar tone often associated with it is charged with feeling, indicating that the speaker is affected by something, often expressing joy, sorrow, pleasure, displeasure, praise, censure, also emphasis, implying that the person in question is convinced of the truth or importance of the statement, i.e., the progressive form often differs from the simpler form in that it has modal force. . . . "I *live* (or *am living*) in Chicago," a habitual, customary act at the present time, often as here without an essential difference of meaning between the two forms, but the progressive form becomes more natural when feeling of any kind enters into the statement: "I am now living in a very pleasant flat" (feeling of satisfaction, arising perhaps from a change of residence for the better).[145]

Aronstein has similar ideas concerning the use of the progressive form ("dieser psychologisch so interessanten Form") as *Intensivum:*

In allen ihren Anwendungen dient sie der feineren Nuancierung und perspektivischen Gestaltung der Rede, scheidet das Tatsächliche von dem Milieu, in das es gestellt ist, den Stimmungen, die es auslöst, und den Betrachtungen, zu denen es Anlaß gibt, verstärkt die Bedeutung des Verbs in mannigfacher Weise, indem

[145] *A Grammar of the English Language,* III, pp. 374 ff.

sie auch Wiederholung, Übertragung, Veranschaulichung, Verinnerlichung ausdrückt.[146]

None of the three scholars gives any example that would prove definitely that the progressive form intensifies the expression of a pleasurable emotion by a verb. The reason for this is not quite clear to me. It seems highly significant that the number of verbs in the field of pleasurable emotions is rather small when compared to that of adjectives, adverbs, participles and nouns; but this fact is not a sufficient explanation for the absence of pertinent examples. Jespersen claims that:

Verbs denoting psychological states, feelings, etc., cannot as a rule be used in the expanded tenses; this is easily explained if we start from the combination *is on -ing*, for we can hardly say: *he is on* (engaged in, occupied in) *liking fish, etc.* Nevertheless it is possible in speaking of a passing state to say "I am feeling cold."[147]

Jespersen's argument is based on his own interpretation of the origin of the progressive form (aphesis from the construction of the verbal substantive with the preposition *on: is on huntinge, is a-hunting, is hunting*), and he overlooks its function as *Intensivum*. Deutschbein, on the other hand, stresses the fact that in early modern English the *-ing*-form is essentially intensive.[148]

Obviously the history of the progressive form does not offer a solution of our problem. The careful definition of intensive verbal aspect by Deutschbein may contribute to a clarification of the matter:

Die intensive Aktionsart drückt die besondere Intensität (Stärke, Nachdruck) einer Handlung aus. Dabei ist aber zu beachten, daß die Intensität sich nicht bloß auf den Vorstellungsgehalt, sondern auch auf die Gefühle und Affekte beziehen kann, die die Vorstellung begleiten. . . . Ne. erscheinen in der intensiven Form besonders die logischen Gefühle der Zustimmung, Bekräftigung, des Widerspruchs.[148]

---

[146] *Englische Stilistik*, p. 58. Aronstein (*ibid.*, p. 25) shows how the German sentence "er spricht" can be translated in seven different ways, each of which represents a different shade of meaning, which either is not expressed in German or is rendered by particles.

[147] *The Philosophy of Grammar*, pp. 278 f.
Cf. also Jespersen, *Tid og Tempus*, pp. 406-420.

[148] *System der neuenglischen Syntax*, pp. 70 ff. In Shakespeare the progressive form is more often intensive than imperfective, and in Chaucer only six out of sixty instances are imperfective.
Cf. Gerike, *Das Partizipium Präsentis bei Chaucer.*

Let us suppose somebody asks me the question: "You're not enjoying the music?" My answer would be: "I ám enjoying it," and my use of the progressive form would imply emphatic contradiction. In other cases the question might result in an emphatically affirmative answer, often depending on the interpretation of the question on the basis of the sentence-pitch used by the questioner.

B. Q. Morgan seems to follow the same line of thought as Deutschbein, in the main, but his treatment of intensive aspect reveals a deeper insight into the spirit of the English language based on a more intimate familiarity with actual living speech, and consequently with feeling-tones. Furthermore he provides the examples which the above-mentioned scholars fail to give. Morgan begins his discussion of the intensive verb with questions like "Are you? were you? do you? did you?" These questions lead to the emphatic answers: "I *am;* I *was;* I *do;* I *did.*" (Cf. German "Ich bin es; ich war es; ich tue es; ich habe es getan.") Other auxiliaries are used in the same way.

A note of vexation is often present, annoyance at implied criticism. This emphasis is then transferred to initial utterances, such as: "O, I *am* so sorry; I *did* so hope you would come; I *had* thought you would call me up; you *would* think that"; (or just, "You would!") The forms of *to be* carry this emphasis with them into the progressive: "He *is* feeling gay, isn't he?" "I (really) *was* expecting you."[149]

Morgan points out that "the pleasurable emotions participate in this usage to some extent, limited however by the character of the verbs in this field." He lists the following:

We are *anticipating* a very good time. Do you think he is *cheering up* now? We are *delighting* in our new radio. They are *enjoying* a month at Miami. He was *enjoying* himself very much. Berlin is *exulting* in the last victories. He is *feasting* his eyes on her. The children are *frolicking* in the garden. We are *rejoicing* in your successes. He is *triumphing* over all his enemies. All of the above sentences can take a strong stress on the auxiliary and thereby indicate a greater intensity of emotion than they would show without that accent.[149]

The periphrastic *to do* serves a purpose similar to that of the progressive form. Thus an example like "It *did* give him great joy" might be interpreted in much the same way as the above sentence "I *am* enjoying it." As a matter of fact Deutschbein applies the same defini-

[149] *Letter* dated May 11, 1940.

tion to the use of *to do* as *Intensivum:* "Vielfach dient NE. auch noch die Umschreibung mit *to do* als Intensivum . . . im Indikativ, um die logischen Gefühle des Widerspruchs, der Zustimmung und der Bekräftigung zum Ausdruck zu bringen."[148] Morgan concludes his discussion of the whole matter with the following remark:

On the one hand, then, the progressive and the periphrastic with *do* take on great emphasis when the auxiliary is stressed, and this in all semantic fields; so that the pleasurable emotions merely share in a general phenomenon. On the other hand, the progressive present (less often the past) intensifies any emotion by virtue of its durative character.[149]

In Irish English we find the interesting type "It's glad that I shall be."

The results obtained in this chapter may be briefly summarized as follows:

1. On the basis of definitions and by comparison with the term "depth" the meaning of the term "intensity" has been clarified.
2. Compared with the German vocabulary of pleasurable emotions, the English vocabulary lacks intensity, and it may be safely assumed that this is due to differences in the two national characters.
3. The number of "negative" intensifying adverbs is greater in German.
4. In contrast to German, English does not use compounds and double phrases to indicate intense emotions. German compounds often correspond to English word complexes; but both languages make frequent use of the latter.
5. In English the progressive form as well as the periphrastic *to do* may serve the purpose of intensification.

CHAPTER IV

Kinetic and Static Reference

The two German compounds *Gemütsbewegung* and *Gemütsruhe* indicate a polarity of feeling which is definitely reflected in the meanings of many words in the field of emotions in general, and in that of pleasurable emotions in particular. It seems therefore advisable to determine the *kinetic* and the *static* values of the words in our field. These terms have been chosen for our investigation in preference to others used by psychologists. Unfortunately there exists a great deal of confusion in psychological literature in regard to this type of polarity.

Wundt in his construction of a tridimensional system of feelings called the two poles *Erregung* 'excitement' and *Beruhigung* 'quiescence,' 'tranquillization'; the opposite pole from *excitement* has sometimes been called *calm;* Wundt also uses the words *Hemmung* 'inhibition' and *Deprimierung* 'depression.' The latter term is quite unsatisfactory because of the unpleasant tone attached to it, which does not allow us to locate the feeling of "depression" on a dimension independent of pleasantness and unpleasantness. If we use a term like *quiescence* in English we are at once faced with another difficulty. *Quiescence* is almost identical with *pacification* (or *satisfaction*), and *pacification* has been used as a translation of *Befriedigung,* which in turn has been called an alternate word for *Lösung* 'relaxation.' Since *Lösung* is the qualitative opposite of *Spannung* 'tension,' 'strain,' and since in German *Spannung* and *Lösung* express a different type of polarity (also established by Wundt), we realize the dangerous state of confusion existing in psychological terminology; this confusion is further increased by the close relation between *excitement* and *strain,* and between *relaxation* and *calm.*[150]

The most satisfactory classification developed on the basis of Wundt's two poles *excitement* and *quiescence* is that of William Stern. For the purpose of his own research Stern distinguishes between *moods, Stimmungen,* and *emotions, Affekte.*. According to his definition a *mood* "is a cast of feeling possessing a special quality that persists

[150] Cf. Ruckmick, p. 84, and Stern, *General Psychology . . .*, pp. 516 f.

over a period of time. But its duration is not sharply limited." *Emotions* "are courses of feelings." It is not necessary for us to present Stern's detailed description of the meaning which he attributes to these two terms because he is concerned with the psychology of feelings and not with semantics.

A classification of the words in our field according to *mood* and *emotion* (in the sense in which Stern uses the two terms) is impossible; in their application to the linguistic material in our field the two terms become at once useful for the purpose of grouping our material if we either define them differently or replace them by other terms.

There is a good deal of justification for the former procedure in what Klages has to say about the matter, because in general, as we have seen before, he pays more attention to the facts of language than does the average psychologist. Klages uses *Affekt* in the same sense as *Gemütsbewegung* and *Emotion;* according to his terminology feelings (*Gefühle*) as *Arterlebnisse* are *moods* (*Stimmungen*), feelings as *Antriebserlebnisse* are *Affekte.* Thus "Freude und Zorn sind artverschieden." On the other hand there is a difference of degree between e.g., *Ärger* and *Wut,* so that *Wut* is *gradverschieden* from *Ärger,* in other words: *Wut* may be called "die Affektform des Ärgers." Klages fails to make entirely clear whether he thinks the difference between *Wut* and *Ärger* is in degree of intensity or in degree of agitation, and the distinction may be difficult in that particular instance.

If we take as examples *Aufgeräumtheit* and *Ausgelassenheit,* we realize there is between these two words not only a difference of intensity, but also of agitation; both are kinetic, but *Ausgelassenheit* is kinetic in a higher degree than *Aufgeräumtheit.* In the following tables the former would have to be placed among the *pleasurable violent emotions,* the latter among the *pleasurable active moods,* with the understanding that in this chapter on the polarity *kinetic-static* it suffices to call Stern's *violent emotions* "kinetic in a high degree" or "strongly kinetic" and his *active moods* simply "kinetic"; what he calls *emotions* and *moods* are then merely *Gemütsbewegungen* of a different degree of agitation; and these *Gemütsbewegungen* are opposed to *static* feelings (*Gemütsruhe*) which in turn correspond to what he calls *passive moods* in Table No. 1. His *enervating emotions* (Table No. 2) would cover a group of words which will be discussed later.[151]

[151] Cf. Stern, *General Psychology . . . ,* pp. 549 ff.
Klages, *Ausdrucksbewegung und Gestaltungskraft,* pp. 22, 34 ff.

Stern has set up two "four-field tables":

TABLE 1. FOUR-FIELD TABLE OF MOODS

	Pleasurable	*Painful*
Active moods	Animation Cheerfulness	Spite State of irascibility
Passive moods	Ease Quiet enjoyment	Sadness Dejectedness Resignation

TABLE 2. FOUR-FIELD TABLE OF EMOTIONS

	Pleasurable	*Painful*
Violent emotions	Exultation Enthusiasm	Rage Indignation
Enervating emotions	Trance	Painful rigidity Horror

It is interesting to compare this classification, at least as far as pleasurable feelings are concerned, with the classification in Stern's original German edition of his book:[152]

Aktive Stimmungen: Angeregtheit, Fröhlichkeit
Passive Stimmungen: Behaglichkeit, genießerische Versunkenheit
Stürmische Affekte: Jubel, Begeisterung
Lähmende Affekte: Verzückung

The vocabulary of pleasurable emotions can be divided into groups on the basis of what has just been said. In general this grouping is not particularly difficult, though in a number of cases the decision to place an individual word in a special group is subjective and may be challenged. This is due to the fact that emotive words are vague and hazy, and that—to quote Edward Sapir—"the individual's feeling-tones for these words are likely to vary enormously."[153] Some words appear in more than one group because of their especially wide range between ideal counterpoles. Words the grouping of which is subject to special doubt have been marked with question marks. Within the different groups the words have been arranged alphabetically; those which do not predominantly belong in our field have been included in the lists. The group which has been called *neutral* is composed of

[152] *Allgemeine Psychologie auf personalistischer Grundlage,* pp. 760 f.
[153] Cf. Sapir's discussion of the feeling-tones of *storm, tempest,* and *hurricane* in *Language, an Introduction . . .* , pp. 41 f.

words like *Freude* and *joy,* which by themselves do not indicate either kinetic or static pleasurable feeling. In order to express one or the other feeling they must be modified in their contexts, e.g., by adjectives: *lebhafte, stürmische Freude* or *stille Freude.* (Cf. Stern's *"quiet* enjoyment.")

I. KINETIC WORDS

amüsant ?
amüsieren
angeregt
animieren
aufgeräumt
Aufgeräumtheit
aufgeweckt
aufmuntern
Aufmunterung
beleben
belebend
belustigen
Belustigung
erheitern
Erheiterung
Fest
Festlichkeit
fidel
flott
frisch
fröhlich
Fröhlichkeit
Gaudium
Gelächter
heiter
Heiterkeit
jovial
Jovialität
kurzweilig
lachen
Laune
Leben
Lebendigkeit
Lebensfreude
Lebenslust
lebenslustig
lebhaft
Lebhaftigkeit
leichtherzig ?
Lustbarkeit
lustig
Lustigkeit
munter
Munterkeit
Scherz
scherzen
scherzhaft
Scherzhaftigkeit
Spaß
spaßen
spaßhaft
Spaßhaftigkeit
Triumph
triumphieren
Übermut
übermütig
Unterhaltung
Vergnügen
vergnüglich
Vergnüglichkeit
vergnügt
Vergnügtheit

alacrity
alert
alertness
amuse
amusement
amusing ?
animate
animation
blithe
blithely
blithesome
brisk
buoyant
cheer
cheerful
cheerfulness
cheeriness
cheery
disport
divert
diverted
diverting
elated
elation
enliven
enlivening
entertain
entertaining
entertainment
exhilarate

exhilaration	*joke*	*rejoice*
feast	*jollity*	*rejoicing*
frisk	*jolly*	*shout*
frolic	*jovial*	*spirits*
frolicsome	*joviality*	*sport*
fun	*laugh*	*sportive*
funny	*laughter*	*thrill*
gaiety	*liveliness*	*thrilled*
gay	*lively*	*thrilling*
glee	*lustily*	*triumph*
gleeful	*lustiness*	*triumphal*
gusto	*lusty*	*triumphant*
hilarious	*merriment*	*vivify*
hilarity	*merry*	*zest*
invigorate	*mirth*	*zestful*
jest	*mirthful*	

There are no significant differences between German and English in this group of *kinetic* words.

II. STRONGLY KINETIC WORDS

ausgelassen	*Ekstase*	*Saus und Braus ?*
Ausgelassenheit	*frohlocken*	*schwärmen*
begeistern	*jauchzen*	*Taumel*
begeistert	*Jubel*	*Triumph*
Begeisterung	*jubeln*	*triumphieren*
berauschen	*Rausch*	*überglücklich*
berauschend		

ecstasy	*intoxicate*	*thrilled*
ecstatic	*intoxicated*	*thrilling*
enthusiasm	*intoxicating*	*transport*
enthusiastic	*jubilant*	*triumph*
exuberance	*jubilate*	*triumphal*
exuberant	*jubilation*	*triumphant*
exult	*overjoyed*	
exultation	*thrill*	

The only German words in this group which do not belong in the *Umgangssprache* are *berauschen(d)* and *Rausch* in as far as they ex-

press definitely pleasurable emotions. E.g., "die ganze Bevölkerung war wie berauscht von den Siegesnachrichten; im Rausch des Erfolges, der Seligkeit." (*Rausch* 'drunken fit' is quite popular, e.g., "der muß erst seinen Rausch ausschlafen.") On the other hand, we find in this group comparatively many English words which are used either in writing or in more or less refined speech: ***exuberance, exuberant, exult, exultation, intoxicate, intoxicating, jubilant, jubilation, transport, triumphal, triumphant.***

III. STATIC WORDS

angenehm	*Besänftigung*	*Milderung*
Annehmlichkeit	*beschwichtigt*	*Paradies*
befriedigt	*beseligt ?*	*schmunzeln*
Befriedigung	*Beseligung ?*	*sich sonnen*
beglückt	*bezaubert*	*unbesorgt*
Beglücktheit	*erlöst*	*sich weiden*
Behagen	*Erlösung*	*wohl*
behaglich	*gemütlich*	*Wohlgefühl*
Behaglichkeit	*himmlisch*	*wohlgemut*
beruhigt	*Labsal*	*zufrieden*
Beruhigung	*lächeln*	*Zufriedenheit*
besänftigt	*Linderung*	

agreeable	*contentment*	*placid*
beatific	*ease*	*placidity*
beatitude	*easement*	*relief*
blessed	*easy*	*relieved*
blessedness	*enchanted*	*satisfaction*
bliss	*enchantment*	*satisfied*
blissful	*felicity*	*serene*
blissfulness	*gratification*	*serenity*
comfort n.	*gratified*	*smile*
comfortable	*heavenly*	*softened*
comforted	*mitigated*	*soothed*
content n.	*pacified*	*tranquil*
contented	*paradise*	*tranquillity*

There is a striking poverty in both languages of words that express positively in our field what Stern calls passive *moods*. None of the

German words of that type (*beglückt, Beglücktheit, beseligt, Beseligung, bezaubert, himmlisch, wohl, Wohlgefühl, wohlgemut*) may be called exclusively *static,* though they seem to be predominantly near the pole of *quiescence.* The English words *beatific, beatitude, blessed, blessedness, bliss, blissful(ness), enchanted, enchantment, felicity, heavenly* are certainly *static,* but none of them, with the possible exclusion of *heavenly,* is common in ordinary speech. The uses of *blessed* in popular speech do not belong here.[125]

It is interesting to note that in the field of unpleasurable emotions the *static* words are much more numerous, e.g., *traurig, Trauer, Traurigkeit, trübe, trübsinnig, verstimmt, Gram, Kummer; sad, sadness, blues, dejected, resigned, grieved, mourning,* etc. (Cf. also the negations of kinetic pleasurable words such as *lustlos, unlustig; cheerless, uncheerful.*)

Among the words in our group that do not predominantly belong in the field of pleasurable emotions the type which expresses pleasurable release of fear and other tensions is strongly represented. Verbs like *beseligen, befriedigen, erlösen; comfort, mitigate, satisfy* have not been included in this group in their infinitive forms; they may be classed as variables since in their contexts they tend to be *kinetic.*

IV. "TRANCE" WORDS

Ekstase	*bezaubernd*	*hingerissen*
berücken	*entzücken*	*verzücken*
berückend	*entzückend*	*Verzückung*
bezaubern	*Entzücken*	
ecstasy	*enrapture*	*rapture*
ecstatic	*entrance*	*rapturous*
enchant	*fascinate*	*ravish*
enchanted	*fascinated*	*ravishing*
enchanting	*fascinating*	*ravishment*
enchantment	*fascination*	

The real kinetic or static value of these words is hard to determine. Any one of them can express emotions of an enervating or benumbing kind, and in that case we might call those words *static.* E.g., "*Bezaubert* vom Anblick der großartigen Gebirgslandschaft standen wir da, ohne ein Wort zu sprechen; wir waren so *hingerissen,* daß wir minutenlang kein Glied rühren konnten." Of course it is well-known that all of the

German words in this group (with the exception of *hingerissen*) often lose their original forceful meaning; in that case they cease to be *trance* words. E.g., "Sie hat heute ein *bezauberndes* (*entzückendes, berükkendes*) Hütchen auf; er schien nicht sehr *entzückt* ('not exactly delighted'), als der unangemeldete Besuch kam." Even the word *Verzückung,* which Stern uses as the most characteristic example for the expression of *lähmende Affekte* shares the fate of the other words. E.g., "Gerate doch nicht in solch eine *Verzückung* (*Ekstase*) wegen dieser Lappalie." *Ecstasy, ecstatic,* like *Ekstase,* may be used as "trance" words as well as in the description of violent pleasurable emotions. Applying the German terminology to the words in this group, we have to place them close to a pole which we might call *stärkste Gemütsbewegung,* certainly not *Gemütsruhe,* and yet they tend to denote something unmistakably static in the behavior of persons who experience these enervating emotions. (Cf. "painful rigidity" in the negative field.)

Enchant, entrance, rapture, ravish, and all of their derivatives are used mainly in elevated style, at least as members of our group. On the other hand, *fascinate, fascination* are quite common in ordinary speech; as *trance* words, however, they are generally outside the boundaries of our field; e.g., "the eye of the Ancient Mariner fascinated the Wedding-Guest." Nowadays *fascinate* usually means 'to attract by delightful qualities,' not necessarily 'to hold spellbound.'

V. NEUTRAL WORDS

amüsant	*Feier*	*glücklich*
aufheitern	*Fest*	*glückselig*
beglückwünschen	*Festlichkeit*	*Glückseligkeit*
beseelen	*Freude*	*heiter*
erfreuen	*freudevoll*	*Heiterkeit*
erfreulich	*freudig*	*herrlich*
erfrischen ?	*Freudigkeit*	*lieb*
Erfrischung ?	*sich freuen*	*Lust*
ergötzen	*freundlich*	*Mitfreude*
Ergötzen	*froh*	*selig*
erheitern	*Frohsinn*	*Seligkeit*
Erheiterung	*gefallen*	*unbesorgt*
erleichtern	*gehoben*	*versüßen*
Erleichterung	*Genuß*	*Vorfreude*
erquicken	*gern*	*Wollust*
Erquickung	*Glück*	*Wonne*

anticipate
bright
brighten
captivate
captivating
charm
charmed
charming
delectable
delicious
delight
delighted
delightful
deliver
deliverance
encourage
encouragement
encouraging
enjoy
enjoyment
feast
felicitate
felicitous
fond
fruition
genial
geniality
glad
gladden
gladness
gladsome
happiness
happy
joy
joyful
joyfulness
joyous
mischief
mischievous
pleasant
please
pleased
pleasing
pleasurable
pleasure
winsome

Why the words in this group have been called *neutral* has been stated above. In their actual use in contexts they may be either *neutral*—i.e., no indication is given whether the emotion expressed by them is kinetic or static—or their modifiers may serve to denote *excitement* or *calm.* A few examples will illustrate these different usages; at the same time they will show what other means language uses, besides kinetic and static words, to express pleasurable *Gemütsbewegung* and *Gemütsruhe.*

NEUTRAL: "Ich hatte ein *amüsantes, erfreuliches, frohes* Erlebnis; die Nachricht machte ihn *glücklich, glückselig,* stimmte ihn *heiter, froh; freudig, freudevoll,* in *gehobener* Stimmung sah er den kommenden Ereignissen entgegen; ich *freue* mich über seinen Erfolg; sein Glück *freut* mich, macht mir *Freude;* dieses Konzert war ein wirklicher *Genuß;* das waren *selige* Stunden; es ist eine *Lust* (*Wonne*), so etwas zu sehen."

"This was a *pleasant* experience; he *captivates* everybody with his kindness; we *anticipate* much *pleasure* from our trip to New England; I am *glad* he is coming soon; he was *delighted* with the beauty of this picture; *joy* is often mixed with sorrow; that is a *joyful* thought; I should be *happy* if I thought so."

It must be noted that by calling these words *neutral* we do not imply the absence of differences among them in regard to their being more or less *kinetic* or *vivid.* E.g., B. Q. Morgan suggests that *joyful* is

more vivid than *glad,* which is an undeniable fact. However, *joyful* does not seem to be as definitely kinetic as *gay* or *merry,* nor does *glad* seem to be as definitely static as *beglückt* or *contented.* All these differences of degree between words are further complicated because quite generally several gradations are involved. This may be illustrated in the case of *glad* and *joyful* by a quotation from B. Q. Morgan: "*Joyful* is not only more vivid than *glad,* but also responds to a different sort of stimulus, and so has a gradation of a different sort. The word *glad* is more conventional (I shall be glad to come, I am glad that you agree with me, give him the glad hand); *joyful* is reserved for occasions of greater moment: 'That is a joyful thought' (not a glad thought). Also, 'She has a joyful (or joyous) nature' (not a glad nature)."[154]

KINETIC: "Er ist außer sich, zittert vor *Freude;* eine *heitere* Gesellschaft; ein *heiteres* Spiel; stürmische *Heiterkeit;* er *heiterte* uns so sehr *auf,* daß wir immer wieder in lautes Lachen ausbrachen; *frohe* Lieder; *freudige* Erregung; zu unserem lebhaften *Ergötzen* hielt er einen seiner *heiteren* Vorträge; der Clown war sehr *amüsant* und lustig; er ist so *(glück)selig,* daß er die ganze Welt umarmen möchte; er *freute* sich unbändig; er taumelt von *Genuß* zu *Genuß; Genußmensch; genußsüchtig;* sie singt vor lauter *Lust;* ungezügelte *Wollust."*

"*Happiness* overcame, overwhelmed him; noisy, riotous *joy;* a burst of *delight; pleasure* intoxicates; he answered in a lively and *pleasant* ('cheerful') way; he *enjoys* these social affairs tremendously." In general it might be said of this group that German has more words of a wider range between the two poles of excitement and calm, while comparatively many of the English words tend to be more static: *captivate, charm, delectable, glad, please,* and their derivatives.

STATIC: "Stille, ruhige *Heiterkeit; glücklich* und zufrieden; endlich kam er zum ruhigen *Genuß* seines Lebens; ein friedliches *Glück;* stille, innige *Freude;* eine innere *Freudigkeit* sprach aus seinen Augen; ich *freue* mich im geheimen, in aller Stille; man muß ihn genau kennen, um zu wissen, daß er eigentlich ein *froher* Mensch ist; eine *glückselige Stimmung* schien ihn zu beseelen; ein stilles *Lustgefühl* überkam ihn."

"He seemed *captivated* by the kindness of his friend; everybody was completely *charmed* with his politeness, with the purity of his motives; I am *glad* to say ('relieved') that all danger is over now; quiet *enjoyment* (Stern's example for pleasurable passive moods!);

[154] *Letter* dated Feb. 22, 1940.

pure, cloudless, everlasting, peaceful *happiness;* deep, sincere, heartfelt, perfect, pure, serene, everlasting *joy;* it is *pleasant* to sit in the sun and dream; I was greatly *pleased* ('gratified, satisfied') to hear of your success; a *pleasing* face, expression."

The main differences between the two vocabularies in regard to kinetic and static reference may be briefly recapitulated at this point:

1. Whereas in German nearly all strongly kinetic words are popular, comparatively many English words of that type are used in refined language only.

2. Those of the words which definitely belong in our field seem to be more static in English than in German; the English words, however, are less common in ordinary speech.

3. Some of the English "trance" words are mainly used in elevated style.

4. German has more neutral words of a wider range between *excitement* and *calm;* many English words tend to be more static.

In both languages static words expressing unpleasurable emotions are much more numerous than those in our field; static words expressing pleasurable release of fear and other tensions form a strong group in English as well as in German.

William Stern's psychological analysis and classification were found to be more satisfactory than any others, though his classification had to be modified for the purposes of the study presented in this chapter.

CHAPTER V

Temporal Reference

In the foregoing chapters the temporal reference of feeling was disregarded. This deliberate omission of an element that is important within the frame of the totality of emotional activity was necessitated not only by our method of presenting surveys of the field of pleasurable emotions from various aspects, but also by the fact that "all feelings as experienced are part and parcel of the present."[155] The two opposites *kinetic* and *static,* which were discussed in the preceding chapter, indicate two different types of *the course of personal activity in time* and thus have, strictly speaking, *temporal reference.* The temporal references which we are about to discuss now are of a different nature, and we shall have to use the term *temporal reference* in a narrower sense by excluding from this discussion the polarity *Bewegung-Ruhe.* On the other hand, we must include the polarity *Spannung-Lösung* because the facts of language make it well-nigh impossible to separate this polarity from the types of temporal reference which we have in mind. It is hoped that the clear differentiation between the two polarities (*Bewegung-Ruhe* and *Spannung-Lösung*), brought about by this method of investigation, may help to disentangle the confusion created in psychological literature by an unsatisfactory terminology.[156]

The linguistic facts which will be studied presently, reflect phenomena that have been described, e.g., by William Stern, who points out that the *personal significance* of feelings extends beyond the present to which they have special reference in terms of inner experience; "there are also feelings that 'reach ahead' into the future, and feelings that 'reach back' into the past." The former he calls *anticipatory,* the latter *retrospective* feelings.[155] While comparatively large groups of pleasurable words that are either kinetic or static have been established in the preceding chapter, most of the words of our field are *neutral* in regard to the expression not only of *tension* and *release* (*Spannung and Lösung*), but also of *temporal reference* in the narrower sense.

[155] W. Stern, *General Psychology . . . ,* p. 547.
[156] Cf. the first paragraph of Chapter IV.

However, there are some words of pleasurable emotion which do have temporal reference, and moreover we find, linked with words belonging in our field, linguistic complexes which serve the same purpose.

Before we proceed to a more detailed examination of the linguistic facts it will be necessary to define *temporal reference* more accurately. So far we have defined it negatively by excluding the polarity *Bewegung-Ruhe*. If we were to limit the term to a discussion of Stern's *anticipatory* and *retrospective* feelings these two adjectives might be understood in too narrow a sense as simply referring to what Stern calls "the asymmetrical poles of future and past."[155] Speaking of *temporal reference* we must also take notice of the temporal pattern of the occurrence and of the temporal changes of feelings. Ruckmick thinks that the form of temporal occurrence is especially important in a classificatory scheme:

> Surprise, fright, disappointment, and rage belong to the first type of *sudden, irruptive* emotions; anxiety, doubt, care, joy, anger, worry, and mournfulness are instances of the second class of gradually arising emotions; and finally any of the second class may come on occasion also into the third or intermittent class, in which there is a periodical ebb and flow in their intensity.[157]

I think that theoretically this classification is quite unsatisfactory and incomplete; it ought to be supplemented by at least three further classes of emotions which might be called: 4. momentary (or of short duration); 5. suddenly ceasing; 6. gradually diminishing. Furthermore I am somewhat doubtful as to Ruckmick's interpretation of the meanings of some of the nouns expressing emotions. E.g., should one really assume that *joy* is always a "gradually arising," or *disappointment* a "sudden, irruptive" emotion? Some disappointments are sudden; but a disappointment can come upon one gradually. The meanings of these words certainly do not clearly reflect definite psychological classes, and Ruckmick's remark about his third class shows that the difference between classes two and three is not expressed by correspondingly different nouns.

Ruckmick might have achieved greater clarity if he had illustrated his classes, not by single words, but rather by word complexes such as "a burst of fury," or "a spasm of laughter" (characterizing class one). Temporal patterns of occurrence and of temporal changes are

---

[157] Ruckmick, pp. 116 ff.

UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA

expressed in language predominantly by word complexes or by special linguistic forms denoting verbal aspect, and in order to arrive at more satisfactory and more detailed psychological classifications psychologists might perhaps make better use of the almost unbelievably delicate distinctions of verbal aspect found in many languages such as English, Russian, Semitic, Turkish, etc.[158]

Our first task in this chapter is an examination of the words for pleasurable emotions in the light of the above remarks on temporal reference; the second task is to take into consideration other linguistic means of expressing temporal reference in connection with the words of our field. The comparative scarcity of pleasurable words having temporal reference and the resulting "gaps" in the vocabulary justify us in performing both these tasks at the same time.

It is significant that in the above-mentioned classificatory scheme of Ruckmick's all nouns denoting emotions belong in the "negative" field, with the exception of *joy* and *surprise,* the former being pleasurable, the latter "indifferent." If we examine the Wundtian classification of emotions in the translation presented by Ruckmick,[157] we have a similar picture. In this classification the *emotions of tension* are subdivided into three groups called: 1. *with pleasantness;* 2. *indifferent;* 3. *with unpleasantness.*

The only single word found under the heading "with pleasantness" is *hope,* which is somewhat neutral and becomes definitely pleasurable only in phrases like "hope makes happy (or merry, cheerful)." The nuclear meaning of *hope* and *Hoffnung* is entirely outside the field of pleasurable emotions: 'desire combined with expectation,' and none of the ideological dictionaries (Roget, Schlessing, Dornseiff) places it among the pleasurable words. All three, however, mention *hoffnungsvoll, hopeful* under the heading "Heiterkeit" ("cheerfulness"). The German compounds *hoffnungsfroh, -freudig, -selig,* which cannot be duplicated in English, are even more clearly pleasurable than *hoffnungsvoll.* Thus, in this particular case, there is in the English word-field a gap, which in the German field is filled with compounds forcefully expressing tension plus pleasurable anticipation.

Under the heading "indifferent" of Wundt's second group of emotions of tension we find *expectation* and *surprise* (sudden resolution of tension). Furthermore, the word complex *joyful surprise* has been

---

[158] Cf. Sapir, *Language, an Introduction . . .* , p. 114, also notes 145-148. Reuning, *Monatshefte für Deutschen Unterricht,* XXVII, 232 ff.

placed under the heading "with pleasantness" and linked by a line with *surprise;* thus *joyful surprise* would have to be defined as a "pleasurable sudden resolution of tension," an emotion for which German does not have a simple word either, using a complex like *frohe Überraschung* instead. Other languages have simple words to fill in such gaps, e.g., Spanish *alegron* 'unexpected quickly passing joy.' Latin *alacer* and *alacritas* sometimes seem to express 'joyful expectation' (frohe Erwartung), as in Cicero's "Catilina alacer et laetus"; "alacres perterritum superare"; or in Terence's "quid tu es tristis? quidne es alacris?" *Alacer* frequently seems to be the contrary of *perterritus.* In many cases in German as well as in English pleasurable release of tension is expressed by complexes, e.g., "Ich bin froh darüber, daß das vorbei ist; I am glad that this is over."[159]

In the third group "emotions of tension with unpleasantness" neither English nor German are lacking in simple words, and Ruckmick

[159] The Latin examples are quoted from Georges. (See Bibliography.)

B. Q. Morgan writes about the words *alacrity, anticipate,* and *satisfaction:* "With regard to the word *alacrity,* there is no doubt that it contains a pleasurable image. Thus a dictionary published in 1895 says, 'Used especially of the cheerful ardor with which . . .' Something of the same sort holds true of the words *anticipate, anticipation.* A dictionary published in 1934 says, 'Look forward to, especially with confidence or pleasure.' This throws light on the word *satisfaction,* in which we have very clearly a straddling of your boundary-line. In some cases the word contains a very plain emotional connotation, as for example, 'I looked at my completed house with great satisfaction.' If, on the other hand, we speak of the satisfaction of a debt, there is clearly no emotional implication whatsoever" (*Letter* dated Jan. 17, 1940).

Frank Aydelotte writes about *anticipation:*

"I think it is a New England usage, that is the use of the word in the sense of pleasurable anticipation. My wife uses it in that sense. I never do. She was brought up in New England, I was brought up in the Middle West. . . . I don't remember ever hearing it used in that sense in England. I think we must say that an educated person might use it in that sense" (*Letter* dated April 28, 1939).

Taylor Starck writes: "With best wishes for the Christmas holidays and looking forward with pleasure to our meeting in N. O. (no, one cannot say anticipate, 'I anticipate much pleasure from our meeting' is the phrase) . . ." (*Letter* dated Dec. 19, 1939).

Roland G. Kent's information given to me orally is the same as that given by Frank Aydelotte: different usage by husband and wife, revealing probable regional differences. Marie Osland-Hill, a Swarthmore student from England, uses anticipate in the sense of 'look forward with pleasure to.'

These quotations have been given in order to illustrate by one example the unsettled conditions characteristic of modern American usage; this is in my personal opinion a very desirable state of affairs, indicating the vitality of the American language.

Cf. Otto Behaghel: "Nichts gibt es, was dem Schulmeister ärgerlicher wäre, als wenn er auf sein Richteramt verzichten soll, wenn er nicht sagen soll: entweder—oder; wenn er anerkennen soll, daß zwei Formen, zwei Fügungen gleich möglich, gleich richtig seien" (*Geschriebenes Deutsch und gesprochenes Deutsch,* p. 18).

quotes as examples *apprehension, fear* (increased form), *anxiety* (durable form), *terror* (sudden with strong depression of connected relaxation), *dismay* (with prominent depression), *horror* (with accompanying feelings of excitement).

Having thus surveyed the emotions of tension, we must emphasize the conclusion, on the basis of linguistic facts, that the polarity of *Spannung-Lösung* is inseparably linked with temporal reference to future and past. E.g., when we speak of "hope; joyful expectation," or when we say "Ich erwarte voller Freude die Ankunft meines Freundes," we not only express feelings of tension, but also feelings that 'reach ahead' into the future; on the other hand, in a sentence like "I am really glad that this is over," or "Ich bin heilfroh, daß die Geschichte gut abgelaufen ist," the pleasurable feelings of resolution of tension implied are also retrospective feelings.

This contrast of *anticipatory* and *retrospective* emotions deserves some further examination. These opposite emotional directions are conveniently suggested by two German compound nouns, *Vorfreude* and *Nachfreude*. As a rule the former is translated by 'pleasurable anticipation'; English has a word *afterpain,* but no *afterjoy,* and thus there is another gap in the word-field of pleasurable emotions in English. In German pleasurable anticipation may also be expressed by the verb *sich freuen* linked with the object toward which joy is directed by the preposition *auf*. The very simple sentence "Ich freue mich auf die Ferien," in which anticipation is expressed merely by the relational *auf,* corresponds to a clumsier English sentence "I am looking forward [with pleasure] to my vacation." I have been told, however, by a considerable number of native Americans, that *to anticipate* and *anticipation* are used as equivalents of German *sich freuen auf* and *Vorfreude;* this has been vigorously denied by others.[159] To be sure, most speakers would use *anticipate* in the sense of 'sich freuen auf' whenever context or situation leave no doubt that a *pleasurable* kind of anticipation is understood without necessitating the actual use of a word for pleasure. *NED* does not mention the pleasurable connotations of *anticipate* and *anticipation.*

Two words, untranslatable in English, express retrospective joy or happiness: *beglückt* and *Beglücktheit;* at least that is the consensus of several native speakers of German who have been consulted.

In the group of "Static Words" in the preceding chapter we found a considerable number of words for pleasurable release of fear and other tensions, like *Zufriedenheit, Befriedigung, Erlösung, contentment,*

satisfaction, gratification; such words deserve mention here in so far as retrospective pleasurable feelings are implied in their meanings.[159]

Finally, the problem of the form of temporal reference calls for further attention. How does language reflect the temporal pattern of occurrences and of temporal changes in the field of pleasurable emotions? We had to criticize Ruckmick for using single words such as *joy* as a basis for his classification. This criticism is supported by the questionable character of statements like the following:

> ***Joy*** **is in its nature commonly short of duration;** ***glad*** **and** ***pleased*** **are both applied to the ordinary occurrences of the day, but the former denotes rather a lively and momentary sentiment, the latter a gentle but more lasting feeling (*Cr*).**

There may be a grain of truth in such statements about these and other words in the field, but they are largely invalidated for the purposes of this study by their subjectivity, indicated by contradictory statements of other scholars.

In connection with the type of temporal reference which we are discussing at this point one special group of words must not be forgotten: German verbs with the prefixes *be-, er-, auf-, ent-, ver-.* These verbs represent linguistic forms of inceptive or durative-inceptive aspect, e.g., *belustigen, aufheitern, erheitern, begeistern, berauschen, beglücken, beseligen, entzücken, verzücken, erfreuen; beruhigen, besänftigen, erlösen.* Thus "sein Gesicht heiterte sich (plötzlich) auf" implies inceptive aspect, and "einen Traurigen (allmählich) aufheitern" inceptive-durative aspect. English *cheer up* has the same function as *aufheitern,* and similarly *exhilarate, thrill; animate, enliven, invigorate.*

The importance of word complexes as a means of expressing the form of temporal occurrence has been stressed above and illustrated by two examples for sudden irruptive emotion. Similar phrases from our field are: "a burst of delight; to feel a surge of happiness; joy welled up in him; ein lauter Freudenausbruch; in der ersten Aufwallung der Freude (der Begeisterung)." A sudden cessation of joy may be expressed by a verb with or without appropriate adverb, as in "Joy turned, changed (suddenly) into earnestness, sorrow." The sentence "He felt increasing joy" denotes gradually arising pleasurable emotion; "seine Freude nahm ab, schwand allmählich dahin" expresses gradually diminishing joy. "Er jubelte immer und immer wieder" might illustrate Ruckmick's intermittent class, and it would correspond

to Sapir's "to cry in fits and starts," which he gives as an example of what he calls momentaneous-iterative aspect.

To sum up, we might say in regard to differences between the two vocabularies that there are some "gaps" in English, which do not exist in German. Thus the compounds *hoffnungsfroh, -freudig, -selig; Vorfreude, Nachfreude; beglückt, Beglücktheit* imply temporal references which in English are expressed by word complexes. Simple words of other languages such as Spanish *alegron* cannot be duplicated in either English or German. There are differences of opinion concerning the use of *to anticipate* 'sich freuen auf.'

German as well as English have more simple words with temporal reference in the field of unpleasant emotions than in our field, e.g., *fear, anxiety;* both languages have a considerable number of words for pleasurable release expressing retrospective feelings.

Careful analysis of the psychological literature on the subject (W. Stern, Ruckmick, and Wundt) leads to the conclusion that the polarity *kinetic-static* must be excluded from the discussion in Chapter V; the polarity *tension-release* cannot be separated from *temporal reference* by the linguist. We must distinguish between 1. anticipatory and retrospective feelings, and 2. the temporal pattern of occurrence of feelings.

Most of our words are neutral in regard to temporal reference, and therefore word complexes predominate, a fact which has been overlooked by psychologists.—The German verbal prefixes *be-, er-, auf-, ent-, ver-,* express a special type of verbal aspect (form of temporal occurrence).

CHAPTER VI

Directionality and Non-directionality

We have now to consider two further distinct and contrasting types of usage, which I propose to call *directional* and *non-directional.* This distinction is psychological only in so far as its basis is found in the person—world (*Ich—Nicht-Ich*) relation; our point of departure for this survey of the FIELD is the Ego that experiences the emotions. I find that the linguistic material expressing emotional experiences can be arranged without serious difficulty in two groups: 1. *Non-directional* expressions, which may be either interjectional words like *juchhe! juhu! hurra! heigh-ho! hurrah! goody!,* or complexes like "Ich bin so froh; er scheint heute aufgeräumt; er ist voller Freude; he is jubilant; his joy was boundless; I am very happy." All of these expressions indicate the emotional states or acts of persons without reference to any objects of joy. 2. *Directional* expressions, such as "Ich freue mich über sein Glück; er hat Freude an der Natur; eine frohe Botschaft; we enjoyed the beautiful scenery; I am delighted that you came; a cheerful room." In all of these examples something is said about the object of the pleasurable emotion. The different types of directional use will be discussed in the second part of this chapter.

Before we review the linguistic material in our fields we should—at least theoretically—consider the results of psychological research. The danger of being influenced by aprioristic categories and, consequently, of persuading ourselves of things which are not so, are negligible, because psychologists themselves, e.g., K. Koffka, admit that "the psychological theory of emotions is highly unsatisfactory."[160] Among the reasons for this unsatisfactory state of things there seems to be only one that can be appraised by the linguist: confused terminology. One of the most elusive pairs of opposites is *subjective-objective,* and after having struggled with the definitions of these two words given in a number of psychological and philosophical texts, one is strongly in-

[160] *Principles of Gestalt Psychology,* pp. 400 f.
Koffka's questionable statement that emotions need not necessarily belong to the Ego (p. 407), and his equally questionable rejection of empathy (p. 326), have no bearing on our classification of the linguistic facts.

clined to sympathize with John Ruskin, who said many years ago: "German dulness, and English affectation, have of late much multiplied among us the use of two of the most objectionable words that were ever coined by the troublesomeness of metaphysicians,—namely, 'Objective' and 'Subjective.' "[161]

A perfect example of an objectionable use of the two terms is afforded by the antithesis mentioned and discussed by William Stern: "Feelings have a *subjective* character;—perceptions, ideas, acts of will, an *objective* character."[162] Stern himself thinks that this is a very important distinction, but that it requires "more exact definition." If we interpret *subjective* as 'having to do with the subject, the Ego, or the person,' and *objective* as 'having to do with objects, Nicht-Ich, or world' (this is the only possible interpretation on the basis of what precedes in Stern's text), the statement is wrong, unless we limit the term *feelings* to "feelings of self," which is a very specific class of feelings. Consequently Stern sets the "feelings of self" aside and claims that "most feelings are combined with a conscious intention to *objectification,* i.e., they are experienced as the feeling-aspects of *objects and values.*"[162] Stern's subsequent argumentation has no significance for our linguistic problem.

No matter what psychological theory one favors, the one outstanding fact remains that feelings are expressed in language either with or without reference to their objects of feelings, i.e., *directionally* or *non-directionally.* In the latter case language concerns itself merely with expressing the emotion of the Ego or the person, and if we use the word *subject* instead of *person,* we might be justified in substituting *subjective* for *non-directional.* However, this might cause another terminological difficulty since *subjective* is sometimes used as the adjective of *subject* in the syntactical sense. Thus in the phrase "Ich bin froh," *ich* is the subject; if we use the phrase "meine Freude" instead, *meine* is certainly not a *subject* in the grammatical sense; but both phrases are *non-directional* in that they express the joy of a person (subject) without reference to the object, source, or cause of the pleasurable emotion.

Stern's distinction of "feelings of self" and "most feelings" (i.e., feelings combined with a conscious intention to objectification) has

---

[161] *Of the Pathetic Fallacy,* p. 152.

[162] *General Psychology . . . ,* p. 526.

Scheler's expression "generelle Ichbezogenheit der Gefühle" is preferable to "subjective character." Cf. note 103.

nothing to do with the distinction between *non-directional* and *directional,* which is simply a linguistic distinction. The phrases "ich bin froh" and "ich genieße meine Freude" would both seem to express "feelings of self"; "ich bin froh" might also be used when pleasure is experienced as the feeling-aspect of some object or value; in other words, I can use "ich bin froh" when the person with whom I happen to communicate knows what is the object of my joy without my mentioning it. For the purposes of a linguistic discussion this use of "ich bin froh" must be called *non-directional* because the object of the emotion is not expressed by means of language. On the other hand, the use of the word *genießen* in "ich genieße meine Freude" is *directional* from the linguistic point of view.[163]

Unfortunately the present state of phenomenological research on *intentionality* is quite unsatisfactory, mainly because philosophers do not agree on the meaning of that term.[164] Our linguistic term *directional* corresponds very nearly to what Scheler calls intentional. Though Scheler has penetrated the matter with which we are concerned more profoundly than anybody else, perhaps because he pays more attention to the facts of language than other philosophers, his terminology could not be accepted for the purposes of this study. He is too much concerned with subtleties of philosophic and psychological speculation—including hair-splitting refinements of expression—, and his use of the word *intentional* is sometimes ambiguous and somewhat obscure. Nevertheless, some of his observations must not be overlooked. E.g., he says: "Wir scheiden zunächst das intentionale 'Fühlen von Etwas' von allen bloßen Gefühlszuständen."[165] This distinction is the same as that between *directional* and *non-directional.* An interesting parallel to our remark on "ich genieße meine Freude" is found in the following quotation from Scheler: "Es gibt ursprüngliches intentionales Fühlen. Dies zeigt sich vielleicht am besten da, wo Gefühle und Fühlen gleichzeitig sind, ja das Gefühl das ist, worauf sich das Fühlen richtet."[165] He then discusses this type of intentional *Fühlen* by illustrating it with the expressions "einen Schmerz leiden, ertragen, dulden, genießen."

---

[163] It goes without saying that in this discussion the word *object* is not used in the grammatical sense; it means 'Gegenstand' and is the opposite of *subject* in the sense of 'person' or 'Ego.' In grammar the term *syntactical* (or *grammatical*) *object* might be used as an unambiguous equivalent of the German term *Ergänzung.*

[164] The clearest discussion of the history and of the different meanings of this important concept is found in an article by Spiegelberg, *Der Begriff der Intentionalität in der Scholastik, bei Brentano und bei Husserl.* (See Bibliography.)

[165] *Der Formalismus in der Ethik . . .*, p. 262.

Another parallel between our use of *directional* and Scheler's use of *intentional* is of special significance: the word *directional* implies a two-way direction, from the person to the object and from the object to the person. E.g., "Ich habe meine Freude an der Musik; die Musik erfreut mich." Both these sentences express what Scheler and others call *intentionales Fühlen* in two different directions. The use of the preposition *an* in the first sentence is relevant to the question of intentionality. The original meaning of this preposition is local, and thus it would point to a "togetherness." This of course is not felt when we use this sentence, at least not consciously. Hermann Paul, referring to such uses of *an* in modern German, calls the preposition "ein allgemeines Mittel, eine Beziehung zu etwas auszudrücken, woran sich dann Nebenvorstellungen verschiedener Art anschließen können: . . . *Lust, Vergnügen, Freude, Gefallen an etwas.*"[166] Though this definition is rather vague it seems to offer an advantage over calling this use of *an* causal, as if the sentence meant the same as "Ich freue mich, weil ich Musik höre (or, weil die Musik schön ist)."

Scheler makes this difference between intentional and causal relation quite clear. E.g., he asks himself: Why am I today in this or that mood? What is it that has caused sadness or joy in me? The causing object and the emotional state may be perceived or remembered in quite different *acts;* only subsequently I establish in this case a relation by "thinking." But this relation is not the same as that between feeling (*Gefühl*) and object when I feel, e.g., the beauty of the snow-covered mountains in the light of the setting sun.

Hier besteht ein ursprüngliches Sichbeziehen, Sichrichten des Fühlens auf ein Gegenständliches, auf Werte. Dieses Fühlen ist nicht ein toter Zustand oder ein Tatbestand, der assoziative Verbindungen eingehen oder bezogen werden kann, oder "Anzeichen" sein kann, sondern es ist eine zielbestimmte Bewegung—wenn auch durchaus keine vom Zentrum ausgehende Tätigkeit—(und gar keine zeitlich ausgedehnte Bewegung). Es handelt sich um eine punktuelle, je nachdem vom Ich aus gegenständlich gerichtete, oder auf das Ich zukommende Bewegung, in der mir etwas gegeben wird und "zur Erscheinung" kommt. Dieses Fühlen hat daher genau dieselbe Beziehung zu seinem Wertkorrelat wie die von "Vorstellung" und "Gegenstand"; eben die intentionale Beziehung.[167]

---

[166] *Deutsches Wörterbuch,* p. 18.
[167] *Der Formalismus in der Ethik* . . . , pp. 263 ff.

A negative definition of this *intentional* relation would be: The relation between feeling and object is not brought about by an act of thinking.

A few examples of the *non-directional* use of words denoting pleasurable emotions have been given in the first paragraph of the introduction to this chapter. We shall now have to make a more detailed examination of our field in this respect. Emotional states not *intentionally* related to objects are quite commonly expressed by adjectives or past participles with an adjectival meaning; these may be used predicatively or attributively. The following examples may serve as types for the non-directional use of adjectives:

1. Er ist fröhlich; he is happy.
2. Ein fröhlicher Mensch; a happy person.

In these word complexes something is said about the emotional state of a person; nothing is said about the intentional relation of the person to some object of joy. It goes without saying that the grammatical subject in type 1 might be *I, we, you, they, John, this fellow,* etc., instead of *he.* No matter what grammatical subject we use, we simply state the *Gefühlszustand* of a person or persons. If we reflect on the causes of a person's joy, we might come to the conclusion that "he is happy because today is his birthday." Thereby we express a *causal,* not an *intentional* relation, and therefore even in this context the term *non-directional* would apply to the linguistic description of the word complex "he is happy." In German one cannot say "er ist heiter über . . . , aufgeräumt über . . . , munter über . . . "; one does say "er ist glücklich über . . . , froh über. . . ." In other words, *glücklich* and *froh* can also be used directionally in combination with the preposition *über.*

Naturally it is impossible to investigate all the potentional uses of pleasurable words in contexts; but we should not overlook peculiarly difficult border-line cases, which I think can hardly be clarified by further philosophical speculation. E.g., in the sentence "Er ist glücklich über seinen Erfolg" *glücklich* is used directionally, or to use the phonomenological term, the relation of the pleasurable feeling to the object is plainly *intentional.* What about the two following sentences: "Er ist glücklich im Gefühl seines Erfolges" and "Er ist glücklich im Gedanken an seinen Erfolg?" I am inclined to think that from the linguistic point of view the use of *glücklich* is directional in both sentences. However, a philosopher of the type of Scheler might do some hair-splitting and call the pleasurable feeling in the first sentence intentional; on the other hand, he might argue that in the second

sentence the cause of the pleasure is the success, and that one becomes conscious of this cause only after reflection (*im Gedanken*); and yet the *Gedanke* might be the object of the intentional feeling. This may compel us to say that linguistically the question whether we should speak of causal or intentional relation cannot be definitely decided in this particular case.

There are many cases in grammar where we have to assume this point of view. E.g., I should not be prepared to determine whether in the sentence "Wenn er kommt, werde ich zu Hause sein" the conjunction is temporal or conditional, unless I knew the details of the situation in which it is used. In the sentence as it stands *wenn* is both temporal and conditional. In spite of their comparative frequency such cases do not invalidate the basic distinction between temporal and conditional clauses, and the same is true in regard to the distinction between causal and intentional relation, though this distinction has not as yet been incorporated in the grammars.

Other adjectives occurring in non-directional use besides those mentioned above are: *fidel, heiter, lustig, freudig, munter, selig, glückselig, wohlgemut, übermütig, überglücklich.* All of these, including *fröhlich, froh, glücklich,* can be used attributively and predicatively, though "ein wohlgemuter Mensch" is not idiomatic, at least in popular speech. *Ausgelassen* and *vergnügt,* originally participles but no longer felt as such, are also used in both ways: "er ist ausgelassen; ein ausgelassener Junge." On the other hand, *aufgeräumt* and *hingerissen,* which in present day German are adjectives, express non-directional feeling only in predicative use; "ein hingerissener, (or aufgeräumter) Mensch" sounds very artificial. *Begeistert* and *beglückt* have adjectival as well as participial meaning, and as adjectives they occur attributively and predicatively. The participles *belustigt, aufgeheitert, erheitert, berauscht, berückt, beseligt, bezaubert, ergötzt, erfreut, entzückt, verzückt* can all be used non-directionally; in that sense they would hardly occur as attributes, though the expression "ein verzückter Mensch" does not seem to be impossible. "Ein berauschter Mensch" is a person who has imbibed too much alcohol; in the expression "ein von Freude berauschter Mensch" we find directional use in that the object of the emotion called *Rausch* is *Freude.* On the other hand, if we consider, as we probably should, compounds like *freudeberauscht* and *Freudenrausch* as linguistic wholes, the sentences "er ist freudeberauscht; er ist in einem Freudenrausch" would express non-directional feeling; we simply state a *Gefühlszustand* of a person.

As far as adjectives and participles are concerned the situation in the English field of pleasurable emotions does not seem to differ from the German. We have the adjectives *cheerful, enthusiastic, gay, glad, gleeful, happy, joyful, jubilant, merry, sprightly, triumphant.* They can all be used non-directionally, and they occur predicatively and attributively. The case of *glad* requires special attention. In modern prose use this adjective is predominantly directional, e.g., "I am glad of . . . ; I am glad (that) you like it; I am glad to see you." In the older language it was quite commonly used non-directionally, and it still is in poetry. E.g., Wordsworth, *Fountain* XII:

> Often, glad no more,
> We wear a face of joy, because
> We have been glad of yore.

In modern prose *glad* is mostly used predicatively. Cf. *NED,* meaning no. 3.a. *simply. NED* gives a significant example, in which in the modern language the word is used non-directionally, according to our terminology, and the cause is "indicated contextually": "'Your friend has won his case.' 'Yes; I am very glad.'" Two of B. Q. Morgan's examples quoted above in another connection[168] may serve here to illustrate further the use of adjectives in the directional and non-directional sense. *Directional:* "I am joyful (not cheerful) that the operation was a success." *Non-directional:* "Although the operation was not a complete success, I am cheerful."

English past participles, which in an adjectival sense may express non-directional pleasurable feelings, are: *amused, buoyed-up, charmed, cheered (up), delighted, diverted, elated, enchanted, enraptured, entranced, exhilarated, fascinated, gladdened, gratified, intoxicated, overjoyed, pleased, ravished, thrilled, transported.* They are more numerous than in German. It should be noted that the German type represented by *ausgelassen, aufgeräumt, hingerissen* is absent in English. These are words which, as expressions of pleasurable emotions, are no longer past participles in the modern language, but adjectives only. The above-mentioned English words are used both as adjectives and as participles. If we disregard the original meanings of *ausgelassen, aufgeräumt, hingerissen,* the presence of these "adjectives" in German would indicate no essential difference between English and German.

---

[168] See note 124.

Another fact that has only slight bearing on our question deserves mentioning: the absence of a clear boundary line between the adjectival and the participial uses of past participles in English. In German this boundary is set up by the use of two different auxiliaries. Cf. English "I was amused; I am delighted," and German "Ich wurde (war) belustigt; ich werde (bin) erfreut." There is, however, a certain ambiguity involved in the use of *werden,* and this has a definite bearing on our problem of directionality. *Werden* has two meanings which become apparent in contextual use. E.g., "Das Publikum wurde von dem Komiker belustigt" (*directional;* genuine *passive voice*). Allmählich wurden wir erfreut, 'froh'" (*non-directional;* here *erfreut* is "more or less" an adjective, and *wurden* means 'became,' denoting a change in the *Gefühlszustand*). The discussion of cases like these is complicated because of our highly unsatisfactory Latin grammatical terminology. A start was made by Theodor Kalepky to create a new terminology, but his attempt has not attracted the attention that it deserved.[169]

The person whose mood or emotional state is described by adjectives without reference to the object of the emotion need not always be expressed by pronouns (*I; he; my*[170] *joy*) or by nouns denoting persons (person; Mensch). In phrases like "eine fröhliche Gesellschaft; eine heitere Menge; a happy crowd" it is easy to see that the words *Gesellschaft, Menge, crowd* are designations of persons, and that the use of the pleasurable adjectives is non-directional. The person (or Ego) is frequently expressed metaphorically, as in "ein fröhliches Herz; a happy soul." Furthermore we describe someone's emotional state by saying "Er ist in vergnüglicher Laune, in heiterer Stimmung; she has a joyful (or joyous) nature." All these uses should be classed as non-directional.

Naturally there are cases where it is quite hard to determine whether we have directional or non-directional use of adjectives. The often quoted proverbial sentence from the "Fledermaus" "Glücklich ist, wer vergißt, was nicht mehr zu ändern ist" may serve as one of many examples. The grammatical subject "wer vergißt, was nicht mehr

---

[169] See note 9. Quite frequently the adverbs *very* and *much* reveal the nature of "participle-adjectives." E.g., "I was *much* amused by the comic actor; he was a *very* amused man." Cf. "a *very* limited space; a *very* learned man; my *much* honored friend; a *much* simplified rule."

[170] I feel inclined to call *my* a possessive pronoun used attributively, though in English it is always called a possessive adjective. Cf. French "adjectif possessif"; Spanish "adjetivo posesivo"; but German "adjektivische (!) oder attributive Form des besitzanzeigenden Fürworts (Possessivpronomens)." Of course in the light of Kalepky's investigations not one of these terms is satisfactory. Cf. *Neuaufbau der Grammatik,* especially pp. 76 ff.

zu ändern ist" characterizes persons who are said to be happy, and thus we might reduce the whole sentence to our type 1. *person(s) is (are) happy,* which is non-directional. On the other hand, a type which may be instanced by Lortzing's "O selig, o selig, ein Kind noch zu sein!" seems to be directional. The condition or state (*Zustand*) of being a child is the object of intentional feeling; a desirable state is a (source of) joy for any person.

In German, adjectives can be used as nouns to a much greater extent than in English, where this linguistic phenomenon is limited to the designation of classes of persons, as in "the rich, the poor; rich and poor; old and young," and to a number of special cases. Thus we have in German, e.g., "dieser Glückliche!" 'this happy man, happy one,' which of course represents non-directional use. Other examples: "Dem Glücklichen schlägt keine Stunde." "Die Uhr schlägt keinem Glücklichen" (Schiller). "Nur dem Fröhlichen blüht der Baum des Lebens" (Arndt). "Dem Heiteren erscheint die Welt auch heiter" (Goethe). In these last cases, where the adjective-nouns designate classes of persons, the English language would also use substantivized adjectives, which, however, are treated as plurals though without plural endings.

In both languages adverbs and adverbial phrases describing pleasurable emotional states are used non-directionally. E.g., "froh und munter tat er seine Arbeit; freudig ging er in den Tod; we shall cheerfully do this work." Adverbial phrases: "Er kam zu mir in heiterer Laune; er handelte in glücklicher Stimmung; he came to me in a happy mood." There are border-line cases where it is hard if not impossible to determine whether we have to regard them as directional or non-directional. E.g., "wir tun das mit Freuden"; pleasurable emotion might just accompany the action (*non-directional*), or the action might be the intentional object of joy (*directional*). The case is further complicated by the fact that *mit Freuden* 'gern, gladly, willingly' straddles the boundaries of our field and reaches into the wider fields of cognition and volition. Cases such as "I had read Coleridge's poems with delight" should be considered directional.

Most German and English nouns in the field can be and are defined (e.g., in dictionaries) by 'state or condition of being glad, pleased, delighted, etc.' In that sense they indicate personal emotional states and are therefore used non-directionally. Among the German nouns there are many formations with the endings *-heit* and *-keit,* such as *Ausgelassenheit, Aufgeräumtheit, Vergnügtheit, Beglücktheit, Fröhlichkeit, Heiterkeit, Lustigkeit, Munterkeit, Freudigkeit, Seligkeit;* some

with *-ung: Begeisterung, Verzückung* (but not *Vergnügung,* which is used only directionally, meaning 'object or source of joy,' as in "wir nahmen an vielen Vergnügungen teil"); some substantivized infinitives like *Entzücken, Vergnügen* (*Vergnügen* is also used directionally in the same sense as *Vergnügung,* especially in the singular, where it has replaced the latter word, which is hardly ever used in the singular in the spoken language). Other nouns belonging in this group semantically are: *Freude, Lust, Übermut, Ekstase, Jubel, Rausch, Taumel, Wohlgefühl, Frohsinn, Wollust, Wonne, Glück.* In order to prove that all these nouns can be used non-directionally one need but put them in model sentences such as: "Meine Freude (Lust, Fröhlichkeit) ist groß (gering, . . .); er ist voller Seligkeit (Glück, . . .); er ist in Ekstase (im Rausch, . . .); sein Übermut (Jubel, seine Begeisterung) nimmt zu (läßt nach)."

English nouns corresponding to the German nouns just discussed are *gaiety, geniality, felicity, hilarity, jollity; cheerfulness, gladness, happiness, cheeriness; amusement, enjoyment; elation, exhilaration, exultation, intoxication; exuberance, enthusiasm; rapture; pleasure; bliss, delight, glee, joy, mirth.* When we compare these nouns with the German nouns in the preceding paragraph, we find that the number of words in actual use in ordinary speech is greater in German, a phenomenon which has been discussed in the chapter on depth gradation. Otherwise there is no significant difference between English and German in regard to their non-directional use. E.g., "His joy (delight, pleasure) was intense (great, . . .); he is in a state of great happiness (elation, . . .); his amusement (enjoyment, enthusiasm, . . .) increases (decreases)."

Non-directional use of nouns for pleasurable emotion is also implied in sentences of the type "I have (had) joy (or, happiness, gladness)."[171] The nouns happen to be grammatical objects, which is a mere coincidence caused by the particular structure of English (and German).[172] Nothing is said about a relation to an object (*Gegenstand*) of joy.

---

[171] B. Q. Morgan finds an interesting difference of meaning among these three nouns; it is worth mentioning, though it has no bearing on the question under discussion in this chapter. "I have had *joy* (time-limited), *happiness* (lasting but less intense), *gladness* (short and relatively mild)" (*Letter* dated Feb. 22, 1940).

Roland G. Kent objects to the expressions "to have joy" and "to have gladness." Others who have been asked claim that *joy* and *gladness* could be used in this combination in poetic language only. *Reum:* "to have joy."

[172] There are languages that do not have a word for 'to have'; e.g., Turkish: *evim var* 'house-my there-is.'

The linguistic fact that the pleasurable emotion is expressed by a noun used as a grammatical subject and followed by an active verb and a grammatical object denoting a person might be explained by what Oskar Weise calls "Beseelung der Gefühle und Regungen, die im Herzen entstehen." These uses of our nouns should be classed as non-directional in as much as no mention is made of the object (*Gegenstand*) of the emotion. There is of course a slight difference in meaning between this type of sentence and the type "I have joy"; this difference is well described by Weise:

Wie ein Mensch außer sich sein, in sich gehen und wieder zu sich kommen kann, so können auch seine Empfindungen als von außen in ihn eintretend gedacht werden. Es ist nicht einerlei, ob ich sage: "Er hat Angst" oder "Die Angst packt ihn." Dort wird er wenigstens insofern als tätig hingestellt, als er im Besitze der Erregung ist, hier erscheint er leidend, weil diese von außen herkommt und ihn anfaßt. So ergreift, überfällt, beschleicht, übermannt jemand auch der Zorn, die Wut, Verzweiflung usw.[178]

Examples in our field are: "Ein Wohlgefühl durchdrang ihn; die Freude überwältigte mich; Übermut plagte ihn; (ein Gefühl der) Heiterkeit überkam ihn; joy filled his heart; (a feeling of) happiness overcame (overwhelmed) me; enthusiasm seized us." It is a well-known fact that this *Beseelung der Gefühle* is very important in the language of poetry. Judging from the material in my files I believe that this way of expressing feelings is more popular in German than in English; but this may be more or less accidental or due to the above-mentioned larger number of popular nouns in our field.

Related to this use of the nouns is their frequent occurrence without reference—at least by linguistic means—to either person or object (*Gegenstand*). Such is the case in most definitions of these words, e.g., in all kinds of dictionaries. E.g., *Joy* 'a pleasurable state or condition; a state of *happiness* or *felicity*' (*NED*). This use of the word is definitely non-directional. On the other hand, when we find in *NED Joy* 3, 'a source or object of joy; that which causes joy, or in which delight is taken; a *delight*,' we are faced with a directional use of the word *joy*. If we define *Freude* as 'das Gefühl des Frohseins' we mean non-directional use; the definition 'die lebhafte Erregung, die das Gemüt über etwas zuteil werdendes oder gewordenes Angenehmes

[178] *Ästhetik der deutschen Sprache*, pp. 113 ff.

empfindet'[174] implies directional use. *NED* defines *cheerfulness* as 'cheerful quality or state,' 1. 'of persons, their dispositions, etc., . . .' b. 'as shown in the countenance . . .' 2. *transf.* 'bright and inspiring appearance . . .' A quotation from Ruskin illustrates meaning 1: "Cheerfulness is just as natural to the heart of a man in strong health as colour to his cheeks." This is a non-directional use of the noun. Under b we find "the cheerfulness of his voice and countenance," under 2 "the cheerfulness of the village with its cabins and its gardens." In the last two quotations we have directional use.

Theoretically verbs that are or may be intransitive in the narrower sense (or absolute) should be expressions for non-intentional emotions. Very few verbs of that type are actually found in our field, such as *jauchzen, jubeln, schwärmen, triumphieren.* All of these can be used non-directionally. E.g., "Ich jauchze (vor Freude); sie jubeln; wie kannst du nur so schwärmen; er triumphiert, (man sieht's ihm an)." These verbs have one characteristic in common: they express *emotional radiation.*[175] It seems that in English *rejoice* is the only verb that occurs in a similar absolute use. E.g., "They are rejoicing." Instead of "I am jubilating, exulting, or triumphing" (expressions that are not idiomatic) we use "I am jubilant, exultant, or triumphant."

Ancient Greek has a middle voice (Medium), which shows that the subject so acts as somehow to affect himself. In our field we find, e.g., ἥδομαι 'I am pleased, ich freue mich.' Jakob Grimm was one of the first to realize the importance of the basic meaning of the middle voice:

> Bei jedem einfachen Aktivum bleibt es an sich zweifelhaft, ob der intransitive oder transitive Begriff in ihm herrsche, z. B. "ich sehe" kann beides heißen sollen: ich sehe mit meinen Augen, oder ich sehe irgend etwas an; κλαίω beides, entweder das innere Weinen selbst, oder das Beweinen eines anderen. Das Medium hebt diesen Zweifel und bezieht den Sinn notwendig auf das Subjekt des Satzes, z. B. κλαίομαι (ich weine um mich, für mich) . . . . Das wahre und eigentliche Medium ist überhaupt zur Bezeichnung dessen, was lebendig in der inneren Seele und an dem Leib vorgeht, geschaffen, daher ihm in allen Sprachen,

[174] Sanders, *Handwörterbuch . . .*, p. 221.

[175] The term *emotional radiation* (*Gefühlsausfluß*) has been suggested by R. G. Kent. I propose to distinguish four types of words in this category: (1) words expressing the utterance of joy: *jubeln, jauchzen, Jubel; jubilate, jubilation, exult, exultation;* (2) words that may or may not serve the same purpose, depending on the context: *Fröhlichkeit, Heiterkeit; cheerfulness, gaiety;* (3) words meaning 'joyful activities': *feiern, Feier, Fest(lichkeit); celebrate, festival, festivity;* (4) *Spaß, Scherz; fun, joke.* Careful examination of the uses of these and similar words for emotional radiation has not revealed any other significant differences between English and German.

nach ihrer wundervollen Einstimmung, Begriffe wie: freuen, trauern, wundern, fürchten, hoffen, weilen, ruhen, sprechen, kleiden, waschen und ähnliche zustehen.[176]

In German the function of the Indo-European *middle* has been largely taken over by reflexive verbs. Hermann Paul points out that in a sentence like "er hat sich getötet" the relation between grammatical subject and object is not different from that in "er hat ihn getötet." The conceptions of an active subject and of an object that is acted upon remain separate. In cases like "er freut sich" the two conceptions are blended, and the reflexive designates "einen an dem Subjekte sich vollziehenden Vorgang."[177] Quite frequently *to be* with the past participle in English corresponds to the type *sich freuen* in German, e.g., *to be pleased* or *delighted.* There are more examples in other fields than in that of pleasurable emotions: *to be terrified, sich entsetzen; to be ashamed, sich schämen; to be afraid, sich fürchten; to be astonished, sich wundern;* etc. All of these verbs can be used directionally as well as non-directionally, e.g., "ich freue mich an (über), . . ." or "ich freue mich (sehr, riesig)." The following occur predominantly in directional use: *sich erheitern, berauschen, entzücken, erfreuen, ergötzen, vergnügen.* On the other hand, *sich aufheitern, begeistern, amüsieren* seem to be quite common non-directionally too. The reflexive is not entirely absent in English; e.g., *amuse, disport, enjoy, entertain oneself.*

So far we have emphasized non-directional uses of the words for the pleasurable emotions, not neglecting, however, necessary comparisons with directional uses. In the following paragraphs the latter use will have to command our special attention. The basis of our classification in the first part of this chapter has been syntactical, and consequently adjectives, adverbs, nouns, and verbs have been treated in that order. To avoid unnecessary repetitions, another method will be used in the second part. Since all directional feeling is concerned with an object (*Gegenstand*) we shall have to inquire into the nature of the object and into the manner in which its relation to persons and to feelings is established in language. The objects may be 1. feelings (*Fühlen von Gefühlen*); 2. objects in general, including behavior patterns of persons: "I was delighted by his cleverness" (*response reactions*);

---

[176] *Deutsche Grammatik*, I, 598 f.
R. G. Kent thinks that Grimm was in error as to Greek use, since the examples in Latin and Sanskrit do not show such a distinction except here and there.
[177] *Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte*, p. 281.

3. mood-characters of objects (*Fühlen von gegenständlichen emotionalen Stimmungscharakteren*); 4. other persons (*altruistic or sympathetic feeling*).

The linguistic means of expressing (pleasurable) feeling of (pleasurable) feelings are quite limited in both English and German. The examples "Freude genießen" and "Schmerz dulden, leiden," etc., have been mentioned above.[178] The characteristic words for this type of directional feeling are *genießen, Genuß; enjoy, enjoyment.* E.g., "Er genoß sein Glück (or seine Freude) in vollen Zügen; he thoroughly enjoyed his happiness; Genuß der Freude; enjoyment of happiness." The sentences "I rejoice in my happiness" and "I rejoice in my children's happiness" differ in directional use; the first expresses, as it were, my pleasurable feeling (*Fühlen*) of my pleasurable feeling (*Gefühl*), the second means that my joy is *directed* to an object which happens to be the pleasurable feeling of other persons (or their happy or fortunate circumstances, depending on the situation in which the sentence is used, and by which it is given its full and unmistakably clear meaning).

Other German expressions for feeling of feeling are: "die Freude auskosten; sich seines Glücks freuen." It should be emphasized that *auskosten* can hardly be regarded as a word definitely belonging in our field; on the other hand, even outside this "pleasurable context" it seems to have a slightly pleasurable connotation, which is absent from 'to experience thoroughly' found in bilingual dictionaries as a translation of *auskosten.* (With respect to this entire group, we must bear in mind English aversion to tautology and unnecessary plethora of words.) The phrase "von Freude berauscht," already discussed in the first part of this chapter, might be referred to as an expression for feeling of feeling. Similarly we have in English "intoxicated with joy." I do not think that "zufrieden mit seinem Glück" belongs here; this could hardly be translated with 'satisfied with his happiness,' but rather with 'satisfied with his good fortune.'

Generally speaking, feeling concerned with objects outside the person, which we have to consider as the most common kind of directional feeling, might be called a reaction or a response to the influence of an object upon the person. In philosophical and psychological literature this kind of intentionality is called *Antwortsreaktion* (response reaction). Scheler instances response reactions with "sich freuen über

[178] Cf. also note 165.

etwas."[179] In the preceding paragraph we have discussed the type with *feelings as objects;* now we shall deal with *objects in general,* excepting the special cases of *mood characters of objects* and of *other persons,* which will be treated separately. In the next paragraphs the syntactical means of expressing the directional relation between person and object (*Gegenstand*) will be investigated.

In both languages the use of prepositions plays a very important part among the means of expressing directionality; they link adjectives, nouns, and verbs denoting pleasurable emotions with the objects of feeling. Thus we find in German: *froh, vergnügt, begeistert, glücklich, selig, entzückt über . . . ; Lust, Vergnügen, Genuß an . . . ; Freude sich freuen am* (Gegenwärtigen), *über* (Geschehenes), *auf* (Zukünftiges);[180] *sich begeistern, begeistert für . . . ; sich amüsieren, jauchzen, jubeln über . . . ; sich erheitern, sich begeistern, sich berauschen, sich erfreuen an . . . ; schwärmen für . . .* ; etc. Similarly in English: *glad of . . . ; happy about . . . ; pleased with . . . ; delighted with, by . . . ; amused, cheered, elated, exhilarated, thrilled,* etc., *by . . . ; joy, delight, pleasure of . . . ; rejoice, delight in . . .* ; etc. There are no differences of a general nature in the use of prepositions as expressions of directionality between English and German. Of course many different shades of meaning depend on what prepositions are used in combination with what words denoting pleasurable emotions. The absence of the combination *sich freuen auf* in English, which was discussed in the preceding chapter on "temporal reference," is one of many examples. These differences present one of the greatest difficulties to the learners of German and English. Although bilingual dictionaries as well as descriptive grammars devote considerable space to the presentation of these so-called idiomatic uses,[181] complete collections of the linguistic material have never been made and probably never will be.

All the expressions just discussed occur in sentences in which the feeling state or *act* (*das Fühlen*) is directed toward the object (*Gegenstand*). This corresponds to the type of *intentional act* which Herbert Spiegelberg calls "gegenstandsgerichteter Akt" or briefly "Erlebnis." Later we shall have to consider the opposite type, in which the linguistic

---

[179] *Der Formalismus in der Ethik . . . ,* pp. 99 ff.

[180] This distinction is made by *Der Große Duden, Stilwörterbuch.* The distinction between *an* and *über,* however, is not only temporal. Curme, *A Grammar of the German Language,* p. 385: "The difference between *an* and *über* in this respect is in general that *an* denotes, in accordance with its meaning of a close approach or contact, a closer and more intimate relation than *über.*"

[181] E.g., Curme, *A Grammar of the German Language,* paragraphs 225-232, 261.

expressions say something primarily about the "intentional-intendierte Gegenstand"; in that case, according to Spiegelberg, the object is "akt-betroffen" or "erlebnisbetroffen."[182] These two types may be illustrated by the following examples:

1. *Gegenstandsgerichteter Akt:* "Ich bin froh über diesen Fund; er hat Freude an der Natur; meine Lust am Wandern, meine Begeisterung fürs Reisen hat mich in viele Länder geführt; I am glad of this turn of events; there is no real pleasure but the pleasure (taken) in one's work, the enjoyment of one's work; he delights in going to the circus." Also German compounds: "Naturfreude, Wander-, Reiselust."

2. *Aktbetroffener Gegenstand:* "Die freudige Nachricht heiterte ihn auf; das Wandern ist eine Freude, eine Lust; dies ist ein entzückendes Kleid; this was happy news, and it cheered him up; his task is a joy to him; she is a delightful person."

The examples given for the first type may at the same time serve as illustrations of the use of prepositions as a means of expressing directionality. In this connection another type of expression should be mentioned, a type which occurs much more frequently in English than in German and is due to the fact that analysis is the living principle of the English language. Instead of using a synthetic verb like *sich freuen (über)* English preferably employs a word complex. E.g., "I find (take) no pleasure in dancing; it gives me great pleasure to see you; I have much pleasure in accepting your invitation; it is impossible to exaggerate the pleasure which he took in children or the delight which he gave them; he takes delight in writing music, in teasing everybody." Of course similar complexes are used in German too, e.g., "Vergnügen finden an . . . ," but they are not very common either in ordinary language or in good style. Exaggerations in the use of such complexes are frequent in *Journalese*—also in German—and they have often been criticized by good authors. Aronstein, who discusses "Analyse des Verbalbegriffs im Englischen" in great detail, quotes an example from Arnold Bennett:

> Mrs. Gates could not conceive how the fellow had effected an entrance. (According to the reporter, Mrs. Gates said: "effected an entrance," not "got in." And here it may be mentioned that in the columns of the Signal burglars never get into a residence, without exception they invariably "effect an entrance.")[183]

[182] *Der Begriff der Intentionalität . . .*, p. 90.

[183] *Englische Stilistik*, pp. 43 ff. Deutschbein in his *System der neuenglischen Syntax*, pp. 44 ff. discusses this and similar phenomena under the heading "Nominaler Charakter der englischen Sprache."

The object of the pleasurable emotion, when linked with the word for the pleasurable emotion by means of a preposition, can be expressed in German by nouns and substantivized infinitives. E.g., "Ich habe Freude an der Arbeit, am Arbeiten." English has other possibilities besides the use of nouns in that case. Though this fact has no direct bearing on our problem it should be mentioned for the sake of completeness. A great advantage that English has over German is the flexible use of gerunds (or verbal nouns), and so we often find examples such as "I had the great pleasure of hearing good music; he takes a delight in making him feel his helplessness; I was thrilled by having seen him again after so many years."

Both languages express the object of joy by infinitives and subordinate clauses. E.g., "Ich freue mich (darauf), ihn recht bald wiederzusehen; ich bin glücklich, daß er endlich gekommen ist; I am happy to be able to tell you this; I am very glad (that) this has happened."

In English the object of the *gegenstandsgerichtete Akt* is expressed by a grammatical direct object in the case of *to enjoy*. E.g., "I enjoy my summers in Maine; I enjoy (like) doing this."

Impersonal use of verbs of pleasurable emotion is lacking in English, but quite common in German. E.g., "Es freut mich, dass du endlich gekommen bist." In word complexes, on the other hand, we have that use in English too. E.g., "It gives me great pleasure to tell you that your friend has recovered."

In the first part of this chapter directional use of adverbial phrases has been mentioned besides their non-directional use. Such directional use may be illustrated here with the help of material provided by B. Q. Morgan.[184] Morgan experimented with different important nouns in our field by using them successively in the same sentence and then determining their meanings in the context. The inclusion of this "experiment" might be regarded as a digression; but it is a very important one because it reveals distinctions that defy all attempts at classification and constitute what might be called the individualities of words. In as far as different response reactions are expressed by single nouns it definitely belongs in this chapter. At the same time it may serve as an example of the nearly incredible amount of meaning contained in the magic instrument of human communication, the word.

She greeted her son upon his return with
joy (internal, deep, strong; the feeling is real);

[184] *Letter* dated Feb. 22, 1940.

gladness (internal, less intense; the occasion less important);
mirth (the mood which corresponds to "laughter," and which may be expressed by laughter or smiles; it need have no "joy" in it, and one can speak of "joyless mirth"; it may approach ridicule, which might be directed against the son; generally, "mirth" is the response to something funny, not to something which produces "joy");
gaiety (almost wholly descriptive of a manner of responding; "gaiety" can be put on or forced, "joy" never; in this sentence the implication would be a concealment of her true state of mind);
joyousness (the external forms which joy would call for; hence its use here would imply that real joy was lacking);
merriment (this relates to "mirth" somewhat as "joyousness" does to "joy"; practically, it would mean "laughter" in this sentence);
laughter (purely external, it says nothing about the state of mind);
anticipation (this looks forward to an expected emotion resulting from what the son does or says; the actual emotion when it comes may be negative as well as positive);
cheerfulness (similar to but less than "gaiety"; the implication would probably be that the mother's actual mood is not a happy one);
cheer (no statement as to her mood; the cheer is for him, as in "to cheer him up");
jubilation, rejoicing (both refer to her manner of receiving him; the difference from "gaiety," "joyousness," "cheerfulness," is that the son is in some way the cause of jubilation, not of gaiety);
jollity (an assumed form of external response);
(*enjoyment, joviality, happiness*: all impossible, for my feeling, in this sentence).

An additional problem within the scope of the discussion of response reactions is an examination of the means by which language expresses the *aktbetroffene Gegenstand.* Some examples have been given above. In the sentence "the experience delighted him beyond all expectation" the object is "the experience" from which a pleasurable emotion is directed, as it were, toward the person "him"; here we have what Scheler calls "eine auf das Ich zukommende Bewegung, in der mir etwas gegeben wird und 'zur Erscheinung' kommt."[185] The person need not be mentioned at all. Thus we have the types: "a delightful experience; an amusing story; the days at the beach were delightful; this book is fascinating; listening to him is a real pleasure; ein glücklicher Tag; eine hinreißende (aufheiternde) Rede; dieses Erlebnis war recht lustig; sein Wesen ist bezaubernd; ihm zuzuhören ist ein wahrer Genuß."

[185] Cf. note 167.

The pleasurable words characterizing the emotion intentionally connected with the object (*Gegenstand*) are "descriptive" adjectives, present participles, nouns meaning 'a source of pleasure,' and verbs meaning 'to cause joy.'

Other examples of adjectives used attributively are: "ein amüsantes, (fröhliches, heiteres) Erlebnis; vergnügte, (himmlische) Stunden; (glück)selige Tage; erfreuliche Ereignisse; eine ergötzliche Sache; joyful news, (occurrence, thought); a pleasant morning, (time); a cheerful face, (sound, aspect); a gay scene, (attire, color); merry songs." Most of the German adjectives can also be used predicatively: "dies Erlebnis war heiter, amüsant, lustig; das Wetter war himmlisch; diese Neuerung ist sehr erfreulich; die Geschichte ist ergötzlich; ist das nicht wonnig?" In English predicative use is not quite so frequent, e.g., "the news was cheerful; the scene is gay; the weather is very pleasant; this is delightful." "Be joyful, glad tidings" are in scriptural or solemn style.

Nouns denoting 'a source of joy' are *Freude, Gaudium, Lust, Glück, Entzücken, Genuß, Wollust, Wonne, Ergötzen, Vergnügen.* They can all be used in a sentence such as: "das ist eine Freude, ein Genuß, etc." In Goethe's *Faust* we find: "das ist des Volkes wahrer Himmel." English nouns of the same type are *delight, joy, pleasure, thrill, happiness, rapture.*

Among the German verbs meaning 'to cause joy' those with the prefix *be-* predominate: *belustigen, begeistern, berauschen, beglücken, bezaubern, beseligen, berücken.* Furthermore we find *erfreuen, ergötzen, erheitern, entzücken, aufheitern, amüsieren.* English has *amuse, buoy up, cheer (up), delight, intoxicate, thrill, enchant, exhilarate, fascinate, charm, please, gladden.* The present participles of the German verbs, except *erfreuen, ergötzen, amüsieren,* are used like descriptive adjectives predicatively as well as attributively. (Note *erfreulich, ergötzlich, amüsant!*) The same is true of the English participles *amusing, thrilling;* exceptions are *buoy up, delight.* (Note *delightful, cheerful, pleasant!*)

The phenomenon which we are about to discuss next and which we have called *mood-characters* of *objects* has caused much philosophical and psychological theorizing in recent years. Scheler calls it "das Fühlen von gegenständlichen emotionalen Stimmungscharakteren (Ruhe eines Flusses, Heiterkeit des Himmels, Trauer in einer Landschaft), in denen zwar emotionale qualitative Charaktere vorliegen, die auch als Gefühlsqualitäten gegeben sein können, aber darum doch nie und

nimmer als 'Gefühle,' d.h. ichbezüglich erlebt sind."[186] Similarly Moritz Geiger speaks of *Gefühlscharaktere* and links this phenomenon with an aesthetic problem of great significance for poetic theory. He distinguishes two opposite types of attitude of the poet which he characterizes in these words: "bei der sentimentalischen Einstellung geht das Ich auf in seiner Stimmung, bei der einfühlenden in der Stimmung des Gegenstandes."[187] The question as to how one or the other *Einstellung* is reflected in the language of poetry calls for further clarification on the basis of linguistic research that should concern itself with the poet's use of expressions for directional feeling.

It seems to me that the empathic attitude prefers linguistic expression of the *aktbetroffene Gegenstand,* and furthermore that what Scheler calls "das Fühlen von gegenständlichen emotionalen Stimmungscharakteren" is nothing but a special type of feeling directed at particular *aktbetroffene Gegenstände.* The problem may be further clarified by a quotation from Eduard Spranger:

> Im ästhetischen Beschauen finden wir nicht unser reales Ich in den betr. Gegenständen liegend, sondern wir finden nur "Seelisches überhaupt" in ihnen. Die Heiterkeit eines Rot ist nicht unsere Heiterkeit, sondern in dem spezifischen Gegenstande (z. B. dem empfundenen oder vorgestellten Rot) liegt "etwas Heiteres," und erst dies strahlt durch Mitfärbung auf unser Ich zurück. Man darf dies auch nicht vorgestellte Gefühle nennen, sondern nur spezifisch: Einfühlungsgefühle. Im ästhetischen Zustande nämlich faßt unsere Seele an den Gegenständen außer ihren begrifflich bestimmbaren Eigenschaften seelische Begleitqualitäten auf, und indem wir in diesen konkret leben, weitet sich unsere Seele über den realen Bezirk ihres Kampfes mit der Außenwelt zu einem frei schwebenden Phantasie-Ich.[188]

The whole matter has led to controversies concerning the complicated mental processes involved. The linguist need not feel called upon to participate in these controversies, since they have no bearing on the explanation of the facts of language. Syntactically the mood characters of objects are expressed in the same way as directionality in general, with reference to the *aktbetroffene Gegenstand.* No essential difference is found between English and German, and therefore a few examples may suffice to illustrate the matter. "Die Heiterkeit der Landschaft; die fröhlich plätschernden Wellen; das Feuer flackert

---

[186] *Der Formalismus in der Ethik . . .*, p. 264.
[187] *Zum Problem der Stimmungseinfühlung,* pp. 20 f., 36 f., 40.
[188] *Lebensformen . . .*, p. 100.

lustig; frohe Farben; sie kleidet sich gern in muntere Stoffe; the cheerfulness of the village; the gaily babbling brook; a cheerful room; a landscape gay with flowery meadows; a thing of beauty is a joy forever."

A special type in the category of response reactions is represented by attitudes towards other persons. We have already mentioned that apparently all languages are much richer in the field of unpleasant emotions. This is especially true in the region of altruistic or sympathetic feelings. Scheler thinks that the reason for this is to be found in the fact that *Mitleid* is much more common among men than *Mitfreude.*[189] In English we find words such as *pity, compassion, commiseration, sympathy;* in German *Mitleid, Bedauern, Teilnahme, Erbarmen.* English lacks an expression for happiness through the sharing of happiness. German has the verb *sich mitfreuen,* and even a noun *Mitfreude,* a formation by analogy to *Mitleid,* "eine schwächliche Analogiebildung" according to Scheler. "Zum Mitleiden gehört nur ein Mensch, zum Mitfreuen ein Engel," says Jean Paul!

Our fifth (and last) survey of the field of pleasurable emotions reveals the following significant facts:

Past participles used non-directionally in an adjectival sense are more numerous in English than in German. The type *ausgelassen* has not been developed in English. No definite boundary line exists in English between the adjectival and the participial uses of past participles.

Non-directional use of substantivized adjectives is characteristic of German. Although nouns are applied non-directionally in both languages, their number in ordinary speech is greater in German.

The type "happiness overwhelmed me" (*Beseelung der Gefühle*) seems to be more popular in German than in English.

Absolute (non-directional) use of verbs expressing emotional radiation is observed in very few verbs in German, in one verb (*to rejoice*) in English.

The German reflexive verb frequently corresponds to English *to be* with the past participle, though the reflexive verb of pleasurable emotion is not entirely absent in English.

In both languages feeling of feeling is expressed by almost the same linguistic means, mainly tautologies; there is, however, a greater tendency in English to avoid tautology.

Directional use of prepositions is most important in our field; English and German differ in details only.

---

[189] *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie,* p. 160.

Word complexes of the type "to take pleasure in" are more frequent in English, analysis being the living principle of the language.

In German the object of the pleasurable emotion can be expressed by substantivized infinitives, whereas English has the advantage of greater flexibility in the use of gerunds for the same purpose.

In English pleasurable feeling directed to an object (*Gegenstand*) is very conveniently expressed by *to enjoy* with a grammatical direct object.

Impersonal use of verbs of pleasurable emotion is lacking in English, but quite common in German; in English, however, we find the type "it gives me great pleasure."

Predicative use of pleasurable adjectives is less common in English.

German and English verbs meaning 'to cause joy' as well as related participles and adjectives differ in many details.

The type *Mitfreude* is not found in English.

The classification of the linguistic phenomena discussed in this chapter has been developed on the basis of phenomenological research, mainly that of Scheler. Because of inconsistencies and contradictions in the uses of the term *intentional* in general, and in Scheler's work in particular, the new terms *directional* and *non-directional* had to be introduced and defined, primarily in consideration of the facts of language. With the exception of William Stern psychologists contribute very little to the investigation of the linguistic problems dealt with in this chapter. Quite generally they overlook important semantic and syntactical facts, e.g., the significance of word complexes; moreover their terminology is not always satisfactory, and even Stern is open to criticism in this respect, e.g., in his objectionable use of *subjective* and *objective*. A clarification of these and other terms has been one of the aims of this chapter.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY

In this concluding chapter a brief review of the plan of the investigation and of the main results would seem in order.

In Chapter I the concepts "field" and de Saussure's "articulation" (Humboldt's "Gliederung") are discussed in detail. Trier's controversies with other scholars are subjected to a critical analysis, and other conceptions of the semantic field are scrutinized in order to present a complete picture of the present state of research.

De Saussure's clear distinction of "linguistique synchronique" and "linguistique diachronique" is accepted, and the reasons for making a non-historical study of living English and German in the field of pleasurable emotions are presented in detail. Trier's theory of distinct internal and external boundary lines of the field is proved to be untenable. An entirely new method of "field" research is recommended. This method is based on the nature of the linguistic material as well as on the research of psychologists and of scholars such as Scheler, Husserl, Klages, and Geiger.

The analysis of the linguistic material is carried out in Chapters II-VI, each of which presents a different aspect of the field. Consequently we never lose sight of the totality of the field.

Chapter II is concerned with *depth gradation* in line with William Stern's "personal dimension of depth" and Scheler's "Tiefenschichtung der Gefühle." Chapter III deals with emotional *intensity,* i.e., the distance from the feeling threshold. In Chapter IV the polarity *kinetic-static* is investigated. In Chapter V the discussion of *temporal reference* to future and past is linked with the closely related polarity *tension-release.* For the polarity described in Chapter VI the new linguistic terms *directional* and *non-directional* had to be coined because of the other meanings already in use for the customary terms "objective" and "subjective," and "intentional" and "non-intentional." Directional feeling is concerned with an object (Gegenstand) of feeling, non-directional feeling has no such reference. The distinction between "directional" and "causal" is emphasized, though it is not always made in language. The objects of directional feeling are grouped as (1) feel-

ings, (2) objects in general, (3) mood-characters of objects, (4) persons.

Trying to visualize in retrospect our field as a whole, we are at once aware of the fact that it is very much more complex than Trier's *Sinnbezirk*. Quite apart from the inexcusable exclusion of verbs from the field (by Trier as well as by Bechtoldt), limitation to the vocabulary proper without consideration of the significance of word complexes and of the many syntactical problems involved seems to be the most serious defect of Trier's work.[190] Further criticism of his conception of the field, discussed in the first chapter and corroborated by the results of our study, need not be repeated at this point.

Even if we disregard for a moment the fact that meanings of words are determined by context, we cannot draw a picture of the field providing a general view of the whole. Let the words be represented by small circles varying, for each word, in size and in position within the scope of each of our five methods of investigation of the field. In each of the sub-fields corresponding to these methods the small circle representing a word would be inside a large circle describing the abstraction, "field of pleasurable emotions." The small circles within a sub-field would overlap in many different ways. They need not, however, in a particular sub-field, overlap or even be tangent. They can also be partly outside the large circle, especially those in Group I of Chapter II. The general structure of the sub-fields and the arrangement of the circles in each would naturally not be the same in English as in German.

Throughout the investigation striking differences between English and German are presented, and occasional reference is made to other languages. These differences have been summarized in the final paragraphs of Chapters II to VI and therefore need not be repeated in detail. We might, however, contribute to a further clarification of the nature of these differences by classifying them tentatively as follows:

(1) The ranges of meaning of individual "synonymous" words vary considerably, no matter which of the five methods of approach happens to be applied.

---

[190] Gustav Stern, *Meaning and Change of Meaning*, makes a similar mistake (p. 8): "The meanings studied are the basic meanings of single words (cf. 4. 26). I have thus excluded relational meanings and phrase meanings. Neither of these types has as yet been more than slightly touched by research, and the material for a review of them is almost entirely lacking. I have had to confine myself to describing some of their main characteristics, and showing their relations to basic meaning."

(2) Groups of words set up within the sub-fields may differ in size and in range.[191]

(3) Certain (synthetic) concepts may be expressed by a simple word in one language; a corresponding simple word may be lacking in the other language. This "gap" in the vocabulary of the latter may be filled by

(a) compounds,

(b) word complexes,

(c) the use of relational words such as prepositions.[192]

(4) Compounds of one language (generally German) may correspond to word complexes in the other (generally English).

(5) The use of relational words in the two languages differs in many details.

(6) In certain groups the number of popular words is greater in one language (German), whereas the other language (English) is richer in words limited to use in refined speech or in literature.

(7) Differences in the syntactical structure and in word formation influence the texture of the field in the two languages; thus we find in English gerunds expressing the object of directional feeling, in German reflexive construction of simple verbs of pleasurable emotion, in English the periphrastic *to do* and the progressive form and in German double forms (tautology) for intensification; we find significant differences between the two languages in the use of participles and adjectives, and there are in German certain verbal prefixes for temporal reference and substantivized adjectives in a characteristic non-directional use.

Similarities in the field between English and German must not be overlooked. Definite groups of words have been established for both languages in Chapter II (depth gradation) and Chapter IV (kinetic

---

[191] E.g., the number of shallow words (Group II of Chapter II) is greater in English, the proportion of definitely shallow words in the same group is approximately three in English to one in German, whereas German has slightly more words with a wider depth range in that same group.

[192] An absolutely satisfactory definition of (a) and (b) seems impossible. E.g.: Is *beglückt* a compound? From the historical point of view it is, but the average educated German would regard it as a simple word. He may or may not consider *Mitfreude* a compound; I would. On the other hand, *hoffnungsfroh* is felt as a compound by everybody. Is *Lebensversicherungsgesellschaft* a compound, and *Life insurance company* a word complex merely because it happens to be written in three separate words? The relational *über,* linked with the two words *sich freuen,* constitutes a word complex, whereas *enjoy* is either a simple or a compound. Of course either of these two expressions is meaningless without being supplemented by an "object," e.g., *dieses Wetter,* this weather.

and static reference). In both languages intensity is expressed mainly by word complexes, forms of verbal aspect, intonation, and negative intensifying adverbs; pleasurable release of tension is strongly represented in both vocabularies. Both English and German express temporal reference predominantly by word complexes and forms of verbal aspect. They have a richer vocabulary in the negative field (unpleasurable emotions). I have strong reasons to believe that, with the exception of the last phenomenon, not all these similarities will be found in other (unrelated) languages.

Statements concerning relations between language and national character I have made with utmost caution, to avoid generalizations. (See especially final paragraphs of Chapters II and III.)

Generally accepted unwarranted ideas about the respective emotional value of German and English words, and likewise of the Germanic and the Romance lexical material in English have been modified. (See last paragraphs of Chapter II.)

A good deal of thought had to be given to the grammatical terminology. Although the investigation might have been simplified by the application of Kalepky's new terminology, the customary grammatical terms have been used for the convenience of the reader.

Moreover, Kalepky's *Neuaufbau der Grammatik* has never been translated into English, and there are as yet no terms in use which correspond exactly with his new German technical terms. Furthermore, Kalepky's revolutionary ideas may have to be modified in detail, and what he has said in his book cannot be considered as being final. Much more discussion and co-operative effort by scholars familiar with languages other than Indo-European will be required before Latin terminology can be discarded. Some of the less common terms used in our book are merely translations from German and French, and sometimes foreign words had to be used for the sake of clarity. It is hoped that psychological terminology, which is closely linked with that of linguistics, may profit from at least some of our clarifying definitions.

The importance of similar studies must be stressed again and again; they should be concerned with (a) other semantic fields, (b) other languages, (c) individual authors and different levels of speech (cf. notes 80 and 131), (d) genetic and historical developments on the basis of descriptive analysis of semantic fields (cf. notes 108 and 127). Investigations of type (c) necessarily imply a discussion of aesthetic problems in the field of poetic theory and style and may therefore contribute to literary research (cf. notes 173 and 187).

Gustaf Stern claims that in the study of meanings

> we have as yet no generally accepted system of fundamental principles on which further research could be based. The principles adopted by Wellander, Falk, Funke, Sperber, Hatzfeld, Weisgerber, Junker, Ipsen, to mention only a few, are irreconcilable on many points of essential importance.[198]

Realization of this general situation in our branch of research is one of the main reasons for the inclusion of Chapter I in this book. If we are aware of this situation the lack of generally accepted principles is rather an advantage than a disadvantage, unless we restrict semantic work to problems of detail in order to be on the safe side.

Although the method of approach and the principles applied in this book have been stated in general and in detail, there are two pertinent questions calling for a brief review of our standpoint in regard to psychological theory.

(1) What does this study owe to psychology? The inadequacy of the psychological theories of emotion has been emphasized sufficiently. Since psychologists have been mainly concerned with the physiological correlates of emotion, most of the books dealing with emotions proved to be without value for our purposes. This statement does not at all imply a condemnation of this type of research. Likewise I should never think of censuring, e.g., Michel Bréal for writing his excellent *Essai de sémantique,* just because I could not use it as a source of information. Nor do I share the insuperable distrust of psychological theories entertained by some linguists whose knowledge of psychology does not reach beyond that of Paul or of Wundt.

It is a fact that so far no psychologist has presented a satisfactory phenomenological analysis of emotion; such an analysis in my opinion should be based on a study of the language expressing emotional experience and behavior. Under these circumstances an eclectic procedure had to be applied and help had to be found wherever it seemed available. In the first place the linguistic material assembled over a number of years provided some starting points. In the second place the researches of Scheler and Klages, both of whom have made extensive use of the facts of language, proved helpful in developing the idea of examining from different aspects the field in its totality. Finally the psychologists William Stern and (to a lesser degree) Ruckmick offered either support for what was planned, or supplementary ideas.

[198] *Meaning and Change of Meaning,* p. 6.

Scheler's influence will be felt especially in Chapters II and VI, William Stern's in Chapter IV. Although Stern had to be criticized in some details, no arguments have been advanced against the general theory of emotion which is the basis of his work.

(2) What does this study suggest to psychologists? It is hoped that it may point the way to a phenomenological analysis of emotion. It should make a thing of the past the neglect by psychologists of a thorough study of linguistic systems created by the *Sprachgeist* of nations. As a consequence Klages' vigorous accusation[194] would become meaningless. Other details such as the need for using word complexes for more satisfactory classifications, or the need for an improved psychological terminology, have been stressed and require no further discussion.[195]

---

[194] See note 95.

[195] Cf. also the application to psychology of Weisgerber's ideas mentioned in note 24.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

General

Aronstein, Philipp. *Englische Stilistik,* 2nd ed. Berlin, 1926.

Bally, Charles. *Traité de stylistique française,* Vols. I & II. Heidelberg, 1919-1921.

Bally, Gustav. *Psychologische Phänomene im Bedeutungswandel.* Sprache und Dichtung, Forschungen zur Sprach- und Literaturwissenschaft, XXX, Bern (1924), 3-85.

Bechtoldt, Heinrich. *Der französische Wortschatz im Sinnbezirk des Verstandes. Die geistliche und lehrhafte Literatur von ihren Anfängen bis zum Ende des 12. Jahrhunderts.* Romanische Forschungen, IL, No. 1 (1935), 21-180. —Review by Hans Rheinfelder in *Literaturblatt für germanische und romanische Philologie,* LX, No. 3-4 (1939), 118-122.

(Behaghel, Otto.) *Beiträge zur germanischen Sprachwissenschaft, Festschrift für Otto Behaghel.* Heidelberg, 1924.

———. *Germanische Philologie, Ergebnisse und Aufgaben, Festschrift für Otto Behaghel.* Heidelberg, 1934.

Behaghel, Otto. "Geschriebenes Deutsch und gesprochenes Deutsch." *Von deutscher Sprache, Aufsätze, Vorträge und Plaudereien.* Lahr i. B., 1927, 11-34.

Bloomfield, Leonard. *Language.* New York, 1933.

Bock, L. *Wolfram v. Eschenbachs Bilder und Wörter für Freude und Leid.* Quellen und Forschungen zur Sprach- und Culturgeschichte der germanischen Völker, XXXIII, Strassburg, 1879.

Bolling, G. M. "Linguistics and Philology." *Language,* V[1] (1929), 27-32.

Boucke, Ewald. *Wort und Bedeutung in Goethes Sprache.* Literarhistorische Forschungen, XX, Berlin, 1901.

Bradley, Henry. *The Making of English.* London, 1916.

Carnoy, A. *La science du mot. Traité de sémantique.* Louvain, 1927.

Curme, G. O. *A Grammar of the English Language.* (*Syntax,* Vol. III.) New York, 1931.

———. *A Grammar of the German Language.* New York, 1922.

Descartes, René. *Discours de la méthode,* ed. by Eugène Durand, 2nd ed. Paris, 1901.

Deutschbein, Max. *Neuenglische Stilistik.* Leipzig, 1932.

———. *System der neuenglischen Syntax.* Leipzig, 1928.

Dornseiff, Franz. "Das Problem des Bedeutungswandels." *Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie,* LXIII (1938), 119-138.

Ehrismann, Gustav. "Psychologische Begriffsbezeichnung in Otfrids Evangelienbuch." *Behaghel Fsch.* (1924), 324-338.

Erdmann, Karl Otto. *Die Bedeutung des Wortes. Aufsätze aus dem Grenzgebiet der Sprachpsychologie und Logik,* 4th ed. Leipzig, 1925.

Fischer, Hermann. *Der intellektuale Wortschatz im Deutschen und Französischen untersucht an Gerzans und Zesens "Sofonisbe."* Neue deutsche Forschungen. Abteilung Deutsche Philologie, V, Berlin, 1938.—Review by Frederick Wagmann in *The Germanic Review,* XIV, No. 2 (1939), 139 f.

Frings, Theodor. "Sprachwissenschaft. Allgemeine Grammatik." *Zeitschrift für Deutschkunde,* XLVI (1932), 359-61.

Contains reviews; inter alia:

Saussure, F. de. *Grundfragen der Sprachwissenschaft.*

Trier, J. *Der deutsche Wortschatz im Sinnbezirk des Verstandes.*

Wartburg, W. von. *Das Ineinandergreifen von deskriptiver und historischer Sprachwissenschaft.*

Funke, Otto. *Innere Sprachform. Eine Einführung in A. Martys Sprachphilosophie.* Prager Deutsche Studien, XXXII, Reichenberg i. B., 1924.

Gabelentz, Georg von der. *Die Sprachwissenschaft, ihre Aufgaben, Methoden und bisherigen Ergebnisse,* 2nd ed. Leipzig, 1901.

Geiger, Moritz. *Zugänge zur Ästhetik.* Leipzig, 1928.

———. "Zum Problem der Stimmungseinfühlung." *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft,* VI (1911), 1-42.

Gerike, Fritz. *Das Partizipium Präsentis bei Chaucer.* Diss., Kiel, 1911.

Gray, Louis H. *Foundations of Language.* New York, 1939.

Greenough, J. B. and Kittredge, G. L. *Words and their Ways in English Speech.* New York, 1920.

Grimm, Jakob. *Deutsche Grammatik,* ed. by G. Roethe and E. Schröder. Gütersloh, 1890.

Gundolf, Friedrich. *Shakespeare und der deutsche Geist.* Berlin, 1927.

Havers, W. *Handbuch der erklärenden Syntax.* Heidelberg, 1931.

Horn, Wilhelm. *Sprachkörper und Sprachfunktion,* 2nd ed. Leipzig, 1923 (Palästra 135).

Humboldt, Wilhelm von. *Gesammelte Schriften,* ed. by Albert Leitzmann. Berlin, 1903-22. 15 vols. in 14.

Hüsgen, Hildegardis. *Das Intellektualfeld in der deutschen Arkadia und in ihrem englischen Vorbild.* Münster and Emmerich, 1935.

Husserl, Edmund. *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology,* translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson. New York, 1931.

———. *Logische Untersuchungen.* Halle a. d. Saale, 1922-28. 2 vols. in 3.

Iordan, Iorgu. "Der heutige Stand der romanischen Sprachwissenschaft." *Streitberg Fsch.,* 585-621.

Iordan, Iorgu. *An Introduction to Romance Linguistics, its Schools and Scholars,* revised, translated and in parts recast by John Orr. London, 1937.

Ipsen, Gunther. "Der Alte Orient und die Indogermanen." *Streitberg Fsch.,* 200-37.

———. "Der neue Sprachbegriff." *Zeitschrift für Deutschkunde,* XXXXVI (1932), 1-18.

———. *Sprachphilosophie der Gegenwart.* Berlin, 1930.

Irons, David. "Descartes and Modern Theories of Emotion." *The Philosophical Review,* IV (1895), 291-302.

Jespersen, Otto. *Growth and Structure of the English Language.* Leipzig and London, 1905.

———. *Language, its Nature, Development, and Origin.* New York, 1922.

———. *The Philosophy of Grammar.* New York, 1924.

———. *Tid og Tempus.* Copenhagen, 1915.

Jolles, André. "Antike Bedeutungsfelder." *Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur,* LVIII (1934), 97-109.

Kalepky, Theodor. *Neuaufbau der Grammatik.* Leipzig, 1928.

Kalicinski, Georg. *Review.*
See Dornseiff, Franz (listed among dictionaries).

Kantor, J. R. *Principles of Psychology.* New York, 1924.

Klages, Ludwig. *Ausdrucksbewegung und Gestaltungskraft, Grundlegung der Wissenschaft vom Ausdruck,* 3rd & 4th ed. Leipzig, 1923.

———. *Der Geist als Widersacher der Seele.* Leipzig, 1929.

———. *Die Grundlagen der Charakterkunde,* 5th & 6th ed. Leipzig, 1928.

Koffka, K. *Principles of Gestalt Psychology.* New York, 1935.

Korn, K. *Studien über "Freude und Trûren" bei mhd. Dichtern.* Diss., Leipzig, 1932.

Kurath, Hans. *The Semantic Sources of the Words for the Emotions in Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, and the Germanic Languages.* Diss., Chicago, 1921.

Lanson, Gustave. *Conseils sur l'art d'écrire, principes de composition et de style,* 7th ed. Paris, 1909.

Leibniz, G. W. "Unvorgreifliche Gedancken." *Wissenschaftliche Beihefte zur Zeitschrift des Allgemeinen Deutschen Sprachvereins,* IV. Reihe, Heft 30 (1908), 313-71.

Leopold, W. "Inner Form." *Language,* V (1929), 254-60.

Marty, A. *Über Wert und Methode einer beschreibenden Bedeutungslehre.* Aus A. Martys Nachlaß herausgeg. v. Otto Funke. Schriften der Deutschen Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft in Reichenberg, III, 1926.

Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. *Also sprach Zarathustra.* Leipzig, Kröner, 1910.

Pascal, Blaise. *Les Pensées.* Fragments 277, 282, 283. Paris (Hachette).

Paul, Hermann. *Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte,* 5th ed. Halle, 1937.

———. "Über die Aufgaben der wissenschaftlichen Lexikographie mit besonderer Rücksicht auf das Deutsche Wörterbuch." *Sitzungs-Berichte der bayr. Akad. phil.-hist. Klasse,* 1894, 53 ff.

Porzig, Walter. *Aischylos, die attische Tragödie.* Leipzig, 1926.

———. "Sprachform und Bedeutung." *Indogermanisches Jahrbuch,* XII (1928), 1-20.

———. "Wesenhafte Bedeutungsbeziehungen." *Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Sprache und Literatur,* LVIII (1934), 70-97.

Reuning, K. "Bemerkungen zu den Aktionsarten des Verbums und zum 'German-American Progressive.'" *Monatshefte für Deutschen Unterricht,* XXVII, No. 6 (1935), 232-36.

Rheinfelder, Hans. *Review.*
See Bechtoldt, Heinrich.

Ribot, Th. "Sur la nature du plaisir." *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger,* LXVIII (1909), 180-92.

Ries, John. *Was ist Syntax? Ein kritischer Versuch,* 2nd ed. Prague, 1927.

Ruckmick, Christian A. *The Psychology of Feeling and Emotion.* New York and London, 1936.

Ruskin, John. "Of the Pathetic Fallacy." *Modern Painters,* III. New York, 1885, Chapter 12, 152-67.

Sapir, Edward. *Language, an Introduction to the Study of Speech.* New York, 1921.

———. "The Status of Linguistics as a Science." *Language,* V (1929), 207-14.

Saussure, Ferdinand de. *Cours de linguistique générale,* 3rd ed. Paris, 1931.

Scheler, Max. *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik,* 3rd ed. Halle, 1927. (Reprint from *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung,* ed. by E. Husserl, I, II.)

———. *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie,* 3rd ed. Bonn, 1931.

Schmidt-Rohr, Georg. *Mutter Sprache. Vom Amt der Sprache bei der Volkwerdung,* 2nd ed. Jena, 1933.

Schneider, Theophora. *Der intellektuelle Wortschatz Meister Eckeharts.* Neue deutsche Forschungen. Abteilung Deutsche Philologie, I, Berlin, 1935.

(Schnitzler, Arthur.) "Gedanken über Kunst, Aus dem Nachlaß von Arthur Schnitzler." *Neue Rundschau,* Jan. 1932, 37-39.

Schopenhauer, Arthur. "Parerga und Paralipomena," Vol. II. *Sämmtliche Werke,* Reclam, V.

Schuchardt, Hugo. *Hugo Schuchardt-Brevier.* Halle, 1928.

Sechehaye, Albert. "Les mirages linguistiques." *Journal de Psychologie normale et pathologique,* XXVII (1930), 337-66.

Smuts, J. C. *Holism and Evolution.* New York, 1926.

Sperber, Hans. *Einführung in die Bedeutungslehre.* Bonn and Leipzig, 1930.

———. "Im Spiegel der Sprache." *Monatshefte für Deutschen Unterricht,* XXXI, No. 8 (1939), 394 ff., and XXXII, Nos. 1 & 2 (1940), 26 ff., 72 ff.

Spiegelberg, Herbert. "Der Begriff der Intentionalität in der Scholastik, bei Brentano und bei Husserl." *Philosophische Hefte,* V, Nos. 1-2, Prague (1936), 75-91.

Spranger, Eduard. *Lebensformen. Geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie und Ethik der Persönlichkeit,* 7th ed. Halle, 1930.

Springer, Otto. "Probleme der Bedeutungslehre." *Germanic Review,* XIII, No. 3 (1938), 159-74.

Stern, Gustaf. "Meaning and Change of Meaning." *Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift,* XXXVIII (1932: 1, Göteborg, 1931).

Stern, William. *Allgemeine Psychologie auf personalistischer Grundlage.* The Hague, 1935.

———, *General Psychology from the Personalistic Standpoint,* translated by H. D. Spoerl. New York, 1938.

Stöcklein, J. *Bedeutungswandel der Wörter.* Munich, 1898.

(Streitberg, Wilhelm.) *Stand und Aufgaben der Sprachwissenschaft, Festschrift für Wilhelm Streitberg.* Heidelberg, 1924.

Stroh, Fritz. "Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft und Sprachphilosophie." *Behaghel Fsch.* (1934), 229-58.

Trelle, Maria. *Zwei Feldgefüge im Sinnbezirk des Verstandes bei Philipp von Zesen.* Bottrop, 1935.

Trier, Jost. "Deutsche Bedeutungsforschung." *Behaghel Fsch.* (1934), 173-200.

———. "Giebel." *Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum und deutsche Literatur,* LXXVI, Nos. 1-2 (1939), 13-44.

———. "Das sprachliche Feld, eine Auseinandersetzung." *Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung,* X (1934), 428-49.

———. "Sprachliche Felder." *Zeitschrift für deutsche Bildung,* VIII (1932), 417-27.

———. *Der deutsche Wortschatz im Sinnbezirk des Verstandes. Die Geschichte eines sprachlichen Feldes. Band I, Von den Anfängen bis zum Beginn des 13. Jahrhunderts.* Heidelberg, 1931.

Urban, Wilbur M. *Language and Reality. The Philosophy of Language and the Principles of Symbolism.* London, 1939.

Voßler, Karl. "Das Verhältnis von Sprachgeschichte und Literaturgeschichte." *Logos,* II (1911), 167-78.

Wagmann, Frederick. *Review.*
See Fischer, Hermann.

Wahmann, Paul. *Der althochdeutsche Wortschatz im Bereich der Gnade, Gunst und Liebe.* Neue deutsche Forschungen. Abteilung Deutsche Philologie, IV, Berlin, 1937.

Walzel, Oskar. *Gehalt und Gestalt im Kunstwerk des Dichters.* (In *Handbuch der Literaturwissenschaft.*) Berlin, 1923.

———. *Das Wortkunstwerk, Mittel seiner Erforschung.* Leipzig, 1926.

Warren, Howard C. *Dictionary of Psychology.* Boston, 1934.

Wartburg, W. von. "Das Ineinandergreifen von deskriptiver und historischer Sprachwissenschaft." *Berichte über die Verhandlungen der Sächs. Akademie der Wissenschaften phil.-hist. Kl.,* 83, Heft 1 (1931).

Wartburg, W. von. "Grundfragen der etymologischen Forschung." *Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung,* VII (1931), 222-35.

Weise, Oskar. *Ästhetik der deutschen Sprache,* 5th ed. Leipzig, 1924.

Weisgerber, Leo. "Adjektivische und verbale Auffassung der Gesichtsempfindungen." *Wörter und Sachen,* XII (1929), 197-226.

———. "Die Bedeutungslehre—ein Irrweg der Sprachwissenschaft?" *Germanisch-romanische Monatsschrift,* XV (1927), 161-83.

———. "Neuromantik in der Sprachwissenschaft." *Ibid.,* XVIII (1930), 241-59.

———. "Das Problem der inneren Sprachform und seine Bedeutung für die deutsche Sprache." *Ibid.,* XIV (1926), 241-56.

———. "Sprachvergleichung und Psychologie." *Bericht über den 12. Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Psychologie in Hamburg vom 12.-16. April 1931.* Jena, 1932, 193-201

———. *Die Stellung der Sprache im Aufbau der Gesamtkultur,* 2 parts. Heidelberg, 1933 & 1934 (Reprint from *Wörter und Sachen,* XV, XVI).

———. *Die volkhaften Kräfte der Muttersprache.* Frankfurt a. M., 1939. (This was received after the completion of this book; it contains a discussion of the "Wortfeld," which does not add anything new to the question of linguistic fields.)

Weiss, Albert P. "Linguistics and Psychology." *Language,* I (1925), 52-57.

Weisweiler, Joseph. "Bedeutungsgeschichte, Linguistik und Philologie. Geschichte des ahd. Wortes *euua.*" *Streitberg Fsch.,* 419-62.

Wilke, Edwin. *Deutsche Wortkunde,* 5th ed. Leipzig, 1913.

Willis, R. *Benedict de Spinoza, His Life, Correspondence, and Ethics.* London, 1870.

Wölfflin, Eduard. "Frustra, Nequiquam und Synonyma." *Archiv für lateinische Lexikographie und Grammatik,* II (1885), 1-24.

Woodworth, Robert S. *Psychology,* 3rd ed. New York, 1934.

Wundt, Wilhelm. *Die Sprache,* 4th ed. Stuttgart and Leipzig, 1921 & 1922. Vols. I & II of *Völkerpsychologie.*

Dictionaries

Allen, F. Sturges. *Synonyms and Antonyms.* New York, 1921.

Bartlett, John. *Familiar Quotations,* 10th ed. by Nathan Haskell Dole. Boston, 1930.

Bergmann, Karl. *Deutsches Wörterbuch.* Leipzig, 1923.

Brockhaus' *Konversations-Lexikon,* 15th ed. Leipzig, 1928-35. 25 vols.

Brockhaus, Der Neue. *Allbuch in vier Bänden und einem Atlas.* Leipzig, 1937-38.

Crabb's *English Synonymes,* Introduction by John H. Finley. New York (Grosset and Dunlap).

Dornseiff, Franz. *Der deutsche Wortschatz nach Sachgruppen.* Berlin and Leipzig, 1934.—Review by Georg Kalicinski in *Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie,* LXII (1937), 166-71.

Duden, Der Große. *Stilwörterbuch der deutschen Sprache.* Leipzig, 1934.

Fernald, James C. *English Synonyms and Antonyms.* New York, 1914.

Fowler, H. W. *A Dictionary of Modern English Usage.* Oxford, 1927.

Funk and Wagnalls. *Desk Standard Dictionary of the English Language.* New York, 1925.

Georges, Karl Ernst. *Ausführliches lateinisch-deutsches Handwörterbuch aus den Quellen zusammengetragen,* 7th ed. Leipzig, 1879-80. 2 vols.

Götze, Alfred. *Frühneuhochdeutsches Glossar,* 2nd ed. Berlin, 1920.

Grimm, Jakob and Wilhelm. *Deutsches Wörterbuch.* Leipzig, 1854-1936. 12 vols. in 17.

Heyne, Moriz. *Deutsches Wörterbuch.* Leipzig, 1890. 3 vols.

Hoffmann, P. F. L. *Volkstümliches Wörterbuch der deutschen Synonyme,* 10th ed. by Wilhelm Oppermann. Leipzig, 1936.

———. *Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache in ihrer heutigen Ausbildung,* 10th ed. by Martin Block. Leipzig, 1936.

Horwill, H. W. *A Dictionary of Modern American Usage.* Oxford, 1935.

Kluge, Friedrich. *Etymologisches Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache,* 11th ed. by A. Götze. Berlin, 1934.

Krüger, Gustav. *Synonymik und Wortgebrauch der englischen Sprache.* Dresden, 1920.

Lipperheide, Franz von. *Spruchwörterbuch.* Leipzig, 1935.

Mawson, C. O. Sylvester. *The Roget Dictionary of Synonyms and Antonyms.* New York, 1931.

Meyer's *Lexikon,* 7th ed. Leipzig, 1924-35. 7 vols.

Muret-Sanders. *Enzyklopädisches englisch-deutsches und deutsch-englisches Wörterbuch.* Berlin, 1906. 4 vols.

Murray's *New English Dictionary* (*Oxford Dictionary*), Large Ed. Oxford, 1888-1933. 11 vols. in 13.

Paul, Hermann. *Deutsches Wörterbuch,* 4th ed. by Karl Euling. Halle, 1935.

Pekrun, Richard. *Das Deutsche Wort.* Leipzig, 1934.

Reum, Albrecht. *A Dictionary of English Style.* Leipzig, 1931.

Roget, John Lewis. *Thesaurus of English Words and Phrases,* Revised and Authorized American Edition. New York, 1937.

Sanders, Daniel. *Handwörterbuch der deutschen Sprache,* 8th ed. by J. Ernst Wülfing. Leipzig, 1924.

Sattler, W. *Deutsch-englisches Sachwörterbuch.* Leipzig, 1904.

Schlessing, A. *Deutscher Wortschatz oder der passende Ausdruck,* 4th ed. Eßlingen, 1907.

Smith, C. J. *Synonyms discriminated.* New York, 1871.

Sprach-Brockhaus, Der. *Deutsches Bildwörterbuch für jedermann.* Leipzig, 1935.

Trübners *Deutsches Wörterbuch,* ed. by Alfred Götze, Sections 1-9. Berlin and Leipzig, 1936-38.

Volks-Brockhaus, Der. *Deutsches Sach- und Sprachwörterbuch.* Leipzig, 1931.

Webster's *New International Dictionary of the English Language,* 2nd ed. (unabridged). Springfield, Mass., 1940.

Weigand, F. L. K. *Deutsches Wörterbuch,* 5th ed. by H. Hirt. Gießen, 1909. 2 vols.